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THE  LIBRARIES 


THE  ORIGIN  OF 
THE  WAR 

Facts  and  Documents 

BY 

KARL  FEDERN 

AUTHOR  OF 

"DANTE  AND  HIS  TIME,"  "HISTORY  OF  CARDINAL  MAZARIN," 

"ESSAYS  ON  AMERICAN  LITERATURE," 

ETC. 


G.  W.  DILLINGHAM  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS  NEW  YORK 


Copyright,  191s,  by 
KARL  FEDERN 

Copyright,  1915,  by 
G.  W.  DILLINGHAM  COMPANY 


The  Origin  of  the  War 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     Introductory  Words      ...*...  5 

II.     War  Preparations 8 

III.  The  Crisis.    Russia  and  the  Austro-Serv- 

ian  Question 42 

IV.  A  Digression  on  the  British  Blue  Book  105 

V.    The   Crisis.     England   and  the  Belgian 

Question 124 

App.  I.     The  German  Ultimatum 170 

"    II.    The  French  Yellow  Book      .    .    s    .    .  173 


I,    INTRODUCTORY  WORDS 

These  pages  have  not  been  written  to  gratify 
the  passions  of  nationalism  of  any  kind  or  to 
indulge  in  hatred  of  hostile  countries  and  na- 
tions. I  believe  that  if  the  peoples  of  civilized 
countries  had  correct  notions  of  each  other's  real 
disposition  and  were  not  misled  by  interested 
persons,  this  fearful  war  might  never  have  been 
precipitated.  And  I  fear  that  an  increase  of 
hatred  between  the  civilized  nations  of  the  earth! 
will  be  its  most  deplorable  result. 

I  have  lived  in  England  and  France,  and  have 

in  both  these  countries  very  real  sympathies. 

French  history  and  French  literature  have  been 

the  chief  subject  of  my  studies  and  publications 

for  many  years,  as  my  readers  know:  I  cannot: 

but  love  the  country  and  the  nation  whose  spirit 

has  attracted  me  so  far  as  to  make  me  give  my 

5 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 


chief  attention  to  its  development.  And  I  am 
deeply  indebted  to  French  scholars  for  the  kind 
assistance  given  by  them  to  my  work.  I  have 
been  a  member  of  the  Comite  for  the  Rapproche- 
ment Intellectuel  Franco- Allemand ;  and  as  for 
England,  I  wrote  articles  during  the  Boer  war 
to  defend  the  British  point  of  view,  when  I  was 
almost  alone  in  my  nation  to  do  so.  I  have  for 
a  long  time  considered  English  civilization  as 
foremost  and  the  English  constitution  as  a  model. 
I  have  constantly  been  pleading  for  an  under- 
standing between  Germany  and  France  and  Eng- 
land as  the  most  advanced  nations  of  Europe.  I 
do  not  believe  in  Lord  Palmerston's  maxim, 
"Right  or  wrong,  my  country" ;  on  the  contrary, 
I  do  believe  it  to  be  a  most  pernicious  principle. 
I  trust  I  may  be  able  to  discuss  the  present  situa- 
tion with  calmness  and  impartiality. 

From  an  international  viewpoint  I  have  at- 
tempted to  scrutinize  as  briefly  as  possible  the 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  7 

facts  which  led  to  the  war.  These  facts  cover 
a  much  larger  field  than  those  contained  in  the 
multicolored  books,  particularly  the  German 
White  Book  and  the  British  White  Papers,  the 
documents  most  generally  known, 


II.    WAR-PREPARATIONS 

On  the  very  last  day  on  which  postal  inter- 
course between  France  and  Germany  seemed  pos- 
sible, I  wrote  to  a  dear  friend  in  Paris  who  is 
now  doing  his  duty  as  an  officer  in  the  French 
army,  the  following  words: 

"These  are  days  of  horrible  suspense.  The 
attitude  of  the  Government  as  well  as  that  of 
the  public  here  in  Berlin  is  admirable,  very  quiet 
and  very  resolute;  if  it  is  to  be  war,  they  will 
fight  with  a  fury  which  will  be  the  more  terrible, 
for  the  very  reason  that  they  do  not  desire  to 
fight !  Do  not  believe  what  your  papers  tell  you ; 
1  live  here  and  I  see:  Neither  the  emperor,  nor 
the  Government,  nor  the  people  want  war;  it  is 
Russia  who  forces  them  by  threatening  Austria, 
their  ally.  And  if  the  war  is  to  be,  Germany 
will  win,  do  not  doubt  that;  but  my  heart  is  op- 

8 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 


pressed  by  the  thought  of  what  a  new  defeat  will 
mean  for  France.  France  will  pay  for  the  crime 
of  her  statesmen  who  have  made  the  shameful  al- 
liance with  Russia,  an  alliance  contradictory  to 
all  that  is  really  great  and  glorious  in  French 
history." 

I  am  still  convinced  that  in  writing  these  words 
I  have  chanced  upon  the  wound  of  which  Europe 
is  now  bleeding. 

The  league  of  England  and  France  with  Rus- 
sia, the  league  of  the  two  most  advanced,  the 
two  most  western  states  of  Europe,  with  the 
oriental  empire  whose  spirit  is  directly  opposed 
to  theirs,  is  the  most  astonishing  political  fac- 
tor in  this  war.  Surely,  powerful  political  rea- 
sons must  have  induced  Western  statesmen  to 
forget  such  an  antagonism;  considerations  of 
great  weight  must  have  covered  the  abyss  which 
separated  the  lands  of  freedom  and  democracy 
from  the  despotic  state  where  hanging,  torturing, 


io  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

and  political  exile  are  the  means  of  government. 
Was  it  a  moral  or  let  us  rather  say  a  com- 
pelling political  reason,  the  true  interest  of  their 
country,  which  moved  French  statesmen  to  con- 
clude that  famous  alliance  so  often  deplored  by 
Frenchmen  of  mark?  Or  was  it  the  old  desire 
for  "Revanche"  for  Sedan  that  made  the  Re- 
publican  Government  give  Russian  despotism 
some  twenty  billions  to  continue  its  rule  of  op- 
pression over  the  Poles,  Finlanders,  Jews,  Ru- 
thenians,  and  the  other  subjugated  races  ?  With- 
out such  assistance  the  political  freedom  of  the 
Russian  people  themselves  would  have  made 
rapid  strides.1  Was  it  all  in  the  interest  of  as- 
suring the  peace  of  Europe — for  this  was  the 
official  formula  of  the  alliance — that  in  these 
last  years  loans  were  furnished  for  the  special 

1  See  Prince  Kropotkin's  pamphlet,  "The  White  Terror,"  and 
the  speech  on  "The  Horrors  of  Russian  Prisons,"  made  by  the 
late  Frangois  de  Pressense,  on  February  13,  1913,  in  the  "Hotel 
des  Societes  Savantes"  in  Paris. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  n 

purpose  of  building  strategic  railways  on  the 
xAoistrian  border?  Was  it  all  disinterested  pa- 
triotism, when  the  French  Boulevard  Press  wrote 
on  behalf  of  Russia  and  inflamed  the  French 
mind  against  Germany,  systematically  reviving 
that  thirst  for  revenge  which  was  beginning  to 
fade  in  the  new  generation?  It  is  an  open  se- 
cret that  this  campaign  was  headed  with  par- 
ticular vigour  by  the  "Matin"  after  its  direc- 
tor's journey  to  Russia  about  two  years  ago,  and 
that  the  "Temps,"  seeing  the  growing  influence 
of  the  "Matin,"  attempted  to  vie  with  its  rival. 

England,  on  the  other  hand,  was* actuated  by 
the  desire  to  secure  the  so-called  balance  of  power 
in  Europe,  and  seeing  Germany's  rapid  growth, 
tried  and  succeeded  in  reconciling  France  after 
the  "affront"  of  Fashoda  and  in  making  the 
"Entente  Cordiale"  with  that  Power. 

France  and  England,  however,  had  been 
friends  and  allies  before.    It  was  a  much  bigger 


12  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

change  in  England's  foreign  politics  when  it  be- 
came the  friend  of  its  old  formidable  opponent 
in  Europe  and  Asia.  How  often  has  war  seemed 
imminent  between  Russia  and  England  since  the 
English  fleet  appeared  in  the  ^Egean  in  1878, 
down  to  1904,  when  England's  Japanese  ally  de- 
feated the  Russians  in  Manchuria,  and  Russian 
warships  shot  at  British  boats  in  the  North  Sea ! 

The  clever  monarch,  the  shrewd  politician  who 
caused  English  politics  to  veer  around  to  such 
an  extent  was  King  Edward  VII.  After  the. 
period  of  England's  "splendid  isolation"  he  origi- 
nated a  policy  if  not  exactly  of  alliances  yet  one 
of  "ententes"  and  succeeded  in  forming  what 
Sir  Edward  Grey  chose  to  call  "not  an  alliance 
but  a  diplomatic  group";  though  the  "Entente" 
of  this  "diplomatic  group,"  as  everybody  is  now 
able  to  ascertain,  has  proved  more  binding  and 
effective  than  other  alliances. 

Was  it  Germany  who  threatened  the  world's 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  13 

peace  and  made  this  powerful  league  necessary 
in  order  to  preserve  it  ?  It  is  true  that  since  her 
wonderful  resurrection  from  division  and  decay 
: — an  incredible  and  incomparable  resurrection 
after  the  country's  having  been  divided  in  itself 
and  powerless  for  ages,  the  toy  of  foreign  in- 
fluences, the  battle-field  of  foreign  ambitions, — 
it  is  true,  I  say,  that  since  the  reconstruction 
of  the  Empire  in  1871,  Germany  has  constantly 
risen  in  power,  commerce,  industry, — it  is  true 
that  she  has  built  a  great  fleet  and  has  gone  on 
organizing  a  great  army.  Yet  with  all  her 
power,  with  an  army  which  though  far  from 
being  the  biggest,  may  perhaps  be  considered  the 
best  of  the  world,  with  an  ever-growing  fleet, 
she  has  preserved  peace  for  full  forty-three  years, 
though  occasions  for  making  war  on  one  of  her 
neighbours  were  not  wanting. 

I  ask  any  man  who  knows  history :  Is  there  in 
the  history  of  Europe  the  case  of  a  nation  which, 


i4  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

after  three  victorious  wars,  with  an  ever-grow- 
ing population  and  an  ever  better  organized  mili- 
tary force,  did  nevertheless  keep  peace  for  full 
forty-three  years?  When  did  France  remain 
peaceful  under  such  conditions?  She  waged  war 
after  war  whenever  she  had  the  power  to  do  so. 
And  Russia  ?  And  England  ?  How  many  wars, 
conquests,  expeditions  in  all  parts  of  the  world 
in  the  same  period ! 

The  German  colonies  were  all  gained  by  ami- 
cable arrangement,  as  far  as  civilized  nations  are 
concerned,  while  those  of  other  countries  have 
been  almost  all  conquered  by  the  sword.  Even 
America  has  obtained  possession  of  the  Philip- 
pines by  conquest. 

Occasions,  as  I  said,  were  not  wanting.  If  Ger- 
many considered  Russia's  power  dangerous,  what 
an  opportunity  for  crushing  it  in  1904,  during 
the  Japanese  war,  when  England  was  bound  to 
assist  Japan!    If  she  thought  England  her  rival, 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  15 

what  an  occasion  during  the  Boer  War,  when 
England  was  hated  all  around  and  by  no  nation 
more  fiercely  than  by  the  French ! 

And  yet  there  are  men  who  dare  say  that  Ger- 
many, who  gave  such  an  example  of  peace  ful- 
ness, an  example  unparalleled  in  history,  threat- 
ened the  other  nations. 

But,  they  say,  Germany  was  a  threat  by  her 
very  existence!  And  there  is  a  hidden  truth 
in  their  saying  so;  though  this  truth  is  quite  the 
contrary  of  that  which  they  intend  to  convey. 
The  truth  is,  they  chose  to  consider  Germany's 
existence  a  threat  because  they  disliked  her  grow- 
ing power,  her  commerce,  her  riches,  her  influ- 
ence, the  successful  competition  of  her  manufac- 
tures, her  merchants,  her  ships  throughout  the 
world.  They  saw  indeed  a  threat  in  all  this. 
But  what  else  does  such  a  feeling  imply,  what 
else  the  numerous  expressions  of  dislike  and  fear, 
but  that  they  would  have  liked  to  threaten  Ger- 


16  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

many  and,  waiting  for  the  favorable  moment, 
continued  to  prepare  the  world  for  their  plans  by 
crying  out:     "See  how  Germany  threatens  us!" 

But  Germany  constantly  increased  her  army 
and  her  fleet !  you  may  say.  Has  not  Russia  al- 
ways had  an  army  greater  than  the  German 
forces?  Has  not  France  devised  an  immense 
army  of  white,  black  and  brown  men,  and  not 
civilized  blacks  and  browns,  as  known  in  the 
States,  but  from  aboriginal  savages?  Has  not 
England  constantly  increased  her  own  fleet  ?  and 
the  other  states  as  well?1 

You  may  perhaps  answer :  It  is  true,  but  they 
were  forced  to  do  so  because  of  Germany's  con- 

1  That  the  German  fleet  whose  constant  increase  was  a  special 
reproach  made  to  Germany  by  English  writers,  was  too  small, 
has  been  proved  in  the  present  war  by  its  being  unable  to  protect 
Germany's  commerce  and  her  colonies.  And  surely  it  will  be 
conceded  as  a  just  demand  that  a  nation  whose  commercial  fleet 
is  the  second  in  the  world,  has  the  right,  as  well  as  the  duty,  to 
build  a  fleet  sufficient  to  protect  it.  Germany  never  raised  the 
exorbitant  claim  that  her  navy — or  for  that,  neither  her  army — 
had  to  be  the  biggest  in  the  world  as  England  did. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  ijj 

stant  and  powerful  preparations  and  her  alli- 
ances. But,  Germany  and  Austria  and  Italy  to- 
gether— had  from  the  very  beginning  fewer  men^ 
a  smaller  army,  and  a  much  smaller  fleet  than  the 
Triple  Entente. — Besides,  the  two  Empires  could 
count  upon  Italy  only  in  some  very  particular 
cases;  and  English  statesmen  knew  this  very 

well} - 

The  forces  of  the  European  armies  in  March", 
19 1 4,  were  (according  to  Capt.  Rottmann)  : 

Number  Army  plus  number 

of  men  on  of  men  in  trained 

peace  footing  reserve 

German  Army 781,000  4,000,000 

Austro-Hungarian 414,000  *  3,720,000 

Armies  of  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary       1,195,000  7,720,000 

French  Army   900,000               4,600,000 

English  Army 258,000                  730,000 

Russian  Army   1,850,000               7,400,000 

Armies   of   the   Triple-  War- 
Entente   3,008,000  force  12,730,000 

1  Including  "Landsturm." 

*In  the  "Nineteenth  Century  and  After"  of  July,  191 1,  Sir 
William  H.  White,  late  Director  of  Naval  Construction,  in  an 
article  entitled  "The  Naval  Outlook,,,  stated  his  "belief  that  the 


18  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

This  shows  clearly  that,  in  March,  19 14,  the 
armies  of  the  Triple-Entente  on  peace-footing 
outnumbered  those  of  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  by  nearly  2,000,000;  while  the  war- 
force  of  the  Triple-Entente  outnumbered  that  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  by  no  less  than 
5,000,000!! 

The  most  striking  fact  to  be  deduced  from 
these  figures  is  that  the  peace-force  of  the  Triple- 
Entente,  the  peace- force  which  forms  the  nucleus 
of  every  standing  army  and  which  forms  the 
regular  and  most  expensive  part  of  war-prep- 
arations, was  nearly  three  times  as  big  as  that 
of  the  two  central  Powers,  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary— a  fact  which  seems  almost  suffi- 
cient to  prove  which  side  was  preparing  war 
against  the  other ! 

Italian  Navy  will  never  be  found  arrayed  against  the  British 
Navy,"  and  he  begs  it  "to  be  understood  that  although  Italy 
has  been  included  by  him  in  some  hypothetical  anti-British  com- 
binations, the  assumption  is  adopted  solely  for  statistical  pur- 
poses." 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  19 

It  is  therefore  erroneous  to  believe  that  these 
powerful  preparations  which  weighed  on  Europe, 
and  their  constant  increase,  were  due  to  German 
politics.  Still  more  erroneous  is  the  notion,  wide- 
spread though  it  be,  that  the  system  of  armed 
peace,  that  "Modern  Militarism,"  so  to  speak,  is 
a  German  invention.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  a 
purely  French  invention.  Public  opinion  is 
quickly  made  to  forget  the  origin  of  an  insti- 
tution, but  History  does  not  lose  sight  of  great 
events.  It  was  Lazare  Carnot,  member  of  the 
:"Comite  de  Salut  Public,"  who  invented  the 
:"levees  en  masses,"  the  transforming  of  the 
whole  nation  into  an  immense  army.  It  was  Na- 
poleon who  used  for  his  conquests  the  instrument 
that  the  republic  had  prepared  for  him  and  who 
threatened  the  whole  world  by  militarising  the 
French  nation  to  the  youngest  boy  who  was  able 
to  carry  arms.  Remembering  past  danger,  and 
desirous  of  preventing  its  return,  Prussia — and 


ao  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

after  the  foundation  of  the  Empire,  Germany — 
adopted  and  perfected  the  French  system. 

Germany  had  every  reason  to  adopt  this  sys- 
tem. The  reader  is  requested  to  give  one  short 
look  at  the  map.  He  will  see  Germany  in  her 
central  situation,  with  an  open  border  on  every 
side,  without  any  natural  defences,  any  natural 
if  rontier — with  the  sole  exception  of  the  Austrian 
border, — with  a  widely  stretched  coast  open  to 
any  aggression,  particularly  if  England  were  to 
be  among  her  enemies.  The  German  borderline 
is  long,  flat,  absolutely  open  towards  Russia. 
The  Vosges  mountains  which  form  the  French 
border,  are  of  easy  access  from  the  French  side. 
Steep  and  ragged  towards  Germany,  they  form 
a  kind  of  bulwark  only  for  France.  They  are, 
as  they  have  proved  in  the  present  war,  a  con- 
venient door  for  inroads  into  Germany. 

A  single  look  at  the  map  is  sufficient  to  show 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  21 

that  Germany,  unless  surrounded  by  friends  and 
allies,  had  to  maintain  an  efficient  army,  if  she 
intended  to  continue  her  existence  unimpaired. 
She  had  a  friend,  an  ally  in  the  south  only.  In 
the  east,  along  an  unprotected  borderline  of  about 
a  thousand  miles  in  length,  her  neighbour  was 
immense  Russia,  with  almost  double  the  number 
of  inhabitants,  with  an  army  of  many  millions  of 
men.  Nicolas  I — the  great-grandfather  of  the 
present  Czar — said  as  early  as  1849  to  the  French 
General  Lamoriciere :  "If,  against  my  wish  and 
yours,  Germany  should  succeed  in  becoming  a 
unified  state,  she  will,  in  order  to  enjoy  her  re- 
gained union,  need  a  man  able  to  do  what  Na- 
poleon himself  could  not  accomplish.  And  if 
such  a  man  should  be  born,  if  the  armed  mass 
should  become  dangerous,  it  will  be  incumbent  on 
us,  on  France  and  Russia,  to  subdue  her !"  *    That 


1  Letter  of  General  Lamoriciere  to  Alexis  de  Tocqueville,  pub- 
lished in  Tocqueville's  "Souvenirs,"  Paris,  1893,  p.  383. 


22  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

was  the  feeling  and  the  program  in  Russia  in 
1849.  Nicolas  II,  the  present  Czar,  concluded 
the  Treaty  of  Alliance  with  France  which  was 
to  realize  this  program.  In  addition,  Russia  was 
the  rival  and  irreconcilable  enemy  of  Austria, 
Germany's  only  reliable  friend, — but  more  of  this 
later. 

That  France  was  Germany's  enemy,  that  she 
would  have  gladly  profited  by  any  occasion  to 
humiliate  her  may  be  called  a  truism.  I  do  not 
believe  there  is  a  Frenchman  who  will  deny  that 
France's  alliance  with  Russia  was  prompted  by 
a  desire  to  regain  her  two  much  loved  provinces. 
Whether  or  not  this  desire  was  justifiable  from 
the  French  standpoint,  it  was  certainly  a  seri- 
ous menace  to  the  peace  of  the  German  people. 

And  if  in  English  politics  such  a  change  took 
place  as  to  make  friends  not  only  with  France 
after  having  stood  at  the  brink  of  war  with  her, 
but  even  with  Russia,  her  arch  enemy  of  old, — 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  23 

there  is  but  one  Power  against  which  her  policy 
could  be  directed.  There  never  existed  any  doubt 
about  this  in  the  world. 

During  all  this  time  the  German  Empire  had 
not  changed  its  political  attitude  toward  one  of 
the  three  Powers.  As  to  Russia,  an  old  friend- 
ship united  the  two  dynasties.  Germany  gave  a 
signal  proof  of  it  in  1904.  There  was  even  too 
much  of  friendship  for  Russia,  many  people  felt. 

Germany  never  had  had  a  quarrel  with  Eng- 
land, never  even  the  thought  of  a  quarrel  with 
her.  The  Imperial  Government  remained  firm 
even  during  the  Boer  War,  when  popular  feel- 
ing in  Germany — as  indeed  all  over  Europe — 
seemed  to  demand  an  intervention,  less  out  of 
animosity  toward  England  than  out  of  sympathy 
for  the  two  Dutch  republics.  As  late  as  August 
6,  1914,  Mr.  Asquith  stated  in  his  speech  in  Par- 
liament that  "for  many  years  and  indeed  genera- 
tions past  Germany  had  been  a  friendly  Power." 


24  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

The  danger  that  Germany  might  ever  make  an 
aggressive  war  on  England  was  altogether  chi- 
merical. The  fact  that  Germany  accepted  the 
British  proposal  of  keeping  the  respective  num- 
bers of  battleships  at  the  ratio  of  16:  10  is  proof 
of  Germany's  attitude. 

There  had  been  times  of  tension  between  Ger- 
many and  France,  particularly  concerning  Mo- 
rocco, where  both  Powers  had  great  commercial 
interests.  But  the  difficulties  had  been  adjusted, 
certainly  not  to  the  disadvantage  of  France. 
Moreover,  it  is  a  known  fact  that  Germany — 
foreseeing  great  danger  from  other  parts — ar- 
dently wished  to  reconcile  France.  There  is  a 
most  interesting  letter  from  Sir  E.  Goschen,  Brit- 
ish Ambassador  in  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
— published  in  the  English  Blue  Book  (on  page 
78,  No.  159).  While  relating  his  last  decisive 
interview  with  the  German  Foreign  Secretary  on 
August  4,  in  which  he  stated  for  the  second  time 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  25 

that  "unless  Germany  could  give  the  assurance 
that  they  would  stop  their  advance  in  Belgium 
he  should  have  to  demand  his  passports,"  the 
Ambassador  states:  "In  a  short  conversation 
which  ensued  Herr  von  Jagow  expressed  his 
poignant  regret  at  the  crumbling  of  his  entire 
policy  and  that  of  the  Chancellor,  which  had  been 
to  make  friends  with  Great  Britain,  and  then, 
through  Great  Britain  to  get  closer  to  France." 
After  this  Sir  E.  Goschen  went  to  see  the  Chan- 
cellor, whom  he  found  "very  agitated" ;  and  who 
said:  "that  Great  Britain  was  going  to  make  war 
on  a  kindred  nation  who  desired  nothing  better 
than  to  be  friends  with  her.  All  his  efforts  in 
that  direction  had  been  rendered  useless  by  this 
last  terrible  step,  and  the  policy  to  which,  as  I 
knew,  he  had  devoted  himself  since  his  acces- 
sion to  office,  had  tumbled  down  like  a  house  of 
cards."  Now  these  are  statements,  which  states- 
men in  office  would  not  make,  unless  "very  agi- 


26  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

tated."  But  the  change  in  British  politics  from 
diplomatic  into  warlike  moves  was  overwhelming. 
Germany  had  never  taken  one  aggressive  step 
against  England,  had  in  fact  since  the  time  of 
the  Berlin  Congress  taken  many  in  her  favor. 
She  was  satisfied  to  "have  her  place  in  the  sun," 
satisfied  to  see  her  own  growing  industry  and 
commerce,  to  develop  her  social  legislation,  to 
develop  the  tendencies  of  art,  music,  science,  and 
invention,  inborn  in  the  nation. 

In  this  development  England  scented  danger: 
to  her  own  prosperity,  but  instead  of  rejuve- 
nating the  inner  structure  of  her  Empire  on  the 
basis  of  good  old  English  ideals,  she  chose  the 
easier  way  of  forming  diplomatic  alliances  with 
Russia,  France,  Japan,  and  Portugal.  The  result 
of  this  war  and  the  development  of  the  next 
generation  will  show  whether  a  strengthening  of 
England  by  these  auxiliaries  which  lay  outside 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  27 

of  the  Kingdom,  was  as  sound  as  the  consolida- 
tion of  the  inner  forces  of  its  rival. 

Germany,  ever  rising  during  peace,  had  no  rea- 
son to  risk,  by  a  dangerous  war,  the  great  re- 
sults she  had  attained. 

According  to  this  view,  they  arranged  the  bias 
of  their  politics  and  made  their  preparations.  Of 
the  nations  that  encircled  Germany  by  the  most 
powerful  league  the  world  has  ever  seen,  it  was 
England's  task  to  increase  the  sphere  of  diplo- 
matic influence,  which  she  succeeded  in  doing  by 
attaching  Japan  and  Portugal. 

France  organized  her  "force  noire"  1  Russia  in 
1912  created  the  "Balkan-League."  This  league 
would  have  added  another  million  of  warriors 
to  the  army  which  the  powers  of  the  Triple- 
Entente  could  have  opposed  to  Germany  and 

1  A  book  was  published  in  France  in  1908  by  an  officer,  Lt-Col 
Mangin,  in  which  the  author  divulges  that,  by  realizing  her 
plans,  France  would  soon  be  able  to  hurl  100,000  Arabs  and 
40,000  black  men  into  the  first  battle  which  would  take  place  at 


28  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Austria,  had  things  but  gone  as  was  hoped  for. 
One  could  scarcely  attribute  it  to  an  excess  of 
caution  when,  seeing  this  tremendous  array  and 
increase  of  forces  around  her,  the  German  Gov- 
ernment demanded  sums  for  the  necessary  in- 
crease of  her  own  defence  in  the  form  of  the 
"Wehrbeitrag,"  and  at  the  same  time  induced 
Austria  to  hasten  the  completion  of  her  much 
neglected  preparations.  Yet  such  was  the  ef- 
fect of  a  clever  agitation  and  of  long  repeated 
assertions  that  all  Europe  was  made  to  see  in 
this  a  confirmation  of  Germany's  threatening 
attitude  toward  her  neighbours,  and  even  clever 
men  credited  the  legend  that  France  was  forced 
to  introduce  the  very  unpopular  law  of  the  Three 
Years'  Service  as  a  measure  against  the  results 

the  end  of  the  third  week  after  the  declaration  of  war.  The 
author  is  fully  confident — as  early  as  in  1908 — that  the  "Allies'* 
of  France  would  hold  the  Atlantic  open  for  the  transportation 
of  that  force.  The  reader  may  judge  how  carefully  the  Anglo- 
French  plans  have  been  prepared,  how  exactly  they  have  been 
carried  out! 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  29 

of  the  German  Wehrbeitrag}  I  confess  that  I 
would  have  believed  it  myself  had  I  not  happened 
to  be  in  France  at  the  time,  where  a  well-known 
politician  told  me  that  the  French  bill  had  been 
prepared  by  the  war-office  two  months  before  any- 
body had  had  the  least  notice  of  the  German  plan. 
It  is  only  to  avoid  giving  annoyance  that  I  am 
silent  about  his  name. 

Finally,  in  the  year  191 3,  the  French  Ambas- 
sador in  Petersburg,  M.  Delcasse,  arranged  with 
the  Russian  Government  for  a  further  loan  of 
2J/2  milliards  of  francs,  which  sum  France  was 
to  furnish  to  Russia  in  five  annual  rates  for  the 
chief  purpose  of  the  construction  of  strategic 
railways  on  the  German  and  Austrian  borders. 
The  purpose  was  openly  avowed;  the  proposed 
lines  were  mentioned  with  every  necessary  de- 

1  Compare  the  passage  concerning  that  law  in  the  Note  of 
M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  of  March  17, 
1913  (French  Yellow  Book  No.  1). 


3o  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

tail  in  the  treaty  presented  to  the  French  Cham- 
ber, as  well  as  in  the  bill  which  was  brought 
before  the  Duma;  the  whole  matter  was  dis- 
cussed for  weeks  in  French  papers  and  reviews 
of  all  kinds,  but  being  adopted  by  Russia  and 
France  against  Germany,  it  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  considered  a  threatening  step.  Quite 
to  the  contrary,  it  was  all  done  in  the  interest  of 
peace. 

These  were  public  transactions;  others  which 
might  seem  almost  still  more  important  were 
secret,  though  they  did  not  remain  so  to  the  Ger- 
man Government.  In  November,  191 2,  the  Brit- 
ish Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  and  the  French  Ambassador  in  London, 
M.  Paul  Cambon,  exchanged  letters  of  almost 
literally  the  same  tenor,  which  ran  thus : 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  31 

Foreign  Office,  Nov.  22,  19 12. 
My  dear  Ambassador, 

From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French 
and  British  naval  and  military  experts  have  con- 
sulted together.  It  has  always  been  understood 
that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  free- 
dom of  either  Government  to  decide  at  any  fu- 
ture time  whether  or  not  to  assist  the  other  by 
armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that  consulta- 
tion between  experts  is  not,  and  ought  not  to  be 
regarded  as,  an  engagement  that  commits  either 
Government  to  action  in  a  contingency  that  has 
not  arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The  disposi- 
tion, for  instance,  of  the  French  and  British 
fleets  respectively  at  the  present  moment  is  not 
based  upon  an  engagement  to  co-operate  in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either 
Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an  un- 
provoked attack  by  a  third  power,  it  might  be- 
come essential  to  knowT  whether  it  could  in  that 
event  depend  upon  the  armed  assistance  of  the 
other. 

I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave 
reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third 
power,  or  something  that  threatened  the  general 


32  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

peace,  it  should  immediately  discuss  with  the 
other  whether  both  Governments  should  act  to- 
gether to  prevent  aggression  and  to  preserve 
peace,  and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be 
prepared  to  take  in  common.  If  these  measures 
involved  action,  the  plans  of  the  General  Staffs 
would  at  once  be  taken  into  consideration,  and 
the  Government  would  then  decide  what  effect 
should  be  given  to  them. 

Yours, 

E.  Gr£y. 

These  important  documents  were  not  published 
until  September,  19 14,  but  they  had  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  German  Government  as  early 
as  in  March,  191 3.  Formally  they  were  not  to 
"restrict  the  freedom  of  either  Government  to 
decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to  assist 
the  other  by  armed  force."  In  the  English  letter 
it  is  even  carefully  stated  that  the  "contingency 
has  not  arisen  and  may  never  arise";  the  omis- 
sion of  the  same  words  in  the  French  Ambas- 
sador's letter  is  rather  remarkable.     But  to  be- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  33 

lieve  that,  because  of  these  restrictions,  the 
exchange  of  the  two  letters  was  a  mere  act  of 
international  courtesy  would  be  a  glaring  ab- 
surdity. Ministers  of  Great  Powers  do  not  write 
such  letters  or  arrange  consultations  of  military 
and  naval  experts  without  most  seriously  con- 
sidering and  desiring  a  future  co-operation  in 
war.  They  could  not  express  their  common  re- 
solve in  a  more  binding  form  without  disclosing 
their  plans  to  the  eyes  of  all  the  world.  A  formal 
treaty  would  have  required  the  sanction  of  the 
English  Parliament;  the  debate  would  have 
proven  to  all  the  world  who  was  really  prepar- 
ing for  war  and  endangering  the  peace  of  Eu- 
rope. Moreover,  it  was  to  be  feared  that  the 
majority  of  the  English  Parliament  would  refuse 
to  sanction  the  proceeding  of  the  Government. 
It  was  Sir  Edward  Grey's  business  to  prepare 
English  public  opinion  for  the  "contingency  that 
might  never  arise/'  and  still  more  to  convince 


34  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

the  Parliament  of  the  necessity  of  co-operation 
with  France  when  the  contingency  had  come. 
He  could  therefore  not  go  further  than  he  did. 
He  remained  cautious  to  the  last.  He  wrote  to 
the  British  Ambassador  in  Paris,  Sir  F.  Bertie, 
on  July  31,  19 14,  when  the  danger  of  a  general 
conflagration  was  imminent:  "I  have  told  the 
French  Ambassador  that  we  should  not  be  jus- 
tified in  giving  a  definite  pledge  to  intervene  in 
a  war  at  the  present  moment  but  that  we  will 
certainly  consider  the  situation  again  directly 
there  is  a  new  development."  (Brit.  Blue  Book 
No.  116;  French  Yellow  Book  No.  no.)  An 
English  statesman  is  a  very  responsible  person, 
the  Commons  and  Public  Opinion  are  his  mas- 
ters, and  he  has  to  manage  them  carefully  in 
order  to  make  them  do  his  will.  The  "new  de- 
velopment" could  not  fail  to  arrive. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  as  far  as 
England  and  France  were  concerned.    Negotia- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  35 

tions  for  bringing  about  a  similar  agreement  for 
future  military,  and  more  particularly  naval,  co- 
operation between  England  and  Russia,  began  in 
the  spring  of  1914,  at  the  occasion  of  King 
George's  visit  to  Paris.  It  seems  that  the  idea 
was  M.  Iswolskij's.  It  was  warmly  recommended 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  the  English  Cabinet.  On 
May  2.6,  a  conference,  presided  over  by  the  chief 
of  the  Russian  Navy  Staff,  took  place  in  St.  Pe- 
tersburg. This  conference  came  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  a  naval  agreement  was  highly  desir- 
able and  that  an  understanding  should  be  ef- 
fected between  the  two  navies  concerning  sig- 
nals, ciphers,  and  wireless  telegraphy;  that  both 
staffs  should  communicate  on  all  questions  of 
interest,  and  that  strategic  co-operation  in  the 
case  of  war  should  be  prepared.  Operations  of 
the  Russian  fleet  in  the  Bosporus,  in  the  Darda- 
nelles, and  in  the  Mediterranean  should  be  dis- 
cussed.    But  the  most  interesting  part  of  the 


36  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

plan  outlined  is  the  following:  England  should 
force  as  many  German  ships  as  possible  to  re- 
main in  the  North-Sea,  and  to  facilitate  a  Rus- 
sian invasion  of  the  German  coast,  the  English 
Government  should  send  as  many  transport-ships 
as  possible  to  Russian  ports  before  the  begin- 
ning of  maritime  operations,  that  is  to  say  in 
time  of  peace. 

If  Sir  Edward  Grey's  policy  was  not  hostile 
to  Germany  and  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  Eu- 
rope, what  policy  may  be  called  hostile  and  a 
menace  to  peace?  And  if  this  was  not  prepar- 
ing war  against  Germany,  what  is  preparing  war 
against  a  country  ? 

It  is  an  extraordinary  institution  which  per- 
mits a  statesman  to  conclude  most  important 
and  even  fatal  "agreements"  with  foreign  Powers 
and  yet  enables  him  to  say  in  Parliament  again 
and  again  and  even  as  late  as  on  the  third  of 
August,  1914:    "I  have  assured  the  House  that 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  27 

if  any  crisis  such  as  this  arose  the  House  of  Com- 
mons should  be  free  to  decide  what  the  British 
attitude  should  be;  that  there  was  no  secret  en- 
gagement which  the  Government  could  spring 
upon  the  House  and  tell  the  House  that,  because 
they  had  entered  into  that  engagement,  there  was 
an  obligation  of  honour  upon  the  country !" 

No,  indeed,  it  was  not  a  question  of  honour, 
it  was  all  a  matter  of  sagacious  management! 

It  was  this  mode  of  procedure  which  caused 
Mr.  Ramsay  Macdonald  to  write  in  the  "Labour 
Leader":  "During  the  last  eight  years  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  has  been  a  menace  to  the  peace  of 
Europe  and  his  policy  disastrous  to  England!" 
while  a  liberal  member  of  the  British  Parliament, 
Mr.  Ponsonby,  wrote  in  the  "Nation"  that  "he 
could  find  Sir  Edward  Grey's  agreements  neither 
right  nor  reasonable." 

Sir  Edward  Grey  as  a  constitutional  minister 
had  to  employ  great  diplomacy  in  his  choice  of 


38  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

words.  Mr.  Sazonof  as  a  Russian  minister  had 
an  easier  task.  When  asked  by  a  German  states- 
man about  the  naval  agreement — for  this  time 
every  stage  of  the  negotiations  had  immediately 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment, and  thanks  to  French  indiscretion  even  the 
press  had  got  hints  of  it — when  thus  questioned, 
Mr.  Sazonof  bluntly  answered  that  "such  an 
agreement  only  existed  in  the  moon  and  in  the 
imagination  of  the  'Berliner  Tageblatt!  " 

Contrast  with  these  utterances  the  well-remem- 
bered speech  made  by  the  German  Emperor  in 
the  London  Guildhall;  and  later  in  Bremen  on 
March  22,  1905 :  "History  has  taught  me  never 
to  aspire  to  the  hollow  ideal  of  a  Universal  Mon- 
archy. I  have  sworn  to  myself  that  this  thought 
shall  never  enter  my  soul.  What  has  become  of 
all  the  large  empires  which  were  extended  over 
a  great  part  of  the  world?  Alexander  the  Great, 
Napoleon,   all   the   great  warriors   weltered   in 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  39 

blood  and  at  their  death  left  conquered  nations 
which  arose  at  the  first  occasion.  And  the  Em- 
pires soon  crumbled  to  pieces.  The  world-wide 
Empire  of  which  I  dream  will  come  into  existence 
when  the  new  German  Empire  will  be  recognized 
as  a  quiet,  honest,  and  peaceful  neighbour,  when 
it  will  enjoy  the  fullest  confidence  from  every 
side;  and  if  History  should  ever  record  a  Ger- 
man Universal  Monarchy,  a  world-wide  rule 
of  the  Hohenzollern,  such  rule  and  such  Mon- 
archy shall  not  be  founded  on  conquests  won  by 
the  sword  but  on  the  mutual  confidence  of  na- 
tions striving  for  the  same  ends.  To  express  it 
in  the  words  of  the  great  poet  I  wish  it  to  be 
"Limited  in  its  boundaries,  boundless  inwardly !" 
That  the  monarch,  who  has  now  been  so  un- 
justly abused  by  a  hostile  press,  was  sincere, 
that  he  really  gave  expression  to  his  inmost 
thought,  is  proven  by  the  fact  that  he  has  kept 
his  word  and  stuck  to  his  resolution  for   full 


4o  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

twenty-six  years,  in  spite  of  various  occasions 
which  might  have  well  drawn  him  into  war.  In 
doing  so  he  has  only  acted  in  accordance  with 
the  spirit  c  the  nation.  Everybody  who  knows 
the  German  nation  knows  how  essentially  peace- 
ful it  is  by  nature.  Perhaps,  for  the  very  rea- 
son that  it  is  so  slow  to  be  stirred,  it  is  so  terrible 
in  war,  when  once  aroused.  If  any  one  thing 
above  all  others  has  obtained  for  the  Emperor 
the  love  of  his  subjects,  the  esteem  and  well- 
meaning  even  of  radicals  and  socialists,  it  is  the 
fact  that  he  has  kept  peace  for  so  long  a  period. 
Compared  with  such  fundamentals,  the  war  cries 
of  the  jingoes,  or  clever  and  enthusiastic  books 
on  war,  written  by  generals  out  of  service,  prove 
nothing.  In  the  Parliament  there  was  absolutely 
no  war-party  at  all,  and  in  the  Nation  the  party 
that  advocated  war  was  small  to  insignificance. 
It  is  curious  to  observe  the  contrast  between 
William  II  and  Napoleon  III,  who  when  he  be- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  41 

came  Emperor  of  France  in  1852  pronounced  the 
famous  words:  "L' Empire  c'est  la  paix!"  and 
who,  only  two  years  later,  undertook  the  Crimean 
War  (1854),  made  war  on  Austria  in  1859,  un- 
dertook the  expedition  to  Mexico  in  1862,  the 
Italian  expedition  in  1867,  and  the  war  against 
Germany  in  1870 — all  of  this  in  the  short  eigh- 
teen years  of  his  reign. 


III.    THE  CRISIS 

RUSSIA    AND    THE    AUSTRO-SERVIAN 
QUESTION 

When  the  diplomatic  group  which  formed  the 
Triple-Entente  prepared  for  the  war,  they  pre- 
pared for  a  war  on  their  own  terms,  that  is  to 
say,  when  the  Russian  fleet  would  be  recon- 
structed, the  Russian  railway  completed,  the 
French  army  perfected  and  increased  by  the 
Three  Years'  Service,  the  unity  among  the  Bal- 
kan Slavs  restored,  and  Turkey — which  might 
be  expected  to  side  with  Germany — reduced  to 
utter  prostration  and  helplessness. 

But  suddenly  the  Servian  question  projected 
itself  as  an  appalling  crisis. 

It  is  impossible,  nor  would  it  be  of  importance 
to   speak  here  at  any  length  of   the   constant 

troubles  in  the  Balkans  which  so  often  have  kept 

42 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  43 

Europe  in  tension  and  in  fear  of  imminent  war. 
Of  the  four  Christian  nations  which  live  in  the 
Peninsula  the  Servians  and  the  Roumanians  are 
Austria's  neighbours.  But  the  relations  between 
Austria  and  Servia  are  much  older  and  have  al- 
ways been  incomparably  more  intimate  than  those 
between  Austria  and  Roumania.  The  border- 
line between  Austria  and  the  two  Servian  coun- 
tries, Servia  and  Montenegro,  is  more  than  four 
hundred  miles  in  length.  In  the  Middle  Ages 
the  Servians  had  repeatedly  been  rescued  from 
the  Turks  by  Hungarian  armies.  When  they 
were  finally  subjugated,  in  the  fifteenth  century, 
a  great  part  of  them  fled  to  Hungary  and  settled 
there  for  good,  in  the  two  provinces  called  Bacska 
and  Banat.  In  later  times  those  who  had  passed 
under  the  Mussulman  yoke  were  again  freed  by 
the  Austrians  under  Prince  Eugene.  In  the  eigh- 
teenth century  Servia  had  long  been  an  Aus- 
trian province.     And  when  reconquered  by  the 


44  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Turks,  the  Servians  repeatedly  rose  up  and 
wanted  to  return  to  Austrian  rule,  although  the 
Imperial  Government  was,  in  those  times, 
scarcely  less  despotic.  The  same  desire  was  ex- 
pressed by  them  more  than  once  during  the  nine- 
teenth century.  It  was  not  until  then  that  the 
rival  influence  of  Russia  began  to  make  itself 
felt.  Since  that  time  the  Servians  were  assisted 
now  by  the  one  and  now  by  the  other  power  and 
finally  the  inhabitants  of  the  present  kingdom 
recovered  their  full  independence,  in  1878,  by 
fighting  successfully  against  the  Turks  after  the 
latter  had  been  defeated  by  the  Russians  and  the 
Roumanians  at  Plevna.  The  control  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  was  allotted  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary in  the  same  year  at  the  Berlin  Congress, 
remaining  nominally  under  Turkish  suzerainty 
from  which  it  had  in  reality  been  freed. 

In  the  new  kingdom  of  Servia  Austrian  influ- 
ence was  soon  again  predominant  and  remained 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  45 

so  for  many  years.  When  in  1885  the  Bulgarians 
defeated  the  Servian  army  at  Slivnitza,  Austria 
saved  Servia  by  the  threat  of  an  armed  inter- 
vention in  her  behalf.  There  was,  however,  a 
Russophile  as  well  as  an  Austrophile  party  in 
Servia. 

Russian  agents,  certainly  not  for  love  of  their 
"Servian  brethren"  but  rather  from  political  op- 
position to  Austria — incited  the  Nationalist 
party  in  Servia  to  strive  toward  uniting  under 
the  same  rule  the  whole  territory  inhabited  by 
their  race.  For,  only  about  3,000,000  Serbo- 
Croatians,  as  the  race  is  called,  live  in  the  King- 
dom of  Servia,  while  no  less  than  5,000,000  live 
in  Austria,  Hungary,  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
That  the  Servians  of  Servia  should  wish  to  re- 
conquer this  whole  big  territory  and  in  this  way 
become  the  most  powerful  state  in  the  Peninsula 
may  perhaps  be  considered  quite  natural.  But 
certainly  it  is  quite  as  natural  and  even  much 


46  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

more  natural  that  Austria  should  regard  such 
aspiration  with  disquietude  and  should  refuse 
to  part  with  five  millions  of  her  people,  most  of 
whom  have  lived  under  her  rule  for  centuries 
and  only  a  very  small  number  of  whom  after 
much  secret  agitation  and  more  or  less  secret 
bribery,  would  willingly  go  from  her  and  be  in- 
corporated in  the  kingdom  of  "Greater  Servia." 
There  is  another  point  of  view  from  which  the 
question  is  to  be  regarded  and  which  is  never 
kept  in  mind  by  foreign  writers — the  matter  of 
religion,  so  much  more  powerful  in  those  parts 
than  race  or  nationality  can  ever  become.  The 
3,000,000  Servians  of  Servia  are  almost  all  Or- 
thodox1; while  of  the  3,500,000  Servians  who 
live  in  Austria  and  Hungary  2  J4  millions  are  Ro- 
man Catholics  (it  is  they  who  call  themselves 
Croatians)  and  of  the  1,500,000  Servians  in  Bos- 

1  That  is  to  say,  members  of  the  Greek  Church.  They  are 
3,000,000  or  more  since  the  aggrandizement  of  the  Kingdom  in 
1912. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  47 

nia  and  Herzegovina  almost  two-thirds  are 
either  Catholic  or  Mahometan.  Now  both  Ma- 
hometans and  Catholics  look  on  the  Orthodox 
Servians  with  abhorrence.  They  would  as  soon 
think  of  going  to  perdition  as  of  becoming  the 
countrymen  of  the  "Servians" ;  they  have  proven 
their  feelings  by  their  fury  in  the  present  war. 
The  Catholic  Servians,  the  Croatians,  have  al- 
ways been  the  staunchest  adherents  and  most 
faithful  subjects  of  the  Austrian  Dynasty.  The 
oldest  Infantry  Regiment  in  the  Austrian  Army, 
the  53d  Warasdin  Regiment,  is  a  Croatian  regi- 
ment, and  none  has  fought  so  brilliantly  in  Servia 
in  the  present  war  as  this  particular  regiment. 
Administration  is  certainly  much  better  in  the 
Austrian  parts  than  in  the  Kingdom.  Commerce, 
agriculture,  industry  are  flourishing  in  quite  an- 
other way  in  Croatia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
than  in  Servia;  justice,  public  security  and  of- 


48  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

ficial  integrity  are  to  be  found  there  in  a  degree 
unknown  in  Servia. 

Let  us  compare  the  results  attained  in  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  which  have  now  been  under 
Austro-Hungarian  control  for  36  years  with  the 
corresponding  achievements  in  the  Kingdom,  the 
foundation  of  which  coincides  with  that  of  the 
provinces.  We  shall  find  that  under  an  able  gov- 
ernment the  progress  of  Bosnia  has  been  such  as 
could  never  have  been  attained  in  the  Kingdom. 
Though  the  birth  rate  has  increased  in  about  an 
equal  degree,  the  increase  of  Commerce — import 
and  export  together, — in  Bosnia  was,  in  spite  of 
the  smaller  population,  from  8  millions  of  crowns 
in  1879  to  226  millions  in  1906  and  2.J7  millions 
in  1 910;  in  Servia  from  80  millions  in  1879  to 
127  millions  in  1906  and  204  millions  in  19 10. 
The  number  of  horses  in  Bosnia  in  1879  was  160,- 
000;  in  1895  ft  nad  increased  to  237,000,  while 
their  number  in  Servia  in  1906,  that  is  eleven 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  49 

years  later,  amounted  to  only  172,000  head 
Neat  cattle  in  Bosnia  increased  in  the  same  time 
from  762,000  to  1,417,000  head;  in  Servia,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  number  as  late  as  in  1906  was 
932,000  head.  Bosnia  contains  thrice  the  num- 
ber of  goats,  many  more  sheep;  only  swine  are 
slightly  more  numerous  in  Servia.  If  the  amount 
of  cattle  in  the  provinces  has  since  remained  more 
or  less  stationary,  the  fact  is  chiefly  owing  to 
the  ever  increasing  export  of  cattle  to  the  Em- 
pire. Though  Bosnia  is  a  more  mountainous  and 
barren  country  than  Servia  and  though  the  lat- 
ter's  population  is  bigger  by  more  than  a  mil- 
lion, the  railways  constructed  in  Bosnia  were 
963  km.  in  length  in  1902,  while  in  Servia  they 
measured  only  562  km.  in  1906.  Similar  is  the 
proportion  as  to  public  roads  and  highways.1  For 
the  provincial  Diet,  whose  constituencies  are  di- 

aIt  is  but  fair  to  state  that  the  division  of  landed  property, 
the  situation  of  the  peasantry,  seems  better  in  the  Kingdom, 
owing  to  special  difficulties  in  the  provinces;  the  redemption  of 


50  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

vided  according  to  religion,  as  being  the  decisive 
distinction  in  the  land,  the  Catholics  elect  30  mem- 
bers, the  Mahometans  42,  the  Jews  1  and  the 
Orthodox  Servians  54  members,  so  that  there  is 
certainly  no  injustice  done  to  the  Orthodox. 

I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment in  treating  Servia  may  never  have  made 
a  mistake.  But  where  is  the  Government  to  be 
found  that  never  has  made  a  mistake?  Par- 
ticularly in  a  situation  where  intricate  political 
and  social  problems  had  to  be  solved,  where  con- 
flicting interests — agrarian  and  commercial — de- 
manded satisfaction,  where  national  and  reli- 
gious questions  had  to  be  settled. 

How  easy  in  comparison  was  the  task  of  the 
Russian  diplomatists!  Separated  from  Servia 
by  two  interjacent  countries — Roumania  and 
Bulgaria — with  no  commercial  relations  to  speak 

the  "Kmets,"  the  replacement  of  tenants  by  or  their  change  into 
freeholders  in  Bosnia  is,  however,  going  on  at  a  very  progres- 
sive rate. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  $i 

of,1  no  political  problem  or  interest  that  inter- 
fered with  her  own,  Russia,  distant  and  uncon- 
cerned, had  in  reality  no  interests  at  all  in  Ser- 
via  save  those  instilled  by  ambition;  her  agents 
therefore  had  only  to  bribe,  to  give  promises, 
and  to  create  difficulties  for  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment. 

Nothing  is  more  easily  stirred  up  in  our  days 
than  Nationalist- feelings;  and  though  only  a 
small  part  even  of  the  Orthodox  Servians,  that  is 
of  the  minority  of  Servians  living  in  Bosnia, 
Herzegovina,  and  Hungary  could  be  misled,  the 
Pan-Servian  Propaganda,  secretly  and  even 
openly  encouraged  and  assisted  by  the  Servian 
authorities,  could  not  fail  to  lead  to  trouble. 

Servian  hostility  increased  when  Austria  in 
1908  proclaimed  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 

1  Almost  all  the  commerce  of  Servia  is  with  Austria  and  Hun- 
gary; only  a  small  part  of  the  export  trade  goes  to  Italy  and 
Egypt;  60  per  cent,  of  imported  goods  come  from  Austria,  the 
rest  from  Germany,  France  and  other  countries. 


52  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Herzegovina  to  her  Empire,  though  in  doing  so 
it  changed  only  in  form  what  had  been  an  ac- 
complished fact  since  the  Berlin  Congress  in 
1878.  The  Servian  Government  protested  to  the 
Powers  against  the  annexation  as  a  "deep  injury- 
done  to  the  feelings,  interests,  and  rights  of  the 
Servian  people."  Now  it  always  hurts  the  "feel- 
ings and  interests"  of  a  person  or  a  people  to 
see  a  thing  definitely  put  into  another  man's  pos- 
session which  they  crave  for  themselves ;  but  we 
are  absolutely  unable  to  conceive  any  right  of 
Servia  to  possess  these  provinces,  unless  it  be 
deduced  from  the  fact  that  in  the  Middle  Ages — 
some  seven  hundred  years  ago — Servian  kings 
had  ruled  them  and  that  a  small  part  of  the  popu- 
lation are  Orthodox  Servians  to  this  day.  With 
much  the  same  right  Austria  could  claim  a  con- 
siderable part  of  Switzerland,  because  in  the  Mid- 
dle Ages  it  had  been  in  her  dominion  and  because 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  53 

a  good  part  of  the  population  are  Germans  and 
Catholics  to  this  day ! 

Austria  had  been  commissioned  to  occupy  the 
provinces  by  a  European  Congress ;  she  had  con- 
quered them  by  force  of  arms,  not  from  the  Ser- 
vians, remember,  but  from  the  Mahometans,  their 
deadly  enemies.  She  had  given  the  provinces  an 
excellent  administration  and  brought  them  to  a 
flourishing  condition,  such  as  they  never  had 
known  before;  she  had  reconciled  the  Mahome- 
tans living  in  those  provinces  and  converted  them 
into  her  most  loyal  subjects;  she  had  invested 
immense  capital — only  a  madman  could  imagine 
that  she  would  ever  give  them  up  again.  The 
annexation  was  but  the  official  and  formal  ex- 
pression of  an  actual  state  of  things  that  had 
lasted  since  the  Berlin  Congress.  Turkey,  of 
course,  had  a  formal  right  to  protest  against  the 
annexation,  but  never  Servia^    And  as  to  Turkey, 


54  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Austria  has  since  come  to  an  agreement  with  her 
upon  the  subject. 

All  this  has  to  be  said  because  in  the  Intro- 
duction to  the  British  Blue  Book  the  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia  is  mentioned  casually  and  in  such 
a  way  as  to  create  the  impression  that  great 
wrong  had  been  done  to  Servia,  while  all  the  real 
import  of  the  event  is  carefully  passed  in  silence. 

The  Servians  of  Servia,  however,  stirred  up 
by  a  highly  nationalistic  propaganda,  became 
deeply  incensed  by  the  annexation,  and  their  ir- 
ritation increased  when,  after  their  successes  in 
the  Balkan  War  in  1912,  Austria  formally  op- 
posed and  prevented  their  being  put  into  posses- 
sion of  a  port  on  the  Adriatic.  Everybody  will, 
of  course,  understand  their  irritation  on  that 
head;  yet  Austria  could  not  act  otherwise  with- 
out grievously  damaging  herself,  so  long  as  Ser- 
via acted  as  a  vassal-state  of  Russia,  blindly  obey- 
ing the  Russian  Ambassador's  orders.     A  Ser- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  55 

vian  port  on  the  Adriatic  would  have  served  as 
a  harbour  to  the  fleet  of  any  hostile  power  that 
was  allied  with  Russia ;  the  Franco-English  fleet 
would  have  found  in  it  an  excellent  point  of  sup- 
port in  the  present  war.  For  this  reason  Austria 
could  not  consent  to  what  she  would  willingly 
have  granted  to  Servia  if  she  had  not  only  been 
her  neighbour  but  also  her  friend.  Under  the 
actual  conditions  she  could  as  little  consent  to 
such  an  acquisition  being  made  by  Servia  as  the 
United  States  could  consent  to  a  port  near  San 
Francisco  being  occupied  by  a  power  that  was 
absolutely  dependent  on  Japan.  Otherwise  Aus- 
tria presented  no  obstacle  to  the  expansion  of 
Servia,  which  during  the  last  Balkan  war  had 
vastly  increased  its  territory. 

After  the  murder  of  the  last  King  of  the  house 
of  Obrenovic  the  Russophile  party  acquired  as- 
cendency in  Belgrade,  and  the  treasonable  Pan- 
Servian    agitation    in    the    Austro-Hungarian 


56  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

provinces  began  to  increase  in  violence.  It  may 
be  sufficient  to  state  that  a  Servian  nationalist 
society  in  the  kingdom,  called  the  "Narodna 
Obrana"  with  which  762  sharpshooters'  com- 
panies were  affiliated,  kept  two  schools  in  which 
armed  bands — "komitatschis" — were  trained  in 
the  art  of  throwing  bombs,  laying  mines,  blow- 
ing up  railway-bridges  and  similar  practices. 

In  the  paper  edited  by  the  "Narodna  Obrana" 
a  "war  of  extermination"  was  preached  against 
Austria  as  being  the  "first  and  greatest  enemy  of 
the  Servian  race." 

Secret  societies  in  Austria  were  organized;  a 
particular  organisation  was  founded  among  Ser- 
vian students  in  Austria  for  the  purpose  of 
"liberating  the  Slavs  of  the  South" ;  its  statutes 
proclaimed  that  "revolution  had  to  be  prepared 
by  acts  of  terrorism."  In  fact,  a  series  of  at- 
tempts on  the  life  of  high  Austro-Hungarian  of- 
ficials followed. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  57 

On  June  8,  19 12,  the  Royal  Commissary  for 
Croatia,  Baron  Cuvaj,  was  wounded  while  driv- 
ing through  the  streets  of  Agram,  and  Councillor 
von  Herwic,  who  was  sitting  in  the  same  car, 
killed  by  a  man  called  Jukic.  The  perpetrator 
of  this  crime  had  just  returned  from  Belgrade, 
where  he  had  been  furnished  with  a  bomb  and 
a  browning  by  an  officer  of  the  Servian  army. 

On  August  18,  of  the  same  year,  a  certain 
Stefan  Dojcic  made  a  similar  attempt  on  the 
life  of  Commissary  Baron  Skerlecz. 

On  May  2,  191 3,  Jacob  Schafer  tried  to  assas- 
sinate Baron  Skerlecz,  who  in  the  meantime  had 
been  appointed  Banus  (Governor)  of  Croatia. 

Readers  are  also  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  reign- 
ing King  Peter  of  Servia  owes  his  crown  to  the 
murder  perpetrated  on  his  predecessor,  King 
Alexander. 

A  certain  Bogdan  Serajic  who  had  tried  to  as- 
sassinate the  governor  of  Bosnia,  General  Baron 


58  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Varesanin,  was  even  glorified  in  Servian  papers 
as  a  national  hero. 

Assassination  is  in  fact  an  established  form  of 
political  agitation  in  Servia. 

In  Servian  school-books,  nay,  in  the  very  guide- 
books which  were  sold  to  travellers  and  which 
are  written  in  the  German  language,  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  provinces  are  called  the  "parts  of 
Servia  which  are  not  yet  freed  from  the  foreign 
yoke."  The  simplest  Austrian  students  of  Ser- 
vian race  who  came  to  visit  Belgrade  were  sure 
to  be  received  by  the  Servian  Crown-Prince 
or  at  least  by  Servian  generals.  On  the  wall  of 
the  Servian  war-office  at  Belgrade  an  allegory 
is  painted  representing  an  armed  female  on  whose 
shield  are  written  the  names  of  the  "unredeemed" 
Austrian  provinces.  The  schools  in  which  the 
above-mentioned  banditti  were  trained  for  fu- 
ture armed  inroads  into  Austria  were  inspected 
at   regular   intervals   by   the   President   of    the 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  59 

"Narodna  Obrana"  the  Servian  general  Boso 
Jankovic.1 

This  Pan-Servian  movement  was  a  serious 
danger  because  it  tended  to  a  dismemberment  of 
the  Empire  and  could  not  but  lead  to  war. 

There  has  been  a  widespread  though  errone- 
ous notion  in  foreign  countries  that  Austria  was 
a  state  which  threatened  dissolution  and  which 
could  not  hold  together  much  longer.  Nothing 
could  be  more  false  than  this  idea  which  has 
proven  one  of  the  great  mistakes  of  Austria's 
enemies.  With  all  her  political  dissensions,  her 
national  difficulties,  the  dual  monarchy,  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  Empire,  is  a  unity,  bound  together 
by  old  historical  ties  and  new  economic  interests, 
by  an  administration  in  most  parts  excellent,  by 

1  See  depositions  of  prisoners  and  witnesses  during  the  trial 
in  Sarajewo,  particularly  of  Misko  Jovanovics  and  Lazar 
Kranjcsevics,  prisoners,  examined  on  October  17;  Trifko 
Krstanovics,  witness,  examined  on  October  20;  depositions  of 
Lazar  Stanarincsics  and  Dragan  Bublic,  witnesses,  read  on  Octo- 
ber 20  and  21. 


60  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

a  national  army,  and  by  a  deep  and  universal 
feeling  for  the  reigning  house.  The  twelve  or 
more  races  who  form  the  population  of  the  Em- 
pire are  geographically  so  intermixed  that  i£ 
would  be  difficult  to  sever  them.  If  these  races, 
whose  population  varies  from  i%  to  9  millions, 
were  made  independent,  there  would  be  endless 
internecine  war  between  them.  History  has  or- 
ganized them  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy, and  though  quarrelling — as  parties  will  do 
in  a  country  inhabited  by  a  homogeneous  popo- 
lation — they  have  learnt  to  understand  their 
common  interests,  and  they  are  ready  to  die,  nay, 
they  are  actually  giving  their  lives  by  thousands 
for  the  Empire  that  unites  them  through  a  com- 
mon bond.  If  the  Federated  Empire  of  Au>- 
tro-Hungary  did  not  exist,  it  would  have  to  be 
invented  and  constructed  in  order  to  save  the 
population  of  the  fertile  regions  along  the  Dan- 
ube from  eternal  war  and  anarchy. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  61 

Suddenly  the  Pan-Servian  movement  sprang 
a  terrible  climax;  the  murder  of  Sarajevo  sent 
its  horrors  through  the  Austro-Hungarian  Em- 
pire, through  all  the  world. 

In  all  Servian  towns  the  news  of  the  murder 
produced  public  rejoicing:  In  Belgrade,  in 
Ueskub,  in  Nisch,  people  embraced  each  other 
in  the  streets,  exclamations  of  joy  were  heard  in 
the  coffee-houses.  The  president  of  the  local  com- 
mittee of  the  Narodna  Obrana  in  Nisch  made  a 
speech  in  which  he  said :  "Servia  has  been  saved 
by  this  deed,  and  one  of  those  who  were  dan- 
gerous to  her  is  out  of  the  way.  Now  Servia 
will  have  peace  for  several  years,  for  the  new 
heir  of  the  Austrian  throne  will  beware  of  walk- 
ing in  the  steps  of  his  predecessor!"  (Reports 
of  Austro-Hungarian  Consuls,  etc.  Red  Book 
No.  i,  2,  3,  5,  io,  End.  io.) 

The  Austrian  Government  waited  till  the  in- 
quiry had  proven  that  the  murderers  of  the  Arch- 


62  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

duke  had  not  only  been  furnished  with  bombs  1 
and  pistols  from  the  Servian  State  Arsenal  at 
Kragujewac,  but  also  had  been  instructed  in  the 
use  of  these  arms  by  Servian  officers,  particu- 
larly by  Major  Tankosic;  that  one  of  them,  Ca- 
brinowic,  the  man  who  threw  the  bomb  at  the 
Archduke's  automobile,  had  had  an  audience 
given  to  him  by  the  Servian  Crown-Prince  Alex- 
ander ;  that  the  murderers  had  been  led  over  the 
Bosnian  border  by  Servian  police  officers,  etc.2 
Only  when  all  this  had  been  proven  beyond 

1The  bombs  were  of  the  particular  kind  of  hand-grenades 
used  in  the  Servian  army. 

2  One  cannot  help  feeling  pity  for  these  poor  misled  boys  who 
perpetrated  the  deed,  and  indignation  toward  those  who  cow- 
ardly thrust  them  into  crime  and  misery,  when  one  reads  the 
last  words  which  one  of  them,  Nedelko  Cabrinowic,  uttered  at 
the  end  of  the  trial.  He  said  that  the  idea  of  murdering  the 
Archduke  had  not  originated  in  their  own  minds ;  that  they  had 
been  taught  in  Belgrade  to  look  upon  such  a  deed  as  noble  and 
beautiful ;  that  they  were  all  sorry  for  it,  though  Gawrilo  Princip 
might  choose  to  take  a  hero's  attitude ;  that  they  had  not  known 
that  the  Archduke  had  children;  that  they  repented  what  they 
had  done  and  implored  pardon  of  the  children;  that  they  were 
no  criminals,  but  had  sacrificed  themselves  for  what  they  be- 
lieved to  be  a  good  cause. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  63 

a  doubt,  only  then  did  the  Austrian  Government 
present  the  well-known  ultimatum  to  Servia,  on 
July  24.  Unquestionably  by  this  action  absolute 
submission  from  Servia  was  intended.  A  de- 
served submission  and  a  necessary  one.  The 
English  and  the  Russian  Ambassadors  at  Vi- 
enna repeatedly  said  in  their  telegrams,  that  they 
"thought"  or  "had  heard"  that  the  German  Am- 
bassador in  Vienna,  Herr  von  TschirschkyL  had 
advised  the  Austrian  Government  to  be  severe.1 
There  is,  however,  not  the  slightest  evidence  of 
the  fact  that  the  German  Ambassador  really  did 
so,  at  any  rate  there  was  no  need  of  such  advice. 

1  In  a  note  of  July  226.  the  French  Ambassador,  M.  Dumaine, 
declares,  without  however  giving  proof  of  any  kind  (Yellow 
Book  No.  18),  that  Herr  von  Tschirschky  expressed  his  inclina- 
tion to  violent  measures  against  Servia,  giving  at  the  same  time 
to  understand  that  his  Government  were  not  quite  of  his  opinion. 
No  place  nor  date  being  given,  the  acting  French  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  in  a  note  dated  on  the 
following  day  (Yellow  Book  No.  20)  added — as  a  piece  of  evi- 
dence afforded  by  his  creative  fancy— that  Herr  von  Tschirschky 
had  made  utterances  of  this  kind  in  "the  diplomatic  circles  of 
Vienna." 


64  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Austria  had  tolerated  only  too  long  what  no  other 
state  could  or  would  have  tolerated,  and  she  had 
done  so  for  the  sole  reason  that  the  old  Emperor 
wished  to  end  his  reign  in  peace.  Now  things 
could  be  tolerated  no  longer.  Indignation  was 
running  high  at  the  court,  in  the  church,  in 
the  press,  through  the  whole  people.  There  is 
no  nation  in  the  world  that  would  not  and  has 
not  made  war  on  less  provocation.  There  is  no 
monarchy  in  the  world  that  would  permit  the 
heir-apparent  of  the  throne  to  be  murdered  with 
the  guilty  connivance  of  another  country's  gov- 
ernment without  making  war  on  that  country,  un- 
less the  most  perfect,  the  most  humble,  the  most 
instantaneous  atonement  was  offered.  There  is 
no  Power  in  the  world  that  would  have  tolerated 
another  Power's  intercession  in  such  a  case.  Sup- 
posing that  the  Russian  Czarewitsch  or  the  Vice- 
roy of  India  had  been  murdered  by  Afghans 
with  the  connivance  of  the  Afghan  Court  and 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  65 

Government — I  most  humbly  beg  Afghanistan's 
pardon  for  the  supposition — what  would  the  Rus- 
sian, what  would  the  English  Government  have 
done,  what  penance,  what  atonement  would  they 
have  asked  or  accepted,  especially  if  the  murder 
had  been  but  the  climax  of  many  that  had  gone 
before!  Would  they  really  have  been  contented 
with  "concern  and  regret,"  as  Sir  Edward  Grey 
proposed  Servia  ought  to  express?1  It  was  a 
useless  task  for  diplomats  to  analyze  and  criticize 
the  answer  which  the  Servian  Government  gave 
to  the  Austrian  note,  on  July  25,  and  to  discuss 
how  far  it  could  be  considered  as  satisfactory  or 
as  the  basis  of  further  negotiations.  It  could  not 
be  considered  at  all,  because  only  absolute  sub- 
mission was  intended.  Moreover,  the  answer 
was  for  the  most  part  evasive.  Besides,  Servian 
promises  had  been  given  before  and  had  always 

^n  his  note  to  the  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade  of 
July  24,  Blue  Book  No.  12. 


66  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

proved  ineffective  and  unreliable.1  The  whole 
Servian  note,  even  the  apparent  concessions 
which  it  contained,  were  in  fact  a  mockery;  for 
while  it  was  handed  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
in  Belgrade,  Baron  Giesl,  at  6  o'clock  on  July 
.25,  at  3  o'clock  on  the  same  day  the  Servian  Gov- 
ernment had  issued  the  order  for  general  mobili- 
sation. (Notes  of  Baron  Giesl  to  Count  Berch- 
told  of  July  25;  of  Count  Berchtold  to  Count 
MensdorfT  of  July  26.  Red  Book  No.  22,  23,  29.) 
And  what  nation  will  accept  a  few  promises  to 
take  care  in  the  future  if  possible,  as  a  satis- 
faction for  the  murder  of  the  chief  representa- 
tive of  the  State,  the  Heir  to  the  Crown?    How 

^^Only  one  small  instance:  On  July  25  the  British  Charge 
d'affaires  at  Belgrade,  Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  telegraphed  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey :  "The  Servian  Government  have  already  arrested 
the  officer  referred  to  in  the  Austrian  note."  I  have  no  doubt 
that  Mr.  Crackanthorpe  had  been  informed  to  that  effect;  but 
in  fact  Major  Tankosic  has  never  been  arrested.  He  was  al- 
lowed to  escape,  and  later  he  returned  to  Belgrade.  Afterwards 
he  was  severely  wounded,  fighting  in  the  Servian  ranks,  and  is 
now  lying  in  a  hospital  at  Nisch. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  67 

often  have  the  guns  of  British  warships  thun- 
dered at  foreign  ports  because  a  British  subject's 
storehouse  had  been  plundered  or  his  bills  re- 
fused? 

On  July  26,  war  between  Austria  and  Servia 
became  inevitable.  It  would  have  been  "lo- 
calised," that  is  to  say,  it  would  have  remained 
a  war  between  Austria  and  Servia  but  for  the  in- 
tervention of  Russia. 

This  fact  is  the  nucleus,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  explanation  of  the  war  that  is  now  ruining 
so  many  peaceful  and  flourishing  countries ;  it  is 
the  cause  of  such  immense  bloodshed,  and  it  is 
almost  needless  to  follow  the  stages  of  the  diplo- 
matic Calvary  that  led  to  the  outbreak  of  the 
greatest  catastrophe  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

Servians  unsatisfactory  reply  would  never 
have  been  given  but  for  the  advice  of  the  same 
persons  who  had  encouraged  all  the  Servian  pro- 
ceedings which  led  to  the  final  catastrophe.    On 


68  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

the  very  day  on  which  the  Austrian  note  was  com- 
municated to  the  Servian  Government,  July  23, 
the  Crown-Prince-Regent  of  Servia  wrote  an  im- 
ploring letter  to  the  Czar.  (Published  in  the  Rus- 
sian Orange  Book  as  No.  10.)  We  do  not  know 
whether  the  telegram  from  St.  Petersburg  with 
the  short  and  energetic  advice  "Mobilize !  we  are 
mobilizing  also !"  was  really  sent  from  St.  Peters- 
burg to  Belgrade,  or  whether  it  represents  only 
one  of  those  happy  historical  legends  which  origi- 
nate on  the  spot  and,  though  not  absolutely  cor- 
rect, are  highly  expressive  of  the  actual  situa- 
tion. 

It  is  certainly  most  astonishing  that  the  Rus- 
sian Orange  Book  observes  an  absolute  silence  on 
the  notes  exchanged  between  the  Russian  and 
Servian  Governments  during  the  important 
forty-eight  hours  which  elapsed  between  the  mo- 
ment of  the  communication  of  the  Austrian  Ul- 
timatum in  Belgrade  and  the  Servian  Reply.  The 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  69 

official  Russian  publication  contains  nothing  but: 
the  answer  given  by  the  Czar  to  the  Crown-Prince* 
(No.  40),  which  was  not  written  until  July  2,7  A 
It  is  evident  that  the  Russian  Government  doe$ 
not  wish  to  have  it  known  by  the  public  of  Eu- 
rope or  America  what  advice  it  gave  to  Servia 
in  those  critical  days,  and  its  silence  is  a  confes- 
sion of  its  guilt.  But  for  Russia's  encouragement 
Servia  would  have  been  forced  to  yield  and  to 
give  Austria  the  satisfaction  desired;  thus  might 
even  the  war  between  Austria  and  Servia  have 
been  avoided. 

That  the  Russian  Government  was  from  the 
very  first  considering  war  against  Austria — * 
which,  as  it  knew,  meant  war  against  Germany 
also — is  proven  by  an  important  passage  in  a  note 
from  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  on  July  24 
(Brit.  Blue  Book  No.  6),  according  to  which  the 
Ambassador  declared  to  M.  Sazonof,  as  his  per- 


7o  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

sonal  opinion,  that  "an  unconditional  engagement 
on  the  British  Government's  part  to  support  Rus- 
sia and  France  by  force  of  arms  was  not  to  be 
expected."  The  Ambassador  then  asked  whether, 
if  Austria  proceeded  to  embark  on  military  meas- 
ures against  Servia,  it  was  the  intention  of  the 
Russian  Government  forthwith  to  declare  war 
on  Austria?  Thereupon  M.  Sazonof  answered 
that  the  "Russian  mobilisation  would  at  any  rate 
have  to  be  carried  out"  and  that  "a  decision  would 
be  come  to"  probably  on  the  next  day  at  a  council 
which  the  Czar  would  preside.  In  his  next  note, 
dated  July  25  (Bl.  B.  Note  No.  17),  the  Brit- 
ish Ambassador  says  that  he  expressed  the 
\  earnest  hope  that  "Russia  would  not  precipitate 
\  war  by  mobilising  until  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
I  had  time  to  use  his  influence  in  favour  of  peace," 
whereupon  M.  Sazonof  assured  him  that  "Russia 
had  no  aggressive  intentions,  and  she  would  take 
no  action  until  it  was  forced  upon  her.    Austria's 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  71 

action  was  in  reality  directed  against  Russia. 
She  aimed  at  overthrowing  the  present  status 
quo  in  the  Balkans,  and  establishing  her  own 
hegemony  there.  He  did  not  believe  that  Ger- 
many really  wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  would 
be  decided  by  ours  (the  British  attitude)  .  .  ." 
Sir  G.  Buchanan  concludes  with  the  following 
words : — "I  said  all  I  could  to  impress  prudence 
on  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  warned  \ 
him  that  if  Russia  mobilised,  Germany  would 
not  be  content  with  mere  mobilisation,  or  give 
Russia  time  to  carry  out  hers,  but  would  prob- 
ably declare  war  at  once.  His  Excellency  re-  I 
plied  that  Russia  could  not  allow  Austria  to  crush 
Servia  and  become  the  predominant  Power  in 
the  Balkans,  and,  if  she  feels  secure  of  the, sup- 
port of  France,  she  will  face  all  the  risks  of  war. 
He  assured  me  once  more  that  he  did  not  wish 
to  precipitate  a  conflict,  but  that  unless  Germany 


72  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

could  restrain  Austria  I  could  regard  the  situa- 
tion as  desperate." 

This  is  plain  language.  It  proves  several  in- 
teresting things.  First  that  English  statesmen 
in  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  stood  aghast  at 
the  possible  consequences  and  were  not  desirous 
of  a  general  conflict  at  that  moment,  while  on 
the  contrary  Russia  was  quite  resolute  now  to 
-face  all  the  risks  of  war."  The  conversation 
reported  in  the  note  proves  further  that  even 
the  Russian  Minister,  according  to  his  own  words, 
'did  not  believe  that  Germany  wanted  war,  and 
that  even  the  English  Ambassador  recognized 
the  necessity  which  would  compel  Germany  to 
declare  war  if  Russia  mobilised. 

When,  on  July  23,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  at- 
tempted to  explain  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
at  London,  Count  MensdorfT,  how  terrible  the 
consequences  of  the  ultimatum  might  be,  Count 
MensdorfT  had  answered,  that  "all  depended  on 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  73 

Russia."  This  was  so  very  clear  that  even  Sir 
Edward  Grey  could  only  give  a  diplomatic  an- 
swer which  said  nothing  at  all.  Sir  G.  Buchanan 
had  stated  to  M.  Sazonof  that  "direct  British 
interests  in  Servia  were  nil" ;  the  same  might  be 
said  of  France;  Germany  had  repeatedly  declared 
that  she  had  no  interest  there.  There  was  an  un- 
questionable conflict  between  Austria  and  Ser- 
via because  the  latter  had  instigated  a  revolu- 
tionary movement  on  Austro-Hungarian  terri- 
tory and  had  sent  out  murderers  who  had  killed 
the  heir  apparent  of  the  throne.  The  Austrian 
Government  had  declared  in  the  most  formal 
manner  that  it  did  not  aim  at  territorial  aggran- 
dizement in  Servia.  All  this  was  so  very  clear 
that  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  found  nothing  to  say 
in  answer  to  Count  Mensdorff,  and  Russian  diplo- 
matists could  only  note  the  "icy  indifference" 
with  which  Servian  complaints  met  in  English 
official  circles.    In  fact,  the  British  Ambassador 


74  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

in  Vienna,  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  said  to  Count 
Berchtold  as  late  as  on  July  28:  "The  English 
Government  have  followed  the  development  of 
the  crisis  with  great  interest  and  wish  to  assure 
the  Austrian  Government  that  they  feel  all  sym- 
pathy for  their  standpoint  and  perfectly  under- 
stand their  griefs  against  Servia."  (Red  Book 
No.  41.)  There  was  at  that  time  nobody  in  the 
diplomatic  world — or  indeed  anywhere  at  all — 
who  did  not  see  and  feel  that  all  depended  on  Rus- 
sia. 

When,  however,  in  the  course  of  the  next  days 
or  rather  hours — so  quickly  the  situation  de- 
veloped into  a  crisis — it  became  clear  that  Russia 
intended  to  interfere,  France  and  England,  her 
allies,  at  once  altered  their  view ;  things  suddenly 
ceased  to  depend  on  Russia,  and  the  responsi- 
bility was  quickly  shuffled  off  to  Germany.  They 
found  out  that  Germany  was  bound  to  exert  an 
influence  upon  Austria  in  order  to  make  her 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  75 

change  her  measures  as  far  as  they  gave  dis- 
pleasure to  Russia. 

On  July  24,  the  German  Ambassador  in  St. 
Petersburg,  Count  Pourtales,  informed  the 
Chancellor  that  M.  Sazonof  had  "indulged  in 
immoderate  accusations  against  Austria  and  had 
declared  in  the  most  positive  way  that  Russia 
could  by  no  means  permit  the  Austro-Servian 
difference  to  be  settled  between  the  two  parties 
alone."  (Tel.  of  July  24,  German  White  Book 
No.  4.)  Thereupon  the  French  Government 
changed  its  tone.1 

1  In  an  article  in  the  "Figaro"  entitled  "Un  Faux  Allemand," 
M.  Denys  Cochin,  the  well-known  Royalist  member  of  the  French 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  declared  that  the  date  of  Count  Pour- 
tales'  telegram,  as  given  in  the  White  Book,  must  needs  be  a 
falsification,  the  Russian  threats  having  not  been  uttered  until 
a  Russian  demand  for  prolongation  of  the  time-limit  in  the  Aus- 
trian Ultimatum  had  been  refused  by  the  Austrian  Government. 
He  concludes  this  from  the  fact  that  this  Russian  demand  is 
quoted  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book  (No.  15)  as  dated  July  24. 
In  fact,  the  falsification — it  may,  of  course,  be  an  error  due  to 
Russian  inexactness — is  to  be  found  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book, 
and  M.  Denys  Cochin  is  in  error  in  all  his  statements.  The 
Russian  demand  for  a  prolongation  of  the  time-limit  was  tele- 


76  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

This  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  English  and 
French  Cabinets  was  very  curious  and  impor- 
tant. 

The  situation  was  perfectly  clear.  If  France 
and  England,  who  had  no  interests  at  all  at  stake 
in  Servia,  accepted  the  Russian  view,  for  the 
sole  reason  that  Russia  was  their  friend  and  ally, 

graphed  by  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Vienna,  Prince 
Koudascheff,  to  Count  Berchtold,  who  had  left  for  Ischl  to 
confer  with  the  Emperor  on  July  25.  The  negative  answer, 
therefore,  could  not  possibly  reach  the  Russian  Embassy  in 
Vienna,  and  still  less  the  Foreign  Office  at  St.  Petersburg,  until 
later  in  the  course  of  the  day  (July  25),  while  the  Russian 
threats  had  been  published  by  the  Viennese  papers  in  their 
morning  editions  of  the  same  day.  It  is,  therefore,  quite  evident 
that  the  threatening  utterances  of  the  Russian  Cabinet  must 
needs  have  been  made  before  and  not  after  the  demand  for  a 
prorogation  of  the  time-limit,  the  refusal  of  which  demand  they 
and  their  French  friend  now  wish  to  pass  off  as  the  cause  of 
their  hostile  attitude. 

The  attempt  to  find  such  an  excuse  is  the  more  preposterous, 
as  in  a  note  of  the  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  M.  Dumaine, 
to  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  July  25  (published 
in  the  French  Yellow  Book  as  No.  45),  not  only  the  real  date 
of  the  telegrams  (two  having  been  sent,  one  to  reach  Count 
Berchtold  on  his  way,  and  one  to  Ischl)  is  stated  as  being  the 
25th  of  July — but  the  confession  is  added  that  Prince  Kouda- 
scheff  did  not  expect  that  his  telegrams  would  have  the  slightest 
effect;  literally:    "II  n'en  attend  aucun  effet." 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  77 

why  should  Germany  not  be  allowed  to  take  the 
side  of  her  friend  and  ally  Austria,  whom  she 
knew,  moreover,  to  be  perfectly  in  the  right? 
Why  should  she  also  be  bound  to  accept  the  views 
of  Russia,  who  was  neither  her  friend  nor  her 
ally  and  whom  she  knew  to  be  thoroughly  in 
the  wrong?  Austria  had  the  greatest  interest 
in  a  decisive  and  final  solution  of  the  difficulties 
produced  by  Servian  agitation  and  assassinations. 
Austria  had  been  frightfully  wronged;  if  her 
Government  desisted  from  exacting  necessary 
reparation,  Austria  would  become  an  object  of 
contempt  to  the  Balkans  as  well  as  to  her  own 
population.  Why  then  should  Germany  be  bound 
to  give  her  advice  which  she  must  needs  know 
to  be  bad,  and  which  would  never  be  accepted 
unless  the  German  Government  exerted  such  pres- 
sure as  to  do  irreparable  harm  to  her  faithful 
friend  and  ally !  It  may  be  that  such  an  estrange- 
ment between  the  two  central  Powers  was  one  of 


78  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

the  objects  in  view ;  Russia,  at  any  rate,  had  been 
wronged  by  nobody,  no  revolutionary  agitation 
in  her  provinces  had  been  encouraged,  no  grand- 
duke  had  been  killed ;  nobody  had  asked  anything 
of  her  but  to  keep  quiet — and  because  Russia 
would  not  keep  quiet  but  chose  to  threaten  with 
war,  Germany  was  bound  to  accept  the  Russian 
view,  and  when  she  refused  to  do  so,  her  "atti- 
tude was  most  alarming  I" 

The  demand  was  the  most  preposterous  that 
could  be  imagined.  In  the  Introduction  to  the 
British  Blue  Book  it  is  said:  "At  this  critical 
moment  everything  depended  on  Germany."  But 
not  the  slightest  reason  is  advanced  to  prove  this 
statement.  The  author  of  the  Introduction,  who- 
soever he  be,  follows  up  with  the  words:  "As 
the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  a 
little  later,  'the  key  of  the  situation  was  to  be 
found  in  Berlin/  "  Now  this  is  a  repetition  of 
the  same  phrase  but  not  a  proof.    Is  anything  a 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  79 

truth  because  a  Russian  Minister  says  so?1  I 
think  that  since  the  time  of  old  Potemkin  the 
augurs  themselves  would  smile  at  such  a  sugges- 
tion. 

We  ask  again :  why  did  everything  depend  on 
Germany?  Had  Germany  threatened  anybody? 
Did  she  refuse  to  keep  quiet,  as  Russia  did?  She 
only  refused  to  give  advice  which  would  be  det- 
rimental to  Austria,  or  to  exert  pressure  on  her, 
just  because  Russia  pleased  to  desire  it.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  says  he  confessed  that  he  felt  help- 
less. In  the  Introduction  to  the  Blue  Book  he 
or  his  deputy  who  wrote  it  says  that  "there  was 
no  time  to  advise  Russia."  Why  was  there  no 
time  for  doing  so  ?  And  if  there  was  not  time  for 
England  to  advise  Russia,  who  had  not  yet  fixed 
any  time-limit  or  come  to  a  final  decision,  how 
could  there  be  time  for  Germany  to  advise  Aus- 

*In  the  French  Yellow  Book  the  same  thing  is  repeated,  of 
course,  over  and  over  again,  without  ever  any  reason  being 
given  for  it. 


80  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

tria,  who  had  made  her  final  decision  and  fixed 
a  time-limit  from  which  she  could  not  withdraw 
without  making  herself  ridiculous?  I  am  afraid 
Sir  Edward  will  have  to  answer  with  Sir  John 
Falstaff:  "If  reasons  were  as  plenty  as  black- 
berries, I  would  not  give  a  man  a  reason  upon 
compulsion,  I." 

It  may  be  important  to  add  just  here  that  Ger- 
many, though  refusing  to  "put  pressure  on  the 
authorities  at  Vienna" — this  was  literally  asked 
from  her  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  (cf.  Brit.  Blue 
Book  No.  112) — nevertheless  did  her  best  to  in- 
fluence Austria  in  the  direction  desired.  She  not 
only  forwarded  the  English  propositions  to  the 
Austrian  Foreign  Office,  but  she  also  did  her  ut- 
most to  facilitate  direct  negotiations  between  the 
Russian  and  the  Austrian  Cabinets;  finally  the 
German  Emperor  appealed  to  the  Czar.  The 
Austrian  Red  Book  contains  as  No.  44  a  note 
communicated  by  Count  Berchtold  to  the  Aus- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  8fl 

trian  Ambassadors  in  London,  St.  Petersburg, 
Paris  and  Rome  on  July  29,  informing  them  of 
the  Austrian  Government's  being  forced  to  de- 
cline, much  to  its  regret,  the  English  proposi- 
tions forwarded  to  it  by  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor, Herr  von  Tschirschky;  and  under  No.  47 
a  note  of  Count  Szapary,  Austrian  Ambassador 
in  St.  Petersburg,  in  which  he  informs  Count 
Berchtold  of  conciliatory  steps  taken  by  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador,  Count  Pourtales.  Proof  of 
Germany's  earnestness  of  effort  in  this  direction 
is  afforded  not  only  by  the  published  notes  but  by 
a  most  unimpeachable  witness,  the  Belgian 
Charge  d' Affaires  in  St.  Petersburg,  M. 
d'Escailles,  who  wrote  to  his  Government  on  July 
30:  "It  is  undeniable  that  Germany  has  tried 
here  (in  St.  Petersburg)  as  well  as  in  Vienna 
to  find  some  expedient  to  avoid  a  general  war."1 

1  Quoted  from  a  letter  which  was  sent  by  post  to  the  covered 
address  of  "Madame  Costermans  in  Brussels"  and  which,  while 
traversing  Germany,  was  confiscated  by  the  German  authorities 


82  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

The  Introduction  to  the  British  Blue  Book  was 
of  necessity  written  post  festum.  In  the  notes 
themselves  as  collected  in  the  Blue  Book  this 
shuffling  off  of  the  responsibility  from  Russia  to 
Germany  is  evident  to  all  eyes,  and  all  the  art 
employed  in  arranging  them  is  insufficient  to 
hide  it.  Some  pretext,  however,  had  to  be  found, 
an  interest  of  Russia  had  to  be  constructed  which 
forced  her  to  interfere.  As  such  an  interest  did 
not  exist  in  reality,  it  had  to  be  founded  on  a 
fiction.  The  fiction  was  ready  at  hand.  As  early 
as  on  July  24,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  written  to 
Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  that 
"Russia  would  be  compelled  by  her  public  opinion 
to  take  action  as  soon  as  Austria  attacked  Ser- 
via."  The  same  argument  is  repeated  in  several 
English  notes  during  the  following  days,  and — • 

after  hostilities  had  begun.  The  envelope,  being  opened,  proved 
to  contain  a  letter  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  83 

if  I  am  not  mistaken — it  was  even  brought  forth 
in  the  English  House  of  Parliament. 

Public  opinion  in  Russia!  If  public  opinion 
had  aught  to  say  in  Russia,  would  the  present 
Government,  the  whole  present  system  of  gov- 
ernment, exist  one  day  longer  ?  "Russian  public 
opinion"  is  a  mannikin  which  is  put  forth  when- 
ever the  Russian  Government  chooses  not  to  as- 
sume the  responsibility  of  certain  acts,  but  lifeless 
and  utterly  unable  to  ask  for  anything  of  its  own 
accord.  Whenever  real  public  opinion  in  Russia 
dares  to  utter  wishes  which  displease  the  Gov- 
ernment, the  newspaper  is  suppressed ;  whenever 
it  dares  to  lift  its  voice  in  meetings,  it  is  trodden 
down  by  Cossacks.  "Public  opinion"  in  Russia, 
as  quoted  by  M.  Sazonof  or  by  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
means  newspaper-articles,  commanded  by  the 
Government  or  printed  by  its  leave ;  it  is  a  thing 
compelled,  not  a  thing  compelling.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  is,  of  course,  not  so  ignorant  that  he  would 


84  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

not  be  aware  of  this  fact;  but  the  average  British 
newspaper-reader  is  grossly  ignorant  of  the  state 
of  foreign  countries,  and,  knowing  public  opin- 
ion to  be  a  real  power  in  his  own  country,  he 
might  easily  be  made  to  believe  that  the  Russian 
Government,  however  loath  to  disturb  the  world's 
peace,  were  indeed  forced  to  intercede.  Thus  the 
fiction  of  "Russian  public  opinion"  is  used  as  a 
means  to  deceive  English  public  opinion. 

There  stands,  however,  behind  this  fiction  an 
idea,  known  to  all  the  world  and  widespread  in 
certain  parts  of  Russian  society,  an  idea  that  is 
itself  a  fiction,  a  monstrous  fiction  in  European 
politics.  Fictions,  as  we  all  know,  may  be  power- 
ful agents  in  history,  and,  as  their  power  is  based 
on  their  being  taken  for  truths,  it  is  time  to  show 
that  this  fiction  is  but  a  dangerous  sham.  It  is  the 
fiction  of  Pan-Slavism,  the  fiction  that  Russia  is 
destined  by  "divine  mission"  to  unite  all  Slavic 
nations  under  her  kind  and  beneficent  rule.     It 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  8? 

was  in  the  name  of  the  Pan-Slavist  idea  or  fiction 
that  Russia  felt  herself  bound  to  intercede  for 
Servia.  Now,  if  the  Pan-Slavist  idea  were  one 
of  love  and  brotherhood  among  all  Slavs,  it 
should  be  welcome.  However,  the  so-called  Pan- 
Slavism  is  in  reality  but  a  euphemistic  term  for 
the  Pan-Russian  idea,  Pan-Moskovitism.  The 
Slavic  nations  who  have  fallen  victim  to  Russia's 
divine  mission,  the  Poles,  the  Ukrainians,  have 
felt  this  fact  with  vengeance.  Hanging,  tor- 
turing, banishment,  deprivation  of  all  political 
rights,  fiercest  oppression,  forbidding  of  their 
very  language  and  religion,  whipping  of  men  and 
violation  of  women  by  hundreds  because  they 
would  not  turn  Orthodox,  has  been  the  lot  of 
those  blessed  with  Russian  Pan-Slavism.  Read 
the  English  consuls'  reports  from  Poland  which 
have  been  published.  Ask  the  Poles,  the  Ukrain- 
ians, ask  the  Russians  themselves  what  they 
think  of  their  Government.    Ask  the  Poles,  the 


86  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Circassians,  the  Georgians,  the  Fins  and  what- 
soever other  nation  has  undergone  the  horrible 
fate  of  being  incorporated  in  the  Russian  Empire. 
Russia  protect  other  Slav  states  and  their  inde- 
pendence! Is  it  not  grotesque?  Is  it  not  like 
Medea  wishing  to  adopt  other  people's  children, 
and  alleging  the  brilliant  treatment  she  gave  her 
own! 

Let  the  Russian  Government  first  free  its  own 
subjects  from  constant  oppression  and  from  inef- 
fable suffering  before  it  pretends  to  liberate  other 
nations !  Let  the  Czar  first  keep  his  oath  to  re- 
spect the  constitution  and  independence  of  Fin- 
land, before  he  dare  intercede  for  the  indepen- 
dence of  Servia!  Let  him  set  free  thousands  of 
his  own  innocent  subjects  who  are  dying  a  slow 
death  in  the  prisons  on  the  Lake  of  Ladoga  or 
in  the  deserts  of  Siberia  before  he  presumes  to 
protect  the  ringleaders  of  the  crime  that  was  per- 
petrated in  Sarajewo! 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  87 

It  was  by  chance  that  the  monstrous  treachery 
which  is  hiding  under  the  name  of  the  "Divine 
Mission"  of  Russia  was  unveiled  to  some  of  its 
destined  victims  and  to  all  the  world, — as  far  as 
it  has  eyes  to  see — during  the  second  Balkan 
War.  The  Balkan  League  had  been  framed,  the 
Balkan  War  had  been  instigated  by  Russian  Di- 
plomacy. But  when  the  Russian  Government 
saw  that  the  Bulgarians,  one  of  the  favoured  na- 
tions set  free  by  Russia,  were  too  victorious,  that 
they  threatened  to  become  too  strong  and  to 
conquer,  sooner  or  later,  the  Turkish  Capital 
whose  possession  was  coveted  by  Russia  herself, 
it  changed  its  attitude  toward  them.  All  the 
world  looked  on  with  astonishment  while  the  Rus- 
sian protectors  delivered  the  Bulgarians  up  into 
the  hands  of  the  Servians,  their  "brethren''  and 
enemies  of  old,  and  even  into  the  hands  of  those 
races  who  were  the  natural  enemies  of  the  Slavic 
race  in  the  Balkans — the  Roumanian  and  the 


88  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Greek.  They  remained  passive  spectators  of  the 
war  in  which  their  beloved  "brethren"  butchered 
and  weakened  each  other  and  through  which  Bul- 
garia in  particular  was  humbled  and  deprived  of 
the  best  part  of  her  conquests.  This  was  the  true 
face  of  Russian  Pan-Slavism.  The  crime,  as 
crimes  so  often  are,  was  at  the  same  time  a  blun- 
der. The  Balkan  League  fell  to  pieces,  and  the 
million  of  Balkan  warriors  ceased  to  number  in 
the  calculations  of  the  Triple  Entente  for  the 
present  war.  The  Bulgarians,  betrayed  as  they 
were,  turned  into  Austria's  and  even  Turkey's 
devoted  friends. 

Of  the  mixed  populations  of  48  millions  which 
inhabit  Austria-Hungary,  about  23  millions  be- 
long to  the  Slavic  race.  They  are  more  numer- 
ous than  the  inhabitants  belonging  to  any  other 
race.  In  the  Austrian  Parliament  the  members 
elected  by  them  form  the  majority.  There  are  al- 
ways two  or  three  ministers  of  Slavic  nationality 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  89 

in  the  Austrian  cabinet.  The  murdered  Arch- 
duke had  married  a  lady  from  an  old  Slavic 
house.  Generals  of  Slavic  blood  are  leading  the^ 
Austro-Hungarian  armies  into  battle  against  the 
Russians.  Even  in  Hungary  where  the  Slavs 
form  a  much  smaller  percentage  of  the  popula- 
tion and  are  not  so  well  treated  as  in  Austria, 
they  still  enjoy  rights  surpassing  the  boldest 
dreams  of  those  who  live  under  Russian  rule. 
Almost  all  the  Slav  peoples  in  Austria  and  Hun- 
gary may  boast  of  a  University  where  the  lectures 
are  given  in  their  own  language,  where  rector, 
council  and  professors  are  of  their  nationality : — 
there  is  a  Tschech  University  in  Prague,  a  Polish 
University  in  Krakaw,  a  Polish  and  Ruthenian 
one  in  Lemberg,  a  Croatian  University  in  Agram, 
a  Tschech  College  of  Engineering  in  Brunn,  etc. ; 
that  they  have  their  own  Latin  schools  and  high 
schools,  not  to  speak  of  grammar-schools,  is  a 
matter  of  course.    No  Slavic  nation  under  Rua- 


90  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

sian  rule  enjoys  the  privilege  of  having  a  Uni- 
versity of  her  own.  At  the  University  of  War- 
saw, the  capital  of  Poland,  all  the  lectures  are 
given  in  the  Russian  language,  Polish  lectures  are 
strictly  forbidden ;  and  the  same  is  the  case  in  all 
lower  schools.  Austria  might  call  herself  with 
infinitely  more  right  than  Russia,  a  friend  of  the 
Slavic  races. 

Russian  Pan-Slavism  is  but  a  cover,  a  smiling 
mask  for  the  expansion  of  the  Russian  empire, 
for  the  rapacious  desire  of  making  sooner  or  later 
a  prey  of  the  other  nations  around  her,  while  it 
is  a  matter  of  perfect  indifference  to  her  whether 
these  nations  be  Slav  or  German  or  Finnish  or 
Chinese. 

This  constant  tendency  of  the  Russian  Empire 
to  expand  has  become  a  sort  of  political  axiom. 
And  there  are  writers,  there  are  historians,  who 
have  accepted  this  axiom  and  who  repeat  that  it 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  91 

is  a  necessity  for  Russia  to  expand.  This  proves 
again  that  if  there  is  a  person  bold  enough  to 
state  with  a  certain  emphasis  the  most  evident 
falsehood,  other  people  will  repeat  it,  and  after 
a  time  it  will  be  accepted  as  a  truth  of  which  there 
is  no  further  need  of  proof.  Is  it  because  she 
owns  the  vastest  territory  with  the  thinnest  popu- 
lation 1  that  Russia  is  forced  to  expand?  Or 
because  in  this  immense  territory  there  are  the 
vastest  stretches  of  soil  not  yet  cultivated  while 
even  those  which  are  devoted  to  agriculture 2  are 
far  from  being  reasonably  and  thoroughly  ex- 
ploited? Or  does  it  seem  needful  to  expand  her 
Government  because  her  administration  is  most 
corrupted,  oppressive,  and  incapable?  Is  it  a 
reason  to  expand  that  she  has  already  rendered  so 
many  nations  the  most  unhappy  on  earth?     I 

^9  inhabitants  to  the  square  kilometer  (1.3  in  the  Asiatic 
possessions)  to  72  in  France,  87  in  Austria,  120  in  Germany. 

3  26  per  cent,  of  the  whole  territory  to  35  per  cent,  in  Austria, 
46  per  cent,  in  Germany,  48  per  cent,  in  France. 


I 


92  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

think  it  is  time  for  a  Government  like  this  to 
withdraw,  to  wither,  but  not  to  expand ! 

Russia  has  no  real  interest  at  stake  in  the  Bal- 
kans. Her  commerce  with  them — import  as  well 
as  export — is  quite  insignificant.  Her  moral  or 
ideal  interest  in  them  is  a  sham.  All  her  interest 
in  the  Balkans  is  to  intrigue  against  Austria  and 
Turkey.  It  is  purely  destructive.  I  may,  of 
course,  call  it  an  interest  in  my  neighbour's  house 
when  I  want  to  steal  it. 

In  this  sense  Russia  has  an  interest  of  old 
standing  in  Constantinople  and  in  the  Darda- 
nelles ;  but  how  much  more  evident  is  in  that  case 
the  interest  of  Italy  in  Malta  or  that  of  Spain  in 
Gibraltar? 

The  statesmen  of  the  Triple  Entente  knew  in 
advance  that  the  Russian  standpoint  could  not  be 
accepted  by  Austria.  The  British  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  wrote  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  July  26 : 
"I  had  the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors  both 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  93 

with  me  .  .  .  They  doubted  whether  the  principle 
of  Russia  being  an  interested  party  entitled  to 
have  a  say  in  the  settlement  of  a  purely  Austro- 
Servian  dispute  would  be  accepted  by  either  the 
Austro-Hungarian  or  the  German  Government." 
(Brit.  Blue  Book  No.  40,  p.  26.) 

So  it  was,  nor  could  it  be  otherwise. 

On  July  28,  Austria  declared  war  on  Servia. 

It  seems  that  during  the  next  forty-eight 
hours  all  the  statesmen  concerned,  the  Rus- 
sian excepted,  were  in  earnest  in  their  wish 
to  "localize"  the  conflict.  A  conference  of 
the  Powers  was  suggested,  but  here  again 
the  measures  proposed  were  strangely  incon- 
sistent and  illogical.  The  Italian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  the  late  Marchese  di  San 
Giuliano,  made  what  should  seem  an  excellent 
proposition ;  he  said  that  "he  saw  no  possibility  of 
Austria  receding  from  any  point  laid  down  in  her 
note  to  Servia,  but  he  believed  that  if  Servia 


94  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

would  even  now  accept  it,  Austria  would  be  satis-: 
fied,  and  if  she  had  reason  to  think  such  would  be 
the  advice  of  the  Powers,  Austria  might  defer, 
action.  Servia  might  be  induced  to  accept  the 
note  in  its  entirety  on  the  advice  of  the  four  Pow- 
ers invited  to  the  conference,  and  this  would  en- 
able her  to  say  that  she  had  yielded  to  Europe  and 
not  to  Austria-Hungary  alone."  (Note  of  Sir 
Renell  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey  of  July  2.7,  1914;  Brit.  Blue 
Book  No.  57,  p.  35.)  It  is  obvious  that  the  Italian 
statesman  would  not  have  made  this  proposition 
without  having  previously  made  sure  of  Austria's 
agreement.  It  does  not  seem,  however,  to  have 
been  accepted  by  the  other  Powers.  Russia  did 
not  want  a  conference  to  make  Servia  give  way 
but  to  humble  Austria.  Was  it  not  once  more  a 
most  preposterous  demand,  that  the  great  state 
which  had  been  wronged  should  be  forced  to  yield 
to  a  conference,  while  the  small  state  which  had 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  95 

wronged  and  which,  being  small,  had  no  such 
"prestige"  to  lose,  should  be  spared  the  same? 
Was  it  not  inevitable  that  Austria  should  decline 
a  conference  which,  as  she  clearly  saw,  would 
be  called  only  to  decide  against  her  ?  How  could 
she  accept  for  herself  what  Russia  would  not  ac- 
cept for  Servia? 

We  have  stated  our  belief  that,  at  this  moment, 
the  English  statesmen  were  serious  in  their  ef- 
forts to  preserve  peace.  We  infer  this  from  the 
'fact  that,  unless  they  could  show  that  they  had 
done  their  utmost  in  that  direction,  they  knew 
they  would  have  a  bad  stand  in  the  English  Par- 
liament. They  had  prepared  war  for  years  past, 
they  had  assembled  their  fleet  at  Spithead;  still 
they  had  reason  to  think  that  the  present  moment 
was  not  so  favorable  for  a  general  war  against 
Germany  as  a  later  time  might  be.  That  Ger- 
many was  sincere  is  proved  by  the  utterances  of 
English  statesmen,  as  contained  in  the  British 


96  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Blue  Book.1  All  attempts,  s;  xere  or  not,  to 
preserve  peace,  were,  however,  rendered  vain  by 
Russia's  going  on  with  her  mobilisation.  Things 
came  to  pass  exactly  as  the  British  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg,  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  had  pre- 
dicted, when,  on  July  25,  he  had  "warned  the 
Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  that  if  Rus- 
sia mobilised,  Germany  would  not  be  content  with 
mere  mobilisation,  or  give  Russia  time  to  carry 
out  hers,  but  probably  declare  war  at  once." 
(British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  p.  16.)  Germany,  by 
the  express  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance,  was 
bound  to  defend  Austria;  nor  could  she  leave  the 
long  stretched  border  of  East-Prussia,  which  is 
not  protected  by  any  fortress,  defenceless 
against  a  sudden  invasion  by  Russian  troops.  It 
was  obviously  impossible  to  suffer  Russia  to  mo- 
bilise in  peace  and  to  wait  patiently  for  the  mo- 
ment when  she  might  be  pleased  to  declare  war. 

acfr.  pp.  25  and  107-8  of  this  study. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  97 

England  was  informed  of  this.  On  July  31,  Sir 
Edward  Goschen  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey:  "Chancellor  informs  me  that  his  efforts 
to  preach  peace  and  moderation  at  Vienna  have 
been  seriously  handicapped  by  the  Russian  mo- 
bilisation against  Austria.  He  has  done  every- 
thing possible  to  attain  his  object  at  Vienna,  per- 
haps even  rather  more  than  was  altogether  pala- 
table at  the  Ballplatz.  He  could  not,  however, 
leave  his  country  defenceless  while  time  was  be- 
ing utilised  by  other  Powers;  and  if,  as  he  learns 
is  the  case,  military  measures  are  now  being  taken 
by  Russia  against  Germany  also,  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  him  to  remain  quiet.  He  wished  to 
tell  me  that  in  very  short  time,  to-day  perhaps, 
the  German  Government  would  take  some  very 
serious  step;  he  was,  in  fact,  just  on  the  point  of 
going  to  have  an  audience  with  the  Emperor/' 
(British  Blue  Book  No.  108,  p.  59.) 
Russia,  who  from  the  beginning  had  said  that 


98  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 


/ 


"if  she  felt  secure  of  the  support  of  France,  she 
would  face  all  the  risks  of  war,"  was  now  fast 
driving  toward  it.  On  July  29,  two  days  before 
Sir  E.  Goschen's  conversation  with  the  German 
Chancellor,  M.  Sazonof  had  written  to  M.  Isvol- 
skij :  "As  we  are  unable  to  fulfil  the  wishes  of 
Germany,  there  is  nothing  left  to  us  but  to  arm 
and  to  count  on  war,  which  is  inevitable.  Inform 
French  Government  of  this."  (Russ.  Orange 
Book  No.  58.)  That  Russia,  while  driving  to- 
ward war  herself,  should  try  to  cast  the  respon- 
sibility on  Germany — being  assisted  in  this  by  the 
Governments  and  Press  of  her  allies — may  be  a 
natural  stratagem.  But  the  way  in  which  the 
Russian  Government  tried  to  deceive  the  German 
Government  concerning  her  real  intentions  and 
attitude  was  distinctly  Oriental  in  its  method. 

The  German  Emperor  who  had  returned  from 
Norway  on  July  26,  sent  a  telegram  to  the  Czar 
on  July  28,  in  which  he  expressed  his  opinion  on 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  99 

the  Servian  crime,  ai  A  represented  to  the  Czar 
that  it  was  their  common  interests  as  sovereigns 
not  to  suffer  those  who  were  responsible  for  it 
to  remain  unpunished.  He  assured  the  Czar  that 
he  was  using  his  whole  influence  in  Vienna  to 
come  to  a  peaceful  agreement  with  Russia,  and 
gave  expression  to  the  hope  that  in  this  he  would 
be  assisted  by  the  Czar  himself.  To  this  tele- 
gram the  Czar  gave  answer  on  the  following  day, 
imploring  the  German  Emperor  to  help  him — 
"shameful  war  had  been  declared  on  a  feeble 
country" ;  he  would  not  be  able  to  resist  the  pres- 
sure which  was  being  put  on  him,  and  would 
be  forced  to  take  measures  which  might  lead 
to  war.  "To  prevent  such  a  disaster,  I  implore 
you  in  the  name  of  old  friendship  to  do  all  that 
is  in  your  power  to  prevent  your  ally  from  going 
too  far."  The  Emperor  answered  on  the  same 
day  that  he  could  not  consider  Austria's  proceed- 
ing shameful;  that  Servia's  promises  on  paper 


ioo  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

had  always  proved  worthless;  that  the  Austrian 
Cabinet  having  solemnly  declared  that  it  would 
not  aim  at  territorial  aggrandisement  at  Servia's 
expense,  Russia  might  very  well  remain  an  on- 
looker without  drawing  Europe  into  the  most  hor- 
rible war  which  ever  had  been.  His  Government 
was  doing  its  utmost  to  bring  about  a  direct  un- 
derstanding between  Russia  and  Austria,  but 
such  mediation  would  be  made  impossible  by  mili- 
tary measures  on  Russia's  part.  Such  measures 
would  be  apt  to  hasten  a  calamity  which  both 
monarchs  wished  to  prevent. 

The  Emperor  sent  a  second  telegram  on  the 
next  day  (July  30)  which  ran  thus:  "My  Am- 
bassador has  been  instructed  to  call  Your  Gov- 
ernment's attention  to  the  dangers  and  the  heavy 
consequences  of  a  mobilisation;  I  told  you  the 
same  in  my  last  telegram.  Austria-Hungary  has 
mobilised  only  against  Servia  and  but  a  part  of 
her  army.    If  Russia  mobilises  against  Austria- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  101 

Hungary,  as,  according  to  your  and  your  Gov- 
ernment's information,  is  the  case,  my  part  as  a 
mediator  with  which  you  kindly  entrusted  me  and 
which  I  accepted  upon  your  particular  wish,  will 
be  rendered  difficult  if  not  hopeless.  The  whole 
grave  decision  lies  now  with  you — you  will  be  re- 
sponsible for  peace  or  war.  William."  To  this 
the  Czar  answered  on  the  same  day,  twenty  min- 
utes later:  "I  thank  you  with  all  my  heart  for 
your  ready  answer.  I  am  sending  Tatitschefr*  to- 
night with  instructions.  The  military  measures 
which  are  now  taking  place  were  decided  on  five 
days  ago  but  only  as  a  defence  against  Austria's 
preparations.  I  hope  with  all  my  heart  that  these 
measures  will  in  no  way  influence  your  mediation, 
which  I  appreciate  very  much.  We  need  your 
strong  pressure  on  Austria  in  order  to  make  her 
come  to  an  agreement  with  us.  Nicolaus." 
These  five  telegrams  have  been  published  in  the 


102  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

German  White  Book  as  No.  20,  21,  22,  23,  23a. 
They  are  carefully  left  out  in  the  Russian  Or- 
ange Book. 

Was  it  not  deceit  of  the  highest  degree  for  the 
Czar  to  send  such  a  telegram — or  may  we  suppose 
that  he  was  deceived  himself  and  used  as  a  screen 
by  those  who  wielded  the  real  power — while  Rus- 
sia was  already  mobilising  on  every  side?  Was 
it  not  an  outrage  to  say  that  this  was  a  measure 
of  defence  against  Austria  while  Austria  had 
mobilised  only  a  few  corps  against  Servia?  But 
what  is  still  more  noteworthy  is  that  the  Czar 
telegraphed  on  July  30  that  measures  had  been 
decided  on  five  days  before, — that  would  be  on 
July  25 — while,  on  July  27,  the  German  Ambas- 
sador at  St.  Petersburg  had  telegraphed  to  the 
Chancellor:  "The  War  Minister  (Suchom- 
linow)  gave  his  word  of  honour  to  the  German 
Military  Attache  that  no  order  of  mobilisation 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  103 

had  been  issued,  that  no  man  of  the  reserve  had 
been  called  up,  not  a  horse  levied  I"1  (German 
White  Book  No.  11.) 

On  the  next  day,  July  31,  "danger  of  war"  was 
proclaimed  in  Germany,  and  an  ultimatum  was 
despatched  to  Russia,  demanding  that  she  should 
countermand  her  mobilisation  within  twelve 
hours.  A  note  was  also  sent  to  France,  demand- 
ing within  eighteen  hours  an  answer  as  to  wheth- 
er, in  case  of  war  between  Germany  and  Russia, 
she  would  remain  neutral. 

Russia's  sole  answer  was  the  interruption  of 
the  telegraphic  communication  between  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  and  his  Gov- 
ernment. 

1  How  shamelessly  Russian  officials  will  say  the  contrary  of 
manifest  truth  may  be  inferred  from  the  following  fact :  The 
Russian  Ambassador  in  Switzerland  declared  in  a  letter  to  the 
"Berner  Tageblatt"  that  no  Austrian  or  German  prisoners  were 
being  transported  to  Siberia,  while  the  Russian  press  was  de- 
scribing the  transports  and  we  had  letters  from  our  friends, 
Austrian  officers,  detained  there! 


:io4  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

France's  answer  was:  "She  would  do  as  her 
best  interests  demanded." 

Thereupon  Germany  declared  war  on  Russia 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  following  day,  August  I, 
and  ordered  her  mobilisation  to  begin. 


IV.    A  DIGRESSION  ON  THE  BRITISH 
BLUE  BOOK 

Before  we  proceed  any  further  in  our  exposi- 
tion of  facts,  a  short  digression  is  necessary  on 
the  English  official  exposition  as  contained  in  the 
Blue  Book. 

It  has  been  shown  how,  in  the  Servian  question, 
when  all  depended  on  Russia,  the  English  and 
Russian  diplomats  suddenly  without  any  sustain- 
able reason  shifted  the  responsibility  on  to  Ger- 
many. 

It  has  been  shown  that  things  happened  exactly 
as  the  English  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  had  predicted  when 
he  warned  the  Russian  minister  "that,  if  Rus- 
sia mobilised,  Germany  would  not  be  content  with 
mere  mobilisation,  or  give  Russia  time  to  carry 

put  hers,  but  would  probably  declare  war  at  once" 

105 


106  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

(Blue  Book  No.  17).  We  may  also  add,  Ger- 
many acted  exactly  as  the  German  Government 
had  announced  it  would  act.  For  although 
Herr  von  Jagow  had  said,  on  July  25,  that  he 
"had  given  the  Russian  Government  to  under- 
stand that  the  last  thing  Germany  wanted  was  a 
general  war"  (Note  by  Sir  H.  Rumbold,  Blue 
Book  No.  18),  and  the  Chancellor  declared  on 
July  28 :  "A  war  between  the  Great  Powers  must 
be  avoided"  (Note  by  Sir  E.  Goschen,  Blue  Book 
No.  71),  still  the  British  Ambassador  had  been 
forewarned  by  von  Jagow  on  July  27,  that  "if 
Russia  mobilised  in  the  north,  Germany  would 
have  to  do  so  too,  as  she  had  to  be  very  careful 
not  to  be  taken  by  surprise"  (Note  by  Sir  E.  Gos- 
chen, Blue  Book  No.  43).  Again  on  July  30,  the 
urgent  warning  was  sent  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment that  "beyond  the  recall  of  officers  on  leave 
the  Imperial  Government  had  done  nothing  spe- 
cial m  the  way  of  military  preparations;  some- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  107 

thing  would  have  soon  to  be  done,  for  it  might 
be  too  late,  and  when  they  mobilised,  they  would 
have  to  mobilise  on  three  sides."  (Note  by  Sir  E. 
Goschen,  Blue  Book  No.  98.) 

It  follows  from  this  that  no  action  could  be 
more  coherent  and  sincere  than  the  German  Gov- 
ernment's during  this  crisis.  Moreover,  it  was 
perfectly  in  accordance  with  what  Sir  G.  Bu- 
chanan had  foretold  would  be  the  necessary  result 
of  Russia's  action.  As  he  had  informed  his  Gov- 
ernment of  his  opinion  just  as  the  British  dip- 
lomats at  Berlin  had  informed  it  of  the  utterances 
quoted  above,  Sir  E.  Grey  could  not  be  surprised 
by  what  was  done. 

We  may  add  two  small  but  important  psycho- 
logical symptoms:  Sir  E.  Goschen  relates  that, 
on  July  29,  when  prospects  darkened,  he  found 
the  German  Secretary  of  State  "very  depressed" 
(Bl.  B.  No.  76) ;  Sir  G.  Buchanan  says  on  the 
next  day  that  the  German  Ambassador  in  Peters- 


108  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

burg,  Count  Pourtales,  "completely  broke  down 
on  seeing  that  war  was  inevitable." 

Why,  if  the  German  Government  had  been  de- 
sirous of  war,  would  they  have  been  so  unhappy 
when  they  saw  it  must  inevitably  come?  They 
ought  to  have  exulted  at  the  success  of  their 
policy,  like  M.  Iswolskij,  who  cried  out  in  great 
glee :    "This  is  my  war !" 

Remember  that  the  depression  of  the  German 
statesmen  was  noticed  at  a  time  when  they  still 
thought  that  England  might  remain  neutral ! 

Yet  the  author  of  the  Introduction  to  the  Brit- 
ish Blue  Book  dares  conclude  with  the  words: 
"It  is  right  to  say  that  His  Majesty's  Government 
believe  this  (the  Czar's  declaration  that  he  had 
'done  all  in  his  power  to  avert  war)  to  be  a  true 
statement  of  the  attitude  both  of  Russia  and 
France  throughout  this  crisis.  On  the  other 
hand,  with  every  wish  to  be  fair  and  just,  it  will 
be  admitted  that  the  response  of  Germany  and 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  109 

'Austria  gave  no  evidence  of  a  sincere  desire  to 
save  the  peace  of  Europe." 

As  the  facts  spoke  too  clearly  for  Germany, 
something,  and  even  much,  had  to  be  done  in  the 
way  of  arrangement  to  give  these  words  a  certain 
semblance  of  truth. 

To  this  end  it  is  said  (Bl.  B.,  Introd.,  p.  8,  §  6) 
that  "as  the  result  of  an  offer  made  by  her,  Russia 
was  able  to  inform  His  Majesty's  Government 
on  the  31st  that  Austria  had  at  last  agreed  to  do 
the  very  thing  she  had  refused  to  do  in  the  first 
days  of  the  crisis,  namely,  to  discuss  the  whole 
question  of  her  ultimatum  to  Servia.  Russia 
asked  the  British  Government  to  assume  the  di- 
rection of  these  discussions."  To  make  this  piece 
of  news  appear  still  more  impressive,  it  is  fol- 
lowed by  the  words:  "For  a  few  hours  there 
seemed  to  be  a  hope  of  peace."  Then  the  para- 
graph ends.  There  is  a  space  of  two  lines  in 
blank.    Then  §  7  opens  with  the  "furioso" :    "At 


no  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

this  moment,  on  Friday,  July  31,  Germany  sud- 
denly despatched  an  ultimatum  to  Russia,  de- 
manding that  she  should  countermand,  etc." 

Now  we  find  here  a  bold  attempt  to  deceive  the 
reader.  The  facts  as  they  appear  from  the  docu- 
ments of  the  Blue  Book  are  the  following:  On 
July  30,  the  German  Secretary  of  State  informed 
the  British  Ambassador  that  he  had  "asked  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  whether  they 
would  be  willing  to  accept  mediation  on  basis  of 
occupation  by  Austrian  troops  of  Belgrade  or 
some  other  place  and  issue  their  conditions  from 
here"  2  and  that,  "if  Sir  E.  Grey  could  succeed 
in  getting  Russia  to  agree  to  this  basis  of  an  ar- 
rangement, and  in  persuading  her  in  the  mean- 
time to  take  no  steps  which  might  be  regarded  as 
an  act  of  aggression  against  Austria,  he  still  saw 
some  chance  that  European  peace  might  be  pre- 


1  King  George  V  had  made  this  Proposition  to  Prince  Henry 
of  Prussia  in  his  telegram  of  July  30. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  in 

served."  (Note  from  Sir  E.  Goschen,  Bl.  B.  No. 
98.)  Sir  E.  Grey  immediately  informed  the  Rus- 
sian Government  of  this  proposal  "as  a  possible 
relief  to  the  situation,"  adding  in  a  note  to  Sir  G. 
Buchanan,  that  the  Russian  Ambassador  had  in- 
deed answered,  he  feared  the  condition  laid  down 
by  M.  Sazonof  on  the  same  day  could  not  be  modi- 
fied, but  that  he,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  thought  a 
satisfying  formula  might  be  found  (Bl.  B.  No. 
103).  On  the  next  day,  July  31,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
informed  Sir  G.  Buchanan  that  he  had  learned 
with  great  satisfaction  that,  "as  a  result  of  sug- 
gestions by  the  German  Government,"  discus- 
sions were  being  resumed  between  Austria  and 
Rus"sia,  but  that  "as  regards  military  prepara- 
tions, he  did  not  see  how  Russia  could  be  urged 
to  suspend  them  unless  some  limit  were  put  by 
Austria  to  the  advance  of  her  troops  into  Servia." 
(Bl.  B.  No.  no.) 
Now,  the  condition  laid  down  by  M.  Sazonof 


ii2  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

on  the  30th  and  slightly  altered  by  him  in  a  way 
suggested  by  the  British  Minister  on  the  31st, 
was  but  a  repetition  of  Russia's  old  demand  that 
Austria  should  allow  a  conference  of  the  Pow- 
ers to  decide  between  her  and  Servia.  But,  al- 
though Austria,  "as  a  result  of  suggestions  by 
German  Government,"  declared  herself  ready  to 
reassume  direct  discussions  with  Russia,  she  posi- 
tively refused  to  stop  the  march  of  her  troops  or 
to  submit  to  an  intervention  of  the  Powers,  and 
it  was  that  which  Russia  had  asked  from  her,  if 
she  was  to  stop  her  own  preparations  (Bl.  B.  No. 
97  and  113).  In  the  telegram  referred  to  in  the 
introduction — it  can  but  be  No.  120  of  the  Blue 
Book,  being  the  only  telegram  sent  from  Russia 
on  the  31st,  in  which  her  magnanimous  offer  is 
mentioned — not  a  word  is  said  of  Austria's  ac- 
ceptance of  it ! 

In  the  Introduction  Austria's  readiness  for  di- 
rect discussion — which  discussion  was  declared 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  113 

useless  by  Russia  unless  Austria  consented  to  stop 
the  march  of  her  troops — is  artfully  mentioned  in 
a  way  to  make  the  reader  believe  that  she  had  at 
last  accepted  the  Russian  formula  which  until 
then  had  always  been  flatly  declined  by  her. 

There  is  reprinted  in  the  Blue  Book — as  No. 
133 — a  telegram  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E. 
Goschen  which  runs  thus: 

"Foreign  Office,  August  1,  19 14. 

M.  de  Etter — Counsellor  of  the  Russian  Em- 
bassy in  London — came  to-day  to  communicate 
the  contents  of  a  telegram  from  M.  Sazonof, 
dated  July  31,  which  are  as  follows: 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  declared 
the  readiness  of  his  Government  to  discuss  the 
substance  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia. 
M.  Sazonof  replied  by  expressing  his  satisfac- 
tion, and  said  it  was  desirable  that  the  discus- 
sions should  take  place  in  London  with  the  par- 
ticipation of  the  Great  Powers. 

"M.  Sazonof  hoped  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  assume  the  direction  of  these  discus- 


114  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

sions.  The  whole  of  Europe  would  be  thankful 
to  them.  It  would  be  very  important  that  Aus- 
tria should  meanwhile  put  stop  provisionally  to 
her  military  action  on  Servian  territory." 

Now  if  this  telegram  be  the  one  meant  in  the 
Introduction,  we  are  forced  to  state  that,  ac- 
cording to  Sir  E.  Grey's  own  words,  it  was  com- 
municated to  him  only  on  August  i,  and  could 
therefore  give  him  no  hope  on  July  31,  the  day 
on  which  Germany  despatched  her  ultimatum. 

Besides,  according  to  this  note,  it  was  not  the 
Austrian  Ambassador,  but  M.  Sazonof  who  de- 
clared it  "desirable  that  the  Great  Powers  should 
participate  in  the  discussions,  and  that  these 
should  take  place  in  London." 

Here  again  Austria  is  ready  for  direct  discus- 
sion while  Russia  wanted  the  conference.  And 
it  is  quite  clear  that  Austria  was  ready  for  dis- 
cussion in  general  but  not  willing  to  discuss  her 
demands  on  Servia.    In  a  telegram  from  Peters- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  115 

burg  of  the  same  day  Sir  G.  Buchanan  states 
that  the  Austrian  Ambassador  had  no  "definite 
instructions"  from  his  Government  and  diverted 
the  conversation  into  a  general  discussion  of  the 
relations  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia, 
while  the  Russian  Minister  tried  to  speak  on  Ser- 
via. 

Lastly  we  find  in  the  Blue  Book  reproduced  as 
No.  161  a  letter  addressed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
by  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  former  British  Am- 
bassador at  Vienna,  dated  from  London,  Septem- 
ber 1.  In  this  letter  Sir  Maurice  declares  to  have 
been  informed  by  M.  Schebeko,  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna,  on  August  1,  that  Count  Sza- 
pary,  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg, 
"had  at  last  conceded  the  main  point  at  issue  by 
announcing  to  M.  Sazonof  that  Austria  would 
consent  to  submit  to  mediation  the  points  in  the 
note  to  Servia  which  seemed  incompatible  with 
the  maintenance  of  Servian  independence.     M. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 


Sazonof,  M.  Schebeko  added,  had  accepted  this 
proposal  on  condition  that  Austria  would  refrain 
from  actual  invasion  of  Servia.  Austria  in  fact 
had  finally  yielded.    .    .    ."  1 

This  seeming  corroboration  of  the  statement 
in  the  Introduction  is  perfectly  worthless,  as  the 
condition  stipulated  by  M.  Sazonof  was  not  ac- 
cepted. Here  again  we  find  that  it  is  the  Russian 
Ambassador  who  informed  Sir  Maurice  de  Bun- 
sen  of  Austria's  intentions.  Why  did  the  latter 
omit  asking  the  Austrian  Government  for  infor- 
mation concerning  so  important  a  point?  Sir  M. 
de  Bunsen  himself  adds:  "Certainly  it  was  too 
much  for  Russia  to  expect  that  Austria  would 
hold  back  her  armies,  but  this  matter  could  prob- 
ably have  been  settled  by  negotiation,  and  M. 

1  The  instructions  given  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  have  since 
been  published  in  the  Austrian  Red  Book  as  No.  49  and  50.  The 
reader  will  find  them  on  pp.  193  and  194  of  this  study :  they  con- 
tain just  the  opposite  of  what  Sir  Edward  Grey  asserts  they 
contained. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  117 

Schebeko  repeatedly  told  me  he  was  prepared  to 
accept  any  reasonable  compromise."  This,  of 
course,  is  mere  idle  talk,  especially  in  such  a  mo- 
ment and  in  such  a  situation,  and  it  is  really  hard 
to  believe  that  on  August  1,  the  day  on  which  war 
had  been  declared,  the  Russian  Ambassador 
should  have  had  leisure  to  indulge  in  such  hollow 
generalities,  unless — they  were  spoken  because  he 
was  requested  to  speak  them.  In  so  far  as  de 
Bunsen's  account  contains  the  intimation  that 
Austria  had  been  ready  to  submit  to  the  preten- 
sions of  the  Russian  Government,  it  is  in  flat  con- 
tradiction to  the  telegrams  of  the  time.  The  fact 
has  also  since  been  declared  untrue  and  even 
"unthinkable"  by  the  Austrian  Foreign  Office.  I 
am  afraid  that  this  piece,  made  up  a  month  after 
the  events,  is  but  a  further  attempt  "to  trouble 
what  is  clear"  and  to  make  things  appear  as  if  the 
good  dispositions  of  peaceful  Russia  and  yielding 
Austria  had  been  wantonly  interrupted  by  Ger- 


n8  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

many.  It  almost  seems  that  the  Austrian  offer 
was  purposely  misrepresented  by  M.  Sazonof  and 
purposely  misunderstood  by  the  English  states- 
men.1 

It  is  not  only  an  untruth  that  the  two  eastern 
Powers  were  well  disposed — for  neither  did  Aus- 
tria intend  to  give  way  in  Servia  nor  did  Russia 
want  peace — but  further  it  is  untrue  that  Ger- 
many despatched  her  ultimatum  suddenly  on  that 
very  day,  "out  of  nervousness"  as  is  ironically 
suggested  in  the  Introduction.2  The  British 
Ambassador  had  had  fair  warning  on  the  day  be- 
fore that  "something  would  have  to  be  done" 
unless  Russia  stopped  her  warlike  preparations, 
and  he  was  again  informed  on  the  next  day  that 
"in  a  very  short  time,  perhaps  to-day,  the  Ger- 
man Government  would  take  a  very  serious  step." 

1  See  the  treatment  of  the  same  question  in  the  French  Yellow 
Book  in  App.  II,  pp.  189-203  of  this  study. 

2  As  to  how  the  declaration  of  war  actually  came  about  see 
pp.  100-104. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  119 

(Bl.  B.  No.  108.)  And  this  step  was  taken  be- 
cause Russian  mobilisation  continued  in  a  threat- 
ening manner.  Russia's  mobilisation  was  a  real- 
ity which  had  to  be  faced,  her  formulas  were 
words.  She  would  have  offered  much  more  pleas- 
ant formulas  than  the  unacceptable  one  discussed 
above  and  M.  Schebeko  would  have  added  as 
many  kind  and  hopeful  words  as  one  might  wish, 
on  condition  that  Russia  would  be  allowed  to  as- 
semble her  immense  armies  undisturbed  by  Ger- 
many. But  Germany  could  not  leave  her  border 
undefended  for  a  formula's  sake. 

In  the  Introduction  as  well  as  in  Sir  Maurice 
de  Bunsen's  letter  a  vain  attempt  is  made  to  turn 
things  upside  down,  and  the  method  is  almost  as 
unfortunate  as  that  adopted  by  the  "Times," 
which  wrote  on  July  29,  "Germany  has  behaved 
very  well,  but  she  is  being  dragged  at  the  heels 
of  the  Austrian  war-chariot,"  and  on  October  2.7, 
upon   better    thoughts:      "The    wretched    Dual 


120  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Monarchy  is  being  dragged  at  the  heels  of  the 
Prussian  war-chariot  !" 

We  are  sorry  to  say  that  we  have  to  adduce 
still  more  unpleasant  proofs  of  "arrangement" 
in  the  British  official  publication. 

War  with  Russia  meant  most  likely  war  with 
France.  For  this  Germany  and  Austria  were 
prepared,  although  they  asked  France,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course,  whether  she  would  remain  neutral. 

In  order,  however,  to  prove  Germany's  alleged 
aggressiveness  even  on  the  French  side,  strange 
documents  are  brought  forth. 

With  a  telegram  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  the 
British  Ambassador  in  Paris,  Sir  F.  Bertie,  of 
July  30  (Bl.  B.  No.  105),  there  are  printed  three 
enclosures :  No.  1  and  2,  the  two  letters  of  No- 
vember, 191 2,  which  contained  the  famous 
"agreement"  on  military  co-operation  between 
France  and  England;  the  third  a  note  from  the 
French    Minister    for    Foreign    Affairs    to    the 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  121 

French  Ambassador  at  London,  M.  Paul  Cambon, 
in  which  the  Minister  complains  of  German  offen- 
sive acts  on  the  French  frontier.  The  French 
Minister's  telegram  bears  the  date  "Paris,  July 
31."  How  could  it  be  sent  enclosed  in  a  despatch 
from  London  of  the  30th? 

But  what  is  still  more  astonishing,  the  text  of 
the  French  note  begins  with  the  words :  "L'armee 
allemande  a  ses  avantpostes  sur  nos  bornes  fron- 
tieres;  Vendredi,  hier,  par  deux  fois  des  patrou- 
illes  allemandes  out  penetre  sur  notre  territoire." 
"The  German  army  has  its  advanced  posts  on  our 
frontier  posts ;  Friday,  yesterday,  German  patrols 
twice  penetrated  on  to  our  territory/' 

Notice,  please :    Friday,  Vendredi,  was  July  31. 

According  to  this,  the  telegram  was  sent  on 
August  1 !  and  the  date  must  have  been  changed 
— most  awkwardly  changed — into  July  3 1 ! 

In  the  second  edition  of  the  Blue  Book,  the 
contradiction  having  probably  been  noticed,  the 


122  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

date  of  the  telegram  is  simply  left  out,  but  not  a 
word  is  offered  in  explanation  of  so  strange  a 
fact! 

The  text,  too,  is  altered  in  the  second  edition, 
the  word  (<Vendredi — Friday"  being  left  out  in 
the  French  text  as  well  as  in  the  English  version 
of  it! 

What  are  we  to  infer  from  all  this? 

But  there  is  more.  In  the  French  note  it  is  said 
further:  "J'ajoute  que  toutes  nos  informations 
concordent  pour  montrer  que  les  preparatifs  alle- 
mands  ont  commence  samedi,  le  jour  meme  de  la 
remise  de  la  note  autrichienne."  "I  would  add 
that  all  my  information  goes  to  show  that  the 
German  preparations  began  on  Saturday,  the  very 
day  on  which  the  Austrian  note  was  handed  in." 

Now  the  Austrian  note  was  not  handed  in  on 
Saturday  the  25th,  but  on  Thursday  23,  while 
the  Servian  reply  was  given  on  Saturday  25. 

There  again,  in  the  second  edition  of  the  Blue 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  123 

Book,  the  actual  dates  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum 
and  the  Servian  reply  are  given  in  a  footnote,  and 
it  is  added  that  the  latter  document  is  the  one 
being  referred  to  in  the  text. 

The  whole  passage  is  an  awkward  and  blun- 
dering invention  to  make  the  reader  believe  that 
Germany  had  concocted  the  Ultimatum  to  Servia 
together  with  Austria  as  a  means  to  have  war, 
and  had  begun  preparation  at  once. 

What  are  we  to  conclude?  Shall  we  believe 
that  the  "nervous  Frenchman"  who  wrote  out  the 
despatch  made  so  many  blunders  in  one  note? 
The  fact  remains  that -two  different  texts  being 
given  in  the  two  editions  of  the  Blue  Book,  the 
documents  have  most  certainly  been  altered.  And 
this  fact  is  scarcely  of  a  nature  to  enhance  con- 
fidence in  the  British  official  publication.1 

What  a  change  has  taken  place  in  British  diplo- 
macy since  the  days  of  Disraeli  and  Gladstone ! 

1  See  further  particulars  on  the  altered  note  in  Append.   II, 
"The  French  Yellow  Book,"  on  pp.  203-207  of  this  study. 


V.     THE   CRISIS. 

ENGLAND    AND    THE    BELGIAN 
QUESTION 

On  August  i  war  between  Germany  and  Rus- 
sia was  declared.  War  between  Austria  and  Rus- 
sia on  the  one  hand,  between  France  and  Ger- 
many on  the  other  hand,  seemed  inevitable. 

On  this  same  day,  August  i,  the  German  Chan- 
cellor received  a  telegram  from  the  German  Am- 
bassador in  London,  Prince  Lichnowsky,  in  which 
the  latter  informed  him  of  the  fact  that  Sir  E. 
Grey  had  just  asked  by  telephone — Sir  Edward 
Grey  was  careful  not  to  put  it  down  in  writing — 
whether,  if  France  remained  neutral,  Germany 
would  refrain  from  attacking  her.  Hereupon 
the  Emperor  himself  telegraphed  at  once  to  the 

King  of  England : 

124 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  125 

"If  France  offers  her  neutrality,  which  should 
be  guaranteed  by  the  British  army  and  navy,  I 
shall  of  course  desist  from  an  attack  on  France 
and  shall  dispose  of  my  troops  in  a  different  way. 
I  hope  France  will  not  become  nervous.  I  am 
herewith  giving  the  order  by  telephone  and  by 
telegraph  that  the  troops  at  my  frontier  be  kept 
from  crossing  the  border.  Wilhelm."  It  is  natu- 
ral that  the  German  Government  should  have 
asked  this  guaranty  from  England,  as  the  offer 
came  from  England. 

Without  further  delay,  a  telegraphic  answer 
came  from  the  King  of  Great  Britain  in  which 
the  whole  was  declared  to  be  a  "misunderstand- 
ing." Now,  misunderstanding  or  not,  the  inci- 
dent gives  final  conclusive  proof  that  Germany 
was  far  from  wishing  war  with  France,  and  far 
from  having  aggressive  intentions. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  nature  of  the 
"misunderstanding,"  it  was,  of  course,  extremely 
improbable,  considering  the  nature  of  the  Franco- 
Russian   Alliance,   that  France  would  or  even 


iz6  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

could  remain  neutral, — France  who  so  long  had 
nourished  the  desire  of  revenge  and  who  for 
years  had  been  paying  Russia  for  future  services 
in  that  direction.  M.  Cambon  had  stated  this 
very  clearly  on  July  29  (Blue  Book  No.  87). 

During  the  crisis  the  English  Government  had 
been  repeatedly  urged  by  Russia  and  France  to 
announce  that  it  would  stand  by  them  in  any 
emergency — "then  there  would  be  no  war."  As 
late  as  July  30,  the  President  of  the  French  Re- 
public expressed  his  conviction  that  "peace  be- 
tween the  Powers  was  in  the  hands  of  Great 
Britain.  If  his  Majesty's  Government  announced 
that  England  would  come  to  the  aid  of  France  in 
the  event  of  a  conflict  between  France  and  Ger- 
many as  a  result  of  the  present  difference  between 
Austria  and  Servia,  there  would  be  no  war,  for 
Germany  would  at  once  modify  her  attitude." 
(Notes  from  Sir  George  Buchanan  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  of  July  25  and  2J,  from  Sir  Edward 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  127 

Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan  of  July  27,  and  from 
Sir  F.  Bertie  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  of  July  30, 
Blue  Book  No.  17,  44,  47,  99;  Note  from  M. 
Jules  Cambon  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  of  July  25, 
Yellow  Book  No.  47.1 

The  mere  thought  that  Germany  or  Austria 
could  be  intimidated  into  submission  goes  but  to 
show  how  little  real  understanding  Russia  and 
France  had  of  their  two  near  neighbours. 

English  statesmen  knew  better,  and  the  answer 
which  they  gave  to  their  friends  was  a  warning 
that  "the  German  Government's  attitude  would 
only  be  stiffened  by  such  a  menace  while  their 
own  part  as  mediators  would  be  rendered  more 
difficult."  At  the  same  time  they  gave  them  to 
understand  that  "England,  if  her  counsels  of 

*M.  Cambon,  being,  as  a  Frenchman,  particularly  imaginative, 
even  goes  so  far  as  to  believe  that  fear  of  England's  joining  in 
the  war  contributed  to  make  Germany  postpone  her  mobilisation 
which,  as  he  strongly  suspects,  had  already  been  decided  on  in 
Potsdam  on  July  29.     (Note  of  July  30,  Yellow  Book  No.  105.) 


128  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

moderation  were  disregarded,  might  be  converted 
into  an  ally,"  and  further  that  "the  impression 
that  England  would  stand  aside  in  case  of  war, 
ought  to  be  dispelled  by  the  orders  given  to  the 
First  Fleet  which  is  concentrated,  as  it  happens, 
at  Portland,  not  to  disperse  for  manoeuvre  leave." 
(Bl.  B.  No.  17,  44,  and  47.) 

The  explanation  of  this  attitude  of  the  British 
Government  has  been  given  in  Chapter  II  on  pp. 

33-34- 

"Agreements"  for  future  military  and  naval 
co-operation  had  been  made  or  prepared  not  only 
with  France  and  Russia  but  even — this  was  still 
a  secret — with  neutral  Belgium  as  well.  Al- 
though at  the  time  when  the  Anglo-French  agree- 
ment had  been  concluded,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in 
his  letter  to  M.  Cambon,  expressly  stated  that  the 
"disposition  of  the  French  and  British  fleets  re- 
spectively at  the  present  moment — that  is  to  say 
November   191 2 — was  not  based  upon  an  en- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  129 

gagement  to  co-operate  in  war"  things  were  very 
different  now.  In  fact  not  only  the  First  Fleet 
"happened  to  be  concentrated  at  Portland,"  but 
almost  the  whole  English  Fleet  happened  to  be 
concentrated  in  the  North  Sea,  and  the  whole 
French  Fleet  in  the  Mediterranean.  Though  the 
British  statesmen  did  not,  perhaps,  find  the  pres- 
ent moment  as  favourable  for  a  general  war  as  a' 
later  moment  might  have  been,  they  were  per- 
fectly decided  not  to  stand  aside,  but  to  join  with 
France  and  Russia  and  as  many  of  their  allies  as. 
could  be  found,  in  order  to  profit  by  the  occasion 
and  crush  Germany.  The  only  question  was  to 
find  a  reason  sufficient  to  inveigle  English  public 
opinion.  On  the  whole  their  policy  was  but  the 
continuation  of  the  old  English  policy  of  fighting 
down  the  strongest  continental  state  with  the  help 
of  continental  allies.  They  knew  that  they  could 
count  on  a  party  who  thought  like  them,  "Ger- 
maniam  esse  delendam."  Among  themselves  they 


li3o  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

took  no  care  to  hide  their  thoughts,  and  whoever 
knows  how  to  read  between  the  lines  of  smooth 
and  cautious  diplomatic  language  will  understand 
what  it  meant  when  Sir  G.  Buchanan  on  July 
24  said  in  St.  Petersburg:  "Direct  British  in- 
terests in  Servia  are  nil,  and  a  war  on  behalf  of 
that  country  would  never  be  sanctioned  by  British 
public  opinion" ;  or  again  when  Sir  Edward  Grey 
said  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  London,  on 
July  27,  that  the  "impression  that  England  would 
at  any  event  stand  aside  ought  to  be  dispelled  by 
the  orders  given  to  the  first  fleet"  though  he 
added,  of  course,  that  "his  reference  to  it  must 
not  be  taken  to  mean  that  anything  more  than 
diplomatic  action  was  promised."  No  more  could 
be  "promised,"  but  much  more  could  be  done,  and 
very  much  could  be  implied.  The  acting  French 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  understood  this  per- 
fectly, when  he  expressed  himself  "grateful  for 
the  communication  of  this  promise  and  quite 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  131; 

appreciated  the  impossibility  for  His  Majesty's 
Government  to  declare  themselves  solidaires  witti 
Russia  on  a  question  between  Austria  and  Servia, 
which  in  its  present  condition  is  not  one  affecting 
England/'  (Bl.  B.  No.  6,  47,  62.)  This  was  on 
the  28th.  On  the  29th  M.  Paul  Cambon,  when 
Sir  E.  Grey  had  explained  his  attitude  to  him, 
likewise  gave  answer  that  "he  understood  it  to 
be  a  Balkan  quarrel,  and  in  a  struggle  for  supre- 
macy between  Teuton  and  Slav  we  should  not 
feel  called  to  intervene;  should  other  issues  be 
raised,  and  Germany  and  France  become  in- 
volved, so  that  the  question  became  one  of  the 
hegemony  of  Europe,  we  should  then  decide  what 
was  necessary  for  us  to  do."  M.  Cambon,  as  Sir 
Edward  Grey  added,  "seemed  quite  prepared  for 
this  announcement  and  made  no  criticism  on  it." 
He  took,  however,  care  to  state  that  "France  was 
bound  fo  help  Russia  if  Russia  was  attacked." 
(Sir  E.  Grey  to  Sir  E  Bertie.    Bl.  B.  No.  87.); 


:i32  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

On  July  31,  Sir  Edward  Grey  took  pains  to 
reassure  the  French  Government,  through  his 
Ambassador,  by  saying  "Nobody  here  feels  that 
in  this  dispute,  as  far  as  it  has  yet  gone,  British 
treaties  or  obligations  are  involved"  .  .  .  and 
adding  in  the  same  breath:  "German  jGovern- 
ment  do  not  expect  our  neutrality/'  ^We  can- 
not undertake  a  definite  pledge  to  intervene  in  a 
iwar,"  said  he,  and  when  the  French  Ambassador 
iirged  His  Majesty's  Government  to  recon- 
sider this  decision,  he  explained  his  words 
by  the  important  comment:  "We  should 
not  be  justified  in  giving  any  pledge  to  intervene 
at  the  present  moment,  but  we  will  certainly  con- 
sider the  situation  directly  there  is  a  new  develop- 
ment." Again,  on  the  same  day,  he  gives  vent 
to  the  still  more  expressive  sentence:  ^"Further 
developments  might  alter  this  situation  and  cause 
the  Government  and  Parliament  to  take  the  view, 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  133 

that  intervention  is  justified."  (Bl.  B.  No.  116, 
119.) 

The  words  "in  the  present  condition,"  "as  far 
as  the  dispute  has  yet  gone,"  "at  the  present  mo- 
ment," "further  developments  might  alter  the 
situation,"  and  the  like  return  in  every  message, 
and  they  were  essential.  Nor  were  they  misun- 
derstood. They  covered  the  Foreign  Secretary 
perfectly,  and  at  the  same  time  gave  to  the  hearer 
very  solid  hopes.  Sir  Edward  Grey  possessed  the 
consummate  art  of  saying  very  much  while  he 
did  not  seem  to  say  anything.  His  "dance  be- 
tween two  rows  of  eggs"  was  in  a  way  a  splen- 
did performance. 

No  promise  was  given,  no  agreement  bound  the 
English  nation,  yet  her  allies  knew  they  could 
count  on  her.  Peace  had  been  mediated  on 
every  side  with  the  most  honest  face  and  the  best 
words  in  the  world,  yet  war  was  being  prepared 
in  the  most  fearful  and  inevitable  way.     Truth 


i34  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

had  been  spoken  to  everybody,  and  yet  he  was 
deceiving  his  own  country  and  the  world  at 
large.  Even  to  Germany  he  had  given  so  polite 
and  friendly  warning  at  the  right  moment  that 
she  could  not  complain  or  at  least  ought  not  to 
ido  so  (see  Blue  Book  No.  85  and  89). 

The  fact  is,  Sir  Edward  Grey  waited  for  the 
"new  development,"  perfectly  sure  to  find  it.  He 
had  it  ready  in  his  pocket  for  full  two  years  and 
sprang  it  on  the  31st, — not  on  his  Parliament,  but 
on  Germany. 

He  asked  the  French  and  the  German  Govern- 
ment in  two  telegrams  of  identical  tenor  whether 
"they  would  engage  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  so  long  as  no  other  Power  violated  it." 

The  telegram  to  France  was  naturally  sent 
only  for  appearance's  sake,  as  the  two  allies  were 
working  in  perfect  harmony. 

Germany  declined  to  give  an  immediate  an- 
swer, because  by  doing  so  she  would  have  be- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  135 

trayed  her  military  plans — but  desired  to  know 
first,  through  her  Ambassador  in  England,  Prince 
Lichnowsky,  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a  prom- 
ise not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  England 
would  engage  to  remain  neutral.  Sir  E.  Grey 
replied  that  he  could  not  say  that,  he  did  not  think 
that  he  could  give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that 
condition  alone. 

Two  days  before,  the  German  Chancellor,  in 
exchange  for  British  neutrality,  had  offered  the 
pledge  of  the  Government  not  to  take  any  French 
territory  in  Europe  in  case  of  victory.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  had  answered  indignantly — but  why 
indignantly — it  would  be  "a  disgrace  for  Eng- 
land to  make  this  bargain  with  Germany  at  the 
expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the 
good  name  of  this  country  would  never  recover." 
It  was  offered,  moreover,  that  the  German  fleet 
would  abstain  from  attacking  the  French  coast 
in  the  channel ;  but  this  was  considered  as  being 


136  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

equally  insufficient.  Why  was  this  a  bargain  at 
the  expense  of  France? 

So  Prince  Lichnowsky  "pressed"  the  Foreign 
Secretary  to  formulate  his  conditions  himself. 
He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of  France 
and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed. 

Sir  E.  Grey,  hard  pressed,  answered  that  he 
felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any  promise  to 
remain  neutral  on  such  terms ;  he  could  only  say : 
aWe  must  keep  our  hands  free."  (Bl.  B.  No. 
123.)1 

Now  on  what  terms  would  Sir  E.  Grey  have 
engaged  to  remain  neutral? 

*No.  123. — Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin. 

Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

Sir:  I  TOLD  the  German  Ambassador  today  that  the  reply 
of  the  German  Government  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium was  a  matter  of  very  great  regret,  because  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  affected  feeling  in  this  country.  If  Germany  could 
see  her  way  to  give  the  same  assurance  as  that  which  had  been 
given  by  France  it  would  materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety 
and  tension  here.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  combatant  while  the  other 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  137 

There  is  as  far  as  England  is  concerned,  per- 
haps no  more  important  document  in  the  whole 
Blue  Book  than  this  telegram  No.  123,  and  the 
evidence  it  contains  is  rendered  still  more  pre- 
cious by  its  being  written — not  telephoned  as 
in  the  case  of  his  offer  of  French  neutrality1  :— ■? 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  so  that  he  cannot  even  say 

respected  it,  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  restrain  public 
feeling  in  this  country.  I  said  that  we  had  been  discussing  this 
question  at  a  Cabinet  meeting,  and  as  I  was  authorized  to  tell 
him  this  I  gave  him  a  memorandum  of  it. 

He  asked  me  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a  promise  not  to  vio- 
late Belgium  neutrality  we  would  engage  to  remain  neutral. 

I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that;  our  hands  were  still  free, 
and  we  were  considering  what  our  attitude  should  be.  All  I 
could  say  was  that  "our  attitude  would  be  determined  largely  by 
public  opinion  here,  and  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  would 
appeal  very  strongly  to  public  opinion  here.  I  did  not  think 
that  we  could  give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that  condition 
alone.  f 

The  Ambassador  pressed  me  as  to  whether  I  could  not  formu- 
late conditions  on  which  we  would  remain  neutral.  He  even 
suggested  that  the  integrity  01  France  and  her  colonies  might  be 
guaranteed. 

I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any  promise  to 
remain  neutral  on  similar- terms,  and  I  could  only  say  that  we 
must  keep  our  hands  free.  I  am,  &c, 

-  J"  E.  GREY. 

1  See  page  124. 


138  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

that  he  was  misunderstood.  His  resolution  not  to 
remain  neutral  on  any  account  had  long  since 
been  taken,  but  the  "moral  drapery,"  the  theatri- 
cal pretext  for  onlookers  were  still  missing. 
Further  proof  of  his  resolution  not  to  remain 
neutral  is  to  be  found  in  the  letter,  dated  July 
30,  of  the  Belgian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  St. 
Petersburg,  M.  de  l'Escaille  (already  quoted 
in  Part  III  on  p.  81),  in  which  is  stated  "the  Rus- 
sian Government  have  the  promise  that  England 
will  assist  France." 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  seemingly  superfluous  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  France  and  Germany  were 
ready  to  engage  to  respect  Belgium's  neutrality 
was  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  imposing  on 
English  and  foreign  public  opinion.  As  he 
himself  said  to  Prince  Lichnowsky:  "Our 
attitude  would  be  determined  largely  by  public 
opinion  here,  and  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  would 
appeal  very  strongly  to  public  opinion  here."    He 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  139 

would  have  been  in  great  perplexity  if  Germany 
against  all  expectation  had  engaged  to  respect 
it.  He  knew,  however,  that  this  was  impossible, 
and  that  he  could  be  quite  sure  of  the  game  he 
was  playing. 

In  order  to  understand  this  question  of  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium,  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
the  military  and  the  political  situation,  respec- 
tively, of  Germany  and  Belgium.  And  in  order 
to  be  fair,  we  shall  take  an  Englishman's  view 
of  it,  the  view  of  Mr.  Hilaire  Belloc,  the  well- 
known  military  writer,  who  in  the  "London 
Magazine"  of  May,  1912,  published  a  most  in- 
teresting article,  entitled  "In  Case  of  War."  In 
this  article  he  states,  as  we  stated  before  on  p.  20, 
that  the  situation  of  Germany's  western  frontier 
is  favorable  only  to  France,  the  Vosges  Moun- 
tains being  a  natural  bulwark ;  while  behind  them 
the  formidable  line  of  fortresses  from  Verdun  to 
Belfort  is  such  that  the  German  offensive  must 


i4o  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

either  break  to  pieces  before  it  or  at  the  very 
most  only  be  able  to  force  it  with  terrible  losses 
of  men  and  fatal  loss  of  time.  The  present  war 
has  well  proved  the  truth  of  this  assertion.  While 
Germany  lies  almost  open  to  French  inroads, 
there  is  small  chance  for  a  German  attack  on 
France.  Not  so  well  protected  by  far  is  the 
French  frontier  towards  Belgium.  There  are  no 
fortresses  of  great  worth  on  this  line.  Here  and 
here  alone  would  France  be  open  to  a  German  in- 
vasion. But  neutral  Belgium  lies  between  the 
two  countries,  and,  what  is  still  more  important, 
neutral  Belgium  is  excellently  fortified  on  the 
German  side.  Mr.  Belloc  says  literally  (on  p. 
283) :  "The  French  strategic  frontier  does  not 
correspond  to  their  political  frontier  on  the 
North"  and  again  on  p.  286:  "The  real  strategic 
frontier  of  France  is  the  Meuse  river." 

Given  this  situation,  Germany  would,  of  course 
be  compelled  to  attack  France  through  Belgium. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  141 

:"Let  us  take  it  as  our  starting  point,"  says  Mr. 
Belloc  on  pp.  284-5,  "that  the  Germans  would  and 
must  try  to  get  across  the  Meuse  at  Liege.' ' 

It  may  seem  unimportant  that  Mr.  Belloc  says 
further  that  it  would  be  "a  woeful  miscalculation" 
to  consider  the  capture  and  occupation  of  a  fort- 
ress like  Liege  as  "the  matter  of  a  few  hours  or 
even  of  a  few  days,"  "calculations  based  upon 
rushing  its  defence  are  calculations  of  defeat." 
We  pardon  Mr.  Belloc  for  not  knowing  German 
valour  and  German  energy.  Unimportant  like- 
wise may  seem  the  measures  which,  according 
to  Mr.  Belloc,  are  incumbent  on  England  to  as- 
sist Belgium  against  Germany,  and  also  his 
theory  that  "Antwerp,  so  long  as  Germany  does 
not  control  the  sea,  can  be  made  the  secure  base 
of  an  ever  increasing  force."  All  of  this  is  un- 
important. What  is  of  real  significance  to  us  is 
that  the  English  military  authority  himself  states 
that  Germany  had  no  choice  but  to  go  at  France 


142  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

through  Belgium.  He  adds,  of  course,  in  pass- 
ing, that  this  would  not  have  to  be  feared  "if  trea- 
ties were  held  sacred  by  the  Government  of  Ber- 
lin" and  that  it  "would  be  an  abominably  wrong 
and  treacherous  action";  but  this  is  just  a  slight 
bow  to  that  hypocrisy  which  is  common  in  poli- 
tics, the  main  import  of  which  can  be  expressed 
in  the  sentence :  "I  may  do  wrong  for  my  coun- 
try, but  you  may  not  for  yours."  The  sacredness 
of  the  treaty  does  not  interest  him  so  very  much, 
after  all,  as  he  devotes  only  two  lines  to  the  moral, 
and  many  pages  to  the  military  side  of  the  ques- 
tion. 

Germany  had  indeed  no  choice.  On  one  side 
she  had  immense  Russia  threatening  an  open  bor- 
derline ;  on  the  other  side  France,  who,  while  be- 
ing protected  from  an  attack,  could  easily  carry 
the  war  into  the  German  provinces.  Germany 
was  certainly  lost  if  she  hesitated  to  take  the  way 
which  the  English  author  had  told  her  two  years 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 


i43 


before  she  must  try.  How  would  the  general  or 
the  statesman  be  treated  in  England  who  re- 
ported :  "I  am  sorry  to  say,  Great  Britain  is  lost ; 
it  is  true,  I  might  have  saved  her  by  marching 
across  neutral  territory,  but  I  have  always  been 
told  that  I  was  not  to  do  that,  and  my  country- 
men, who  are  exceedingly  severe  and  even  inexor- 
able on  the  point  of  morals,  would  never  have  par- 
doned me  for  saving  them  in  that  way."  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  I  have  no  doubt,  would  have  clapped 
him  on  his  back  as  being  the  man  of  his  ethics, 
and  he  would  have  been  carried  in  triumph 
through  the  London  streets.  The  world  seems  to 
have  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  not  all  of  Britain's 
great  men,  not  even  all  of  her  Parliament,  be- 
lieved that  Germany's  proposal  to  march  through 
Belgium  was  Sir  Edward  Grey's  real  reason  for 
entering  the  war.  Meetings  of  protest  were  held 
by  leading  men.  Lord  Morley,  Burns  and  Treve- 
lyan  resigned  from  office.     Mr.  Ramsay  Mac- 


i44  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

donald,  M.  P.,  answered  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
speech  of  August  3  in  the  following  words :  "I 
think  the  Government  which  the  right  honourable 
gentleman  represents  and  for  which  he  speaks  is 
wrong.  I  think  the  verdict  of  history  will  be  that 
they  are  wrong.  ...  If  the  right  honourable 
gentleman  could  come  to  us  and  tell  us  that  a 
small  European  nationality  like  Belgium  is  in 
danger,  and  could  assure  us  he  is  going  to  con- 
fine the  conflict  to  that  question,  then  we  would 
support  him.  What  is  the  use  of  talking 
about  coming  to  the  aid  of  Belgium  when, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  you  are  engaging  in  a  whole 
European  war  which  is  not  going  to  leave  the 
map  of  Europe  in  the  position  it  is  in  now  ?  The 
right  honourable  gentleman  said  nothing  about 
Russia.  We  will  want  to  know  about  that.  We 
want  to  try  to  find  out  what  is  going  to  happen 
when  it  is  all  over  to  the  power  of  Russia  in 
Europe  and  we  are  not  going  blindly  into  this 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  145 

conflict  without  having  some  sort  of  a  rough  idea 
as  to  what  is  going  to  happen." 

Another  member  of  Parliament,  Mr.  Pon- 
sonby,  in  the  thirteen  questions  published  by  him 
in  the  "Nation"  answered  to  Qu.  4:  "Would  we 
have  declared  war  on  France,  if  in  the  interest  of 
her  security,  she  would  have  found  it  necessary  to 
send  a  French  army  across  the  Belgian  frontier  ?" 
"No!" 

But  another  still  more  important  answer  was 
given  in  a  most  unexpected  way.  In  the  war-office 
in  Brussels  most  interesting  papers  were  found, 
among  them  a  report  of  General  Ducarme,  dated 
Brussels,  April  10,  1906,  and  addressed  to  the 
Belgian  War-Minister,  relating  to  a  conversation 
he  had  had  with  the  English  Military  Attache 
Lt.-Col.  Barnardiston.  The  subject  of  the  con- 
versation had  been  the  landing  of  British  troops 
in  Belgium  in  case  of  a  German  attack  on  the 
country.  In  this  conversation  and  consequent  upon 


146  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

it  in  the  report,  everything  is  considered:  what 
forces  would  be  landed — 100,000  men — and  of 
what  troops  they  would  consist ;  the  landing-place, 
which  ought  to  be  Dunkirk,  because  Antwerp 
would  take  much  more  time;  the  railway-trans- 
port from  there,  and  the  time  required  for  the 
transport.  It  was  further  suggested  that  maps 
should  be  prepared  for  the  English  officers,  and 
pictures  representing  the  Belgian  uniforms,  as 
well  as  translations  of  certain  Belgian  military 
instructions ;  also  Belgian  staff-officers  should  be 
appointed  to  accompany  the  single  British  corps, 
etc.  There  is  a  note  to  the  report,  in  which  is 
added  that  the  English  General  Grierson  had  in- 
formed General  Ducarme,  at  the  manoeuvres, 
that  even  150,000  men  could  be  landed.  Of 
course,  the  well-known  formula  is  not  missing 
"that  the  English  Government  should  not  be 
bound  by  the  agreement,"  and  on  the  margin  is 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  147 

written :  "U entree  des  Anglais  en  Belgique  ne  se 
ferait  qu'apres  la  violation  de  notre  neutralite 
par  V  Allemagne"  ("the  English  would  not  enter 
Belgium  before  the  violation  of  our  neutrality- 
through  Germany"). 

A  few  years  later,  however,  a  new  conference 
having  taken  place  between  the  English  Military 
Attache  and  the  Belgian  General  Jungbluth,  a 
new  report  was  written.  The  paper  is  dated  April 
23  only,  no  year  being  given,  but  it  is  to  be  in- 
ferred from  the  contents  that  it  must  be  191 1  or 
1912 — .  The  report  was  made  by  Count  Van  der 
Straaten  of  the  Belgian  Foreign  Office.  Accord- 
ing to  this  document,  England,  "during  the  late 
events/'  as  Col.  Bridges  informed  General  Jung- 
bluth, would  have  sent  over  160,000  men,  and  on 
£he  Belgian  General's  protest  that  Belgian 
consent  would  first  be  necessary  for  that,  the 
Englishman  replied  that  he  was  aware  of  this, 
but  that,  knowing  Belgium  to  be  incapable  of  re- 


148  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

pelling  the  German  attack,  England  would  have 
landed  her  army  in  any  case.1 

It  must  also  be  added  that  in  the  pockets  of 
English  officers,  killed  or  taken  prisoners  during 
the  present  war,  not  only  detailed  maps  of  Bel- 
gium have  been  found,  but  elaborate  military 
informations  concerning  Belgium  in  English 
translation,  such  as  could  only  be  furnished  by 
the  Belgian  General  Staff  and  which  required  a 
long  time  to  be  prepared.  On  each  copy  the 
words  "Property  of  the  Crown"  were  printed, 
with  severe  injunctions  of  secrecy  to  the  respon- 
sible possessor  of  the  same. 

Moreover,  important  papers  were  found  in  the 
possession  of  the  Secretary  of  the  English  Em- 
bassy at  Brussels,  Mr.  Grant  Watson,  who  had 

1  Compare  the  words  of  the  German  ultimatum :  "The  Imperial 
Government  are  afraid  that  Belgium  in  spite  of  the  best  inten- 
tions will  be  unable  to  repel  a  march  of  French  forces.  .  .  . 
Germany  is  forced  by  measures  of  her  enemies  to  violate  Belgian 
territory.  .  .  ."     (Belg.  Gray  Book  No.  20.) 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  149 

remained  there  and  was  arrested  by  the  German 
troops.  Among  them  were  secret  informations 
concerning  Belgian  mobilisation,  the  defence  of 
Antwerp  and  its  provisions,  dated  May  27,  191 3; 
also  a  piece  of  paper  on  which  was  written  by 
hand: 

"Renseignements: 

1.  Les  officiers  frangais  ont  regit  ordre  de  re- 
joindre  des  le  27  apres-midi: 

2.  Le  meme  jour,  le  chef  de  Gare  de  Feignies  a 
regit  ordre  de  concentrer  vers  Maubeuge  tons 
les  wagons  fermes  disponibles,  en  vite  de 
transports  de  troupes. 

Communique  par  la  Brigade  de  gendarmerie  de 
Frameries.Jf  1 

Now,  Feignies  is  a  railway  station  in  France 
3  km.  from  the  Belgian  frontier,  while  Frameries 
is  a  station  of  the  same  line  in  Belgium,  about  10 
km.  from  the  borderline.    This  meant  active  as- 

XA11  these  documents  have  been  reproduced  by  order  of  the 
German  Government,  and  the  facsimiles  have  been  communi- 
cated to  the  Governments  of  neutral  states. 


ISO  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

sistance  given  to  the  French  Mobilisation  on  July 
27,  1914 — that  is  to  say,  six  days  before  the  de- 
livery of  the  German  ultimatum.  The  papers 
were  confiscated  just  as  Mr.  Grant  Watson  tried 
to  destroy  them. 

There  we  find  the  neutral  State  of  Belgium 
granting  to  one  neighbour  the  permission  to 
march  through  its  territory,  furnishing  maps  and 
transcriptions  of  its  most  jealously  guarded  mili- 
tary secrets  to  one  side  and  to  one  side  only,  the 
Allies.1 

Let  us  suppose  things  had  taken  the  other 

1  Belgium  had  not  been  without  timely  warning.  Her  own 
Ambassador  at  the  court  of  Berlin,  Baron  Greindl,  had  admon- 
ished the  Belgian  Government  to  beware  of  making  one-sided 
agreements  with  the  Triple-Entente.  He  even  went  to  the 
length  of  calling  the  English  propositions  "naive  and  perfidious." 
Yet,  in  full  consciousness  of  all  these  facts,  the  Belgian  Foreign 
Minister,  M.  Davignon,  dared  declare  in  a  note  addressed  to  the 
German  Ambassador,  Herr  von  Below-Saleske,  on  Aug.  3,  1914 
(Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  22)  :  "Belgium  has  always  been  faith- 
ful to  her  international  obligations;  she  has  fulfilled  her  duties 
in  a  spirit  of  loyal  impartiality,"  and  he  repeated  these  words  in 
a  note  addressed  to  the  heads  of  Belgian  Embassies  in  all  foreign 
countries  on  Aug.  5.     (Belgian  Gray  Book,  No.  44.) 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  151 

course,  let  us  suppose  for  a  moment  that  the  Bel- 
gian Government  had  made  the  same  agreements 
with  Germany,  fearing  France  and  her  inten- 
tions. It  may  be  well  to  remind  the  reader  of 
the  fact  that  Belgium  had  been  afraid  of  French 
Politics  for  many  years  and  of  more  than  a  mere 
march  of  troops  through  Belgian  territory.  (In 
1867  France  desired  to  incorporate  Belgium  in 
France  and  proposed  to  Prussia  that  she  should 
take  Holland.)  Let  us  suppose  that  this  state  of 
things  had  lasted  and  that  the  agreements  had 
been  made  with  Germany:  will  anybody  believe 
that  England  and  France  would  have  been  sat- 
isfied, that  they  would  have  declared  in  Brus- 
sels: "Provided  that  you  take  care  to  add  that 
all  your  arrangements  with  Germany  are  made 
for  the  protection  of  your  neutrality  and  for  the 
prevention  of  violations  of  it,  they  are  all  right. 
Your  'conversations'  with  the  German  military 
attache  may  be  ever  so  explicit,  they  may  touch 


1 52  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

- 

every  detail  of  the  future  inroad  of  German 
troops;  your  attitude  is  correct  and  not  in  con- 
tradiction with  your  international  obligations/' 
Does  anybody  believe  that  this  would  have  been 
the  attitude  of  the  French  and  English  Govern- 
ments? Let  us  suppose  further  that  the  Belgian 
Government  had  been  compelled  by  the  German 
Government  to  make  military  preparations  on  the 
French  border,  what  would  French  and  English 
statesmen  have  said? 

All  this  was  done — but  the  other  way  round! 
The  arrangements  were  made  with  England,  the 
preparations  were  against  Germany.  The  proof 
is  to  be  found  in  an  article  which  was  written 
by  a  well-known  member  of  the  Belgian  Parlia- 
ment, M.  Louis  de  Brouckere  and  published  by 
him  in  the  "Neue  Zeit"  of  July,  1914,  No.  18, 
just  a  few  days  before  the  war  broke  out: 

"Only  a  few  days  after  the  elections  (of  1912) 
the    (Belgian)    Government  obeyed  the  urgent 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  153 

admonitions  of  France,  England  and,  undoubt- 
edly, Russia,  and  M.  de  Brocqueville  brought  a 
bill  before  the  Chamber  introducing  Compulsory 
Service.  .  .  .  Our  field  force  has  been  increased 
to  150,000  men  by  order  of  the  Triple-Entente 
which  has  installed  itself  as  protector  of  our 
possessions.  .  .  .  To-morrow  perhaps  England, 
who  considers  Compulsory  Service  to  be  an  oner- 
ous institution  only  within  her  own  borders,  will 
again  ask  us  to  fulfill  our  obligations.  .  .  .  We 
must  dance  to  the  pipe  of  France  and  England, 
dance  even  to  our  death." 

Prophetic  words,  destined  to  be  realised  only 
too  soon!  Nobody  could  express  in  clearer 
terms  on  which  side  and  on  whose  behalf  the 
Belgian  Government  was  making  its  military 
preparations.  Now  consider  all  elements  to- 
gether: Belgium,  by  her  very  situation,  forms 
the  strategic  frontier  of  England  and  France, 
her  fortresses  were  considered  England's  and 


154  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

France's  defences;  they  played  an  important  part 
in  their  strategic  plans;  her  government  had 
made  arrangements  with  both  in  order  to  make 
her  position  still  more  effective  in  their  favour 
and  against  Germany,  while  no  arrangements  had 
been  made  with  Germany  against  a  possible 
French  or  English  inroad;  at  the  wish  of  the 
Triple-Entente,  Belgium  had  increased  her  field 
force  and  fortified  her  defences  against  Germany; 
the  sympathies  of  the  public  and  of  the  press 
were  all  for  France:  what  more,  please,  could 
have  been  done  against  the  spirit  and  the  let- 
ter of  Belgian  neutrality? 

Germany  did  not  desire  to  take  Belgian  ter- 
ritory nor  to  touch  Belgium's  independence; 
twice  she  offered  peace  and  perfect  restoration 
for  damages  after  the  war.  She  only  wanted 
to  march  through  Belgium.1 

In  the  face  of  these  facts,  hear  Mr.  Asquith 

1  See  the  German  ultimatum  in  Appendix  I. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  i55 

declaiming  in  Parliament  on  August  6,  1914. 
"What  does  that — the  German  proposal — 
amount  to?  Let  me  just  ask  the  house.  I  do 
so,  not  with  the  object  of  inflaming  passions, 
certainly  not  with  the  object  of  exciting  feel- 
ings against  Germany  ["O  masters,  if  I  were 
disposed  to  stir — your  hearts  and  minds  to  mu- 
tiny and  rage, — I  should  do  Brutus  wrong"],  but 
I  do  so  to  vindicate  and  make  clear  the  position 
of  the  British  Government  in  this  matter.  What 
did  that  proposal  amount  to?  In  the  first  place 
it  meant  this:  That  behind  the  back  of  France 
— they  were  not  made  a  party  to  these  communi- 
cations— we  should  have  given,  if  we  had  as- 
sented to  that,  a  free  license  to  Germany  to  an- 
nex, in  the  event  of  a  successful  war,  the  whole 
of  the  extra-European  dominions  and  possessions 
of  France.  What  did  it  mean  as  regards  Bel- 
gium? When  she  addressed,  as  she  has  ad- 
dressed in  these  last  few  days,  her  moving  appeal 


156  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

to  us  to  fulfil  our  solemn  guarantee  of  her  neu- 
trality, what  reply  should  we  have  given?  What 
reply  should  we  have  given  to  that  Belgian  ap- 
peal? We  should  have  been  obliged  to  say  that, 
without  her  knowledge,  we  had  bartered  away 
to  the  Power  threatening  her  our  obligation  to 
keep  our  plighted  word.  The  House  has  read, 
and  the  country  has  read,  of  course,  in  the  last 
few  hours,  the  most  pathetic  appeal  addressed 
by  the  King  of  Belgium,  and  I  do  not  envy  the 
man  who  can  read  that  appeal  with  an  unmoved 
heart.  Belgians  are  fighting  and  losing  their 
lives.  What  would  have  been  the  position  of 
Great  Britain  to-day  in  the  face  of  that  spec- 
tacle, if  we  had  assented  to  this  infamous  pro- 
posal? Yes,  and  what  are  we  to  get  in  return? 
A  promise — nothing  more ;  a  promise  as  to  what 
Germany  would  do  in  certain  eventualities;  a 
promise,  be  it  observed — I  am  sorry  to  have  to 
say  it,  but  it  must  be  put  upon  record — given 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  i57 

by  a  Power  which  was  at  that  very  moment  an- 
nouncing its  intention  to  violate  its  own  treaty, 
and  inviting  us  to  do  the  same.  I  can  only  say, 
if  we  had  dallied  or  temporised,  we,  as  a  Govern- 
ment, should  have  covered  ourselves  with  dis- 
honour, and  we  should  have  betrayed  the  in- 
terests of  this  country,  of  which  we  are  trus- 
tees." 

Must  not  these  words  have  sounded  fine  and 
pathetic  in  the  ears  of  the  hearers  who  were 
ignorant  of  the  monstrous  comedy  that  preceded 
and  which  culminated  in  the  two  telegrams  of 
July  31? 

It  is  only  in  Mr.  Asquith's  last  sentence,  where 
he  says  that  the  country's  honour  as  well  as  its 
interest  required  the  war,  and  only  in  the  lat- 
ter half  of  this  last  sentence  that  a  ray  of  truth 
breaks  through  his  statements. 

In  this  firm  of  "Honour  and  Interest"  which, 
according  to  Mr.  Asquith,  determined  the  Eng- 


158  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

lish  Cabinet's  action,  Honour  is  a  very  insig- 
nificant person  with  a  fine  appearance,  who  is 
sent  forth  to  represent  the  house  whenever  his 
partner  thinks  fit  to  do  so,  but  who  is  at  once 
silenced  and  shut  up  in  a  back-room  when  his 
views  do  not  happen  to  be  in  accordance  with 
those  of  the  shrewd  business-man  who  is  the 
real  head  of  the  house,  and  who  reserves  the 
management  of  it  absolutely  to  himself. 

Politicians,  of  course,  are  often  forced  to  hide 
their  thoughts,  but  seldom  does  one  find  a  great 
statesman  resorting  to  such  "cant"  as  Mr.  As- 
quith  has  done. 

England's  honour  implicated  by  the  observa- 
tion of  neutrality  or  the  violation  of  treaties  she 
has  put  her  name  to!  In  how  many  treaties, 
since  1878,  has  Great  Britain  pledged  her  faith 
as  a  guarantee  of  the  integrity  of  Turkish  ter- 
ritory? Yet,  in  spite  of  so  many  solemn  prom- 
ises, she  did  not  feel  herself  bound  to  keep  "her 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  i59 

plighted  word"  in  1912,  but  delivered  the  Otto- 
man Empire,  a  friendly  Power,  up  to  the  Balkan 
League.  Nor  did  Mr.  Asquith's  Cabinet  then 
abhor  the  bartering  away  of  their  obligations 
behind  a  friendly  Powers  back. 

In  1807,  in  time  of  peace,  the  British  bom- 
barded the  neutral  Port  of  Copenhagen  and  took 
possession  of  the  entire  Danish  fleet. 

But  in  1914  Mr.  Asquith  continued:  "If  I 
am  asked  what  we  are  fighting  for,  I  reply  in 
two  sentences.  In  the  first  place,  to  fulfil  a  sol- 
emn international  obligation,  an  obligation  which, 
if  it  had  been  entered  in  between  private  per- 
sons in  the  ordinary  concerns  of  life,  would  have 
been  regarded  as  an  obligation  not  only  of  law 
but  of  honour  which  no  self-respecting  man  could 
possibly  have  repudiated.  I  say,  secondly,  we 
are  fighting  to  vindicate  the  principle  which, 
in  these  days  when  force,  material  force,  some- 
times seems  to  be  the  dominant  influence  and  f  ac- 


160  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

tor  in  the  development  of  mankind,  we  are  fight- 
ing to  vindicate  the  principle  that  small  nationali- 
ties are  not  to  be  crushed,  in  defiant  of  inter- 
national good  faith,  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  a 
strong  and  overmastering  Power."  Thus  speaks 
the  Prime-Minister  of  the  British  Empire,  which 
is  strong,  overmastering  numberless  small  na- 
tions powerless  to  resist  her!  Did  he  never  for 
a  moment  think  of  Egypt,  of  the  Boer  Republics 
in  1904,  of  Southern  Persia,  of  North  Persia 
delivered  up  to  Russia  and  trodden  down  by 
her  with  greatest  brutality  ?  Were  they  not  small 
nations  crushed  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  a  strong 
and  overmastering  Power?  Why  if  so  desirous 
"to  vindicate  the  principle/'  did  the  English  Gov- 
ernment never  fight  for  oppressed  countries  like 
Finland  or  Poland,  the  Baltic  provinces,  the  Ru- 
thenians  ? 

All  the  world  knows  why  England  made  war 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  161 

on  Germany  and  "what  she  is  fighting  for." 
To  begin  with,  England  believed  that  she  was 
takir  J  no  risk.  To  quote  from  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  speech  of  August  3  (Blue  Book,  Part  II 
[1]) — we  hope  that  speech  may  ever  be  remem- 
bered— "For  us,  with  a  powerful  Fleet,  which 
we  believe  able  to  protect  our  commerce  and  to 
protect  our  shores,  and  to  protect  our  interests  if 
we  are  engaged  in  war,  we  shall  suffer  but  lit- 
tle more  than  we  shall  suffer  if  we  stand  aside/' 

England's  great  fear  was  the  growth  of  Ger- 
man commerce.  In  the  time  between  1901  and 
191 1  German  commerce  had  grown  from  7.3  to 
17.6  milliards  of  Marks,  that  is  to  say,  increased 
by  10  milliards  or  by  141%. 

English  Commerce  in  the  same  period  had 
grown  from  12.7  to  21.1  milliards,  that  is  to  say, 
increased  by  8.4  milliards  or  by  66%. 

It  is  clear  that  in  a  given  period  German  Com- 


162  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

merce,  if  allowed  to  grow  unimpaired,  will  not 
only  proportionately  but  also  absolutely  become 
superior  to  British  Commerce. 

From  1897  to  191 1  the  German  merchant  ma- 
rine increased  from  3,256,000  to  7,884,000  reg„ 
tons,  that  is  to  say,  by  192%;  the  English  mer- 
chant marine  in  the  same  time  increased  from 
22,507,000  to  33,864,000  reg.  tons,  that  is  to  say, 

by  59%. 

From  1897  to  191 1  the  percentage  of  the 
world's  ships,  which  is  represented  by  the  Ger- 
man merchant  marine,  rose  from  6.5  to  9.9,  that 
is  to  say,  3%,  while  the  percentage  represented 
by  the  English  merchant  marine  decreased  from 
54.3  to  47.4,  that  is  7%. 

These  and  a  series  of  similar  figures  contain 
the  true  reason  of  England's  war  against  Ger- 
many. Regarding  this  point,  however,  Mr.  As- 
quith  said  nothing.    The  fact  has  since  been  con- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  163 

fessed  with  all  commendable  openness  by  British 
statesmen  as  well  as  by  the  British  press.1 

Now  it  seems  permissible  to  combat,  nay  to 
ruin,  a  commercial  competitor  by  commercial 
means,  but  not  by  burning  his  house  or  by  an 
attempt  on  his  life;  and  it  seems  particularly 
contemptible  to  make  this  attempt  on  his  life 
by  "striking  him  from  behind  while  he  is  fight- 
ing for  his  life  against  two  assailants/'  This 
is  what  England  has  done,  and  it  is  what  in  Ger- 
many has  caused  the  sudden  and  terrible  hatred 
of  the  English,  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  of  Asquith. 
The  high  esteem  that  up  to  the  war  existed  for 
England  exists  now  only  for  those  few  great 
British  minds  which  have  kept  their  impartial 
view  of  the  entangled  matters  of  this  world. 

1  In  a  long  article  on  Iron  and  Steel  Industry  in  Germany  and 
England  in  the  "Engineer"  (Aug.  28  to  Sept.  25)  it  is  said: 
"The  end  of  the  war  must  be  the  methodical  ruin  of  all  great 
industrial  establishments  in  the  German  provinces  occupied  by 
the  allied  troops." 


164  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

While  the  Germans  fight  for  their  country,  for 
their  homes,  for  their  existence,  England,  threat- 
ened by  no  one  in  her  existence,  made  war  for 
her  mercantile  interests,  for  her  money's  sake. 
The  Germans  knew  against  what  odds  and  for 
what  a  price  they  were  to  contend,  while  for  Eng- 
land it  has  been  a  question  of  the  merest  expe- 
diency. 

There  is  still  another  reason  for  our  disap- 
pointment. The  Germans  admired  England. 
Ever  since  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury they  believed  her  to  be  the  birthplace  as  well 
as  the  patron  of  political  liberty.  Some  of  them, 
deceived  by  outward  show,  and  some,  by  the  ex- 
istence of  many  Englishmen  whose  views  are 
most  enlightened,  whose  moral  standard  is  very 
high,  deceived  by  these  things,  I  say,  some  of 
them  believed  in  a  higher  English  civilisation. 
And  man  hates  to  be  deceived  in  what  he  thought 
an  ideal,  and  more  than  an  enemy  he  hates  the 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  165 

ifriend  who  has  betrayed  his  belief  in  him.  Evi- 
dence of  the  very  friendly  attitude  of  the  Ger- 
man people  towards  England  and  the  English 
we  find  in  the  utterance  of  no  less  a  witness, 
than  Lord  Aspley,  who  returned  to  London  on 
August  2  after  a  two  months'  sojourn  in  the 
German  Empire.  The  "Morning  Post"  of  Aug- 
ust 4  relates  the  following:  "Asked  as  to  the 
attitude  of  the  German  people  towards  England 
and  the  English,  he  said  that  his  experience  had 
been  that  they  were  friendly  rather  than  other- 
wise. From  the  conversations  he  had  had  with 
different  people,  they  seemed  to  exclude  England 
from  the  quarrel  altogether,  and  seemed  to  re- 
gard her  as  a  country  that  would  have  no  hand  in 
the  matter  at  all.  One  and  all  seemed  deeply 
appreciative  of  England's  efforts  for  peace,  and 
spoke  in  the  highest  terms  of  Sir  Edward  Grey." 
The  Germans  can  pardon  France,  though  she 
is  wronging  herself  and  them,  because  they  can 


a  66  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

at  least  conceive  her  hatred  of  them  since  1871. 
They  can  understand  that  a  barbarian  and  des- 
potic Empire  like  Russia,  which  thought  itself 
the  master  of  the  continent,  annoyed  at  finding  a 
highly  organized  smaller  Power  in  its  way,  rushes 
upon  it  to  destroy  it.  But  they  cannot  pardon 
the  people  and  party  led  by  the  diplomats  of 
England,  with  whom  they  never  had  any  war 
or  even  a  quarrel,  for  treacherously  coming  in 
to  help  the  destroyers. 

Indications  of  the  feelings  of  the  best  English- 
men were  not  wanting,  however.  A  meeting  of 
prominent  men  declared  during  the  most  critical 
time  that  a  war  against  Germany  would  be  "a 
war  against  civilization/'  We  are  not  to  forget 
either  that  England  was  the  sole  country  where 
three  ministers  resigned  because  they  were  not 
willing  to  assume  the  responsibility  for  this  war. 
We  see  that  a  high  standard  of  political  morals 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  167 

is  by  no  means  extinct  in  England,  and  that 
there  are  men  left  whose  views  coincide  with 
those  of  Germany.  Unhappily  they  seem  to 
have  no  influence  on  the  politics  of  their  coun- 
try. 

What  remains?  This  war  is  no  more  a  war 
of  races  than  it  is  one  of  principles.  What  M. 
Cambon  said  of  a  struggle  between  Teuton  and 
Slav  is  but  fiction.  There  are  25  millions  of 
Slavs,  the  strong  men  of  which  are  actually  fight- 
ing with  Germany  and  Austria.  There  are  40 
millions  more  (Poles,  Bulgarians,  Ukrainians) 
sympathizing  with  them.  The  number  of  Slavs 
who  are  for  them  is  at  least  as  large  as  the 
number  of  those  against  them.  It  is  not  a  war 
of  nations.  The  French,  the  English  and  the 
Russian  peoples  had  as  little  wish  for  a  war 
with  the  Central  Powers  as  their  people  ever  had 
to  fight  against  them.    It  is,  as  a  Spanish  scholar 


ii68  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

said  lately,  a  kind  of  civil  war.  It  is  a  war  cre- 
ated by  the  envy,  ambition  and  low  interest  of 
a  small  number  of  persons  who  deluded  them- 
selves and  deceived  the  many.  The  interest  and 
illusions  of  a  few  ambitious  French  politicians 
who  made  the  fatal  alliance  with  Russia,  pre- 
cipitated their  unfortunate  country  into  a  war 
created  out  of  reckless  ambition  by  a  few  Rus- 
sian Granddukes  and  their  adherents.  Only  ir- 
responsible and  merciless  politicians  like  those 
who  wield  the  power  in  Russia  could  let  loose 
the  horrors  of  such  a  war.  No  responsible  states- 
man would  ever  have  dared  to  do  it.  But  France 
was  forced  to  join  and,  seeing  she  could  not 
do  otherwise,  tried  to  comfort  herself  morally 
with  the  hope  that  the  moment  of  great  revenge 
was  near.  England,  who  had  engineered  the 
dangerous  diplomatic  situation,  joined,  to  profit 
by  the  occasion,  for  her  commercial  interest. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  169 

Germany  is  fighting  to  preserve  that  which 
she  has  achieved,  while  England  is  fighting  not 
for  her  achievements  but  against  them. 

The  consequences  will  fall  heavily  on  England 
and  on  all  the  world. 


APPENDIX  I 

THE  GERMAN  ULTIMATUM 

Note  handed  by  Herr  von  Below-Saleske,  Ger- 
man Ambassador,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  at  2  o'clock  p.  m.  of 
August  2,  1 9 14. 

Brussels,  August  2,  19 14. 

The  German  Government  have  sure  informa- 
tion that  French  troops  intend  to  march  along 
the  Meuse  river  by  Givet  and  Namur.  This  news 
renders  all  further  doubt  as  to  the  intention  of 
France  to  march  on  Germany  through  Belgian 
territory  impossible.  The  Imperial  Government 
are  afraid  that  Belgium  in  spite  of  the  best  in- 
tentions will  be  unable  to  repel  a  march  of  French 
forces  of  that  strength.  The  fact  constitutes 
a  sufficient  certainty  of  an  imminent  danger  to 
Germany. 

It  is  Germany's  imperious  duty  to  prevent  such 

an  attack  on  the  enemy's  part. 

The  German  Government  would  deeply  regret, 
170 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  171 

if  Belgium  should  see  in  the  fact  that  Germany 
is  forced  by  measures  of  her  enemies  to  violate 
Belgian  territory,  an  act  of  hostility  toward  her- 
self. 

In  order  to  exclude  all  misunderstandings,  the 
German  Government  declare: 

I.  Germany  intends  no  hostile  act  toward 
Belgium.  If  in  the  war  which  is  beginning,  Bel- 
gium consents  to  observe  an  attitude  of  friendly 
neutrality  toward  Germany,  the  German  Govern- 
ment engage  to  guarantee  the  existence  of  the 
Kingdom  and  all  its  possessions  for  the  time  of 
peace. 

II.  On  the  same  condition  Germany  engages 
to  evacuate  Belgian  territory  as  soon  as  peace  is 
restored. 

III.  If  Belgium  observes  a  friendly  attitude, 
Germany  is  ready  to  buy  and  to  pay  cash — by 
concert  with  the  Belgian  authorities — for  every- 
thing that  is  necessary  to  the  German  troops,  and 
to  pay  damages  for  all  detriment  caused  by  them. 

IV.  If  Belgium  should  commit  hostile  acts 
against  the  German  troops,  if  she  should — in  par- 


172  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

ticular — oppose  difficulties  to  their  advance,  be 
it  by  means  of  the  fortifications  on  the  Meuse 
river,  be  it  by  destroying  roads,  railway  lines, 
tunnels,  and  other  works  of  the  kind,  Germany 
will  be  forced  to  consider  Belgium  as  a  hostile 
power. 

In  this  case  Germany  will  assume  no  engage- 
ments toward  the  Kingdom  but  will  leave  all  fu- 
ture relations  between  the  two  states  to  the  de- 
cision of  arms.  The  German  Government  en^ 
tertain  the  just  hope  that  such  a  contingency  will 
not  arise  and  that  the  Belgian  Government  will 
apply  all  appropriate  measures  to  prevent  it.  In 
this  case  the  friendly  relations  existing  between 
the  two  states  will  become  still  more  close  and 
durable.     (Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20.) 


APPENDIX  II 

THE  FRENCH  YELLOW  BOOK 

The  French  official  publication  is  not  nearly 
so  clever  as  the  British  Blue  Book.  The  Blue 
Book  deals  at  least  with  facts,  though  they  be 
often  arranged  and  misrepresented  with  great 
cunning,  while  the  French  publications  deal 
mostly  with  conjectures.  Misrepresentation  and, 
we  are  afraid,  forgery  is  sometimes  attempted,! 
but  with  so  little  skill  that  to  all  readers  who 
have  even  a  slight  knowledge  of  the  facts  in 
question,  the  blunder  is  at  once  discernible.  We 
would  be  inclined  to  speak  of  French  superficial- 
ity, if  we  did  not  know  the  wonderful  and  most 
exact  works  of  French  historians  which  forbid 
generalisations  of  this  kind.  But  is  it  possible 
that  French  statesmen  who  have  lived  in  Ger- 
many for  a  long  time  and  are  known  to  be  able 

173 


174  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

men,  should  be  so  absolutely  incapable  of  judg- 
ing facts,  persons,  public  opinion  in  Germany? 
Is  it  because  they  have  always  acted  and  judged 
according  to  a  settled  prejudice?  or  did  they  in- 
tentionally misrepresent  events  because  they  did 
not  desire  friendly  relations  between  the  two  na- 
tions? Did  they  intend  to  delude  the  French 
reader  or  were  they  the  dupes  of  their  own  ig- 
norance? How  could  they  allow  unconscien- 
tious subalterns  to  abuse  their  credulity  in  a  way 
so  gross  as  is  shown  by  the  documents  published 
in  this  strange  volume? 

I  need  only  state  that  it  contains,  as  No.  5,  a 
note  to  M.  Stephan  Pichon,  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  "On  German  public  opinion  as 
reported  by  diplomatic  and  consular  agents," 
dated  July  30,  1913,  in  which  we  read  literally 
the  following  passage:  "The  personality  of  the 
Emperor  is  being  discussed,  the  Chancellor  is 
unpopular,  but  Herr  von  Kiderlen-Wachter  was 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  175 

the  most  hated  man  in  Germany  last  winter. 
Though  still  in  discredit,  however,  he  is  not  hated 
so  much,  for  he  intimates  that  he  will  soon  have 
his  revenge."  Now,  in  July,  19 13,  Herr  von 
Kiderlen-Wachter,  the  former  Foreign  Secre- 
tary, had  been  dead  and  buried  for  about  half 
a  year. 

I  wonder  what  salary  France  pays  to  her  Am- 
bassador and  to  her  "diplomatic  and  consular 
agents"  for  furnishing  her  such  first-class  in- 
formation on  German  politics.1 

This  important  document  which,  as  is  at  once 
evident  from  its  date,  has  nothing  whatever  to 
do  with  the  present  crisis,  is  contained  in  a  kind 


'We  may,  of  course,  look  for  another  explanation  of  such  an 
inadmissible  blunder:  What  if  the  whole  "document"  had  been 
compiled  ad  hoc  from  various  reports,  written  at  different  pe- 
riods? Let  us  suppose  the  man  entrusted  with  its  compilation 
had  overlooked  the  contradiction  between  the  facts  contained 
and  the  date  he  chose  to  put  on  his  performance.  Still,  if  this 
be  the  case,  what  is  the  worth  of  proofs  and  documents  pre- 
pared and  dated  in  such  a  way?  What  is  the  worth  of  the 
whole  publication? 


176  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

of  "Prelude,"  where,  what  one  might  call  "Ger-. 
man  Impressions"  are  to  be  found,  impressions 
which  are  calculated  to  produce  in  their  turn 
a  certain  desirable  impression  upon  the  mind  of 
the  reader,  and  to  imbue  him  with  the  idea  that 
the  German  Government  and  the  German  nation 
thirsted  for  war  long  before  the  Servian  Ques- 
tion arose  at  all. 

It  is  preceded  by  another  document,  dated  April 
2,  19 1 3,  and  printed  as  No.  2,  an  "official  and 
secret  report  on  the  reinforcement  of  the  Ger- 
man army"  which  M.  Etienne,  then  French  War 
Minister,  sent  to  the  Foreign  Minister,  M.  Jon- 
nart.  Not  a  word  is  said  on  the  not  unimportant 
question :  viz.  for  what  German  office  this  secret 
report  had  been  destined  or  from  what  German 
office  it  had  taken  its  origin.  It  is  given  as  of- 
ficial with  all  the  candour  of  innocence.1 

1  One  French  paper,  commenting  on  this  document,  stated  that 
it  had  been  found  somewhere  in  Germany  in  a  first-class  railway 
compartment  where  a  high  German  officer  had  forgotten  it,  other 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  177 

To  anybody  who  knows  the  dry,  matter-of-fact 
style  of  German  official  documents  it  is  clear  at 
first  sight  that  the  whole  article,  in  which  we  find 
phrases  of  the  "gnashed  teeth  of  French  Chauvi- 
nists," of  the  necessity  of  "extending  German 
Power  all  over  the  world"  and  the  like,  must  at 
best  have  been  stolen  from  the  editor's  office  of 
some  second-class  Pan-Germanist  Magazine, 
such  as  we  often  find  ridiculed  in  "Simplicissi- 
mus"  It  culminates  in  the  sentence  that  Ger- 
many must  reconquer  the  old  County  of  Bur- 
gundy because  some  five  hundred  years  ago  it 
had  been  a  fief  of  the  old  Empire,  a  political 
idea  which  is  of  the  same  order  and  about  as 
serious  as  if  a  fanatical  subject  of  the  Austrian 
Emperor  should  write  upon  the  necessity  of  re- 
conquering the  Kingdom  of  Jerusalem  because 

journals,  that  it  had  been  destined  for  no  less  a  person  than  the 
Emperor  himself,  though,  maybe,  it  was  only  the  rough 
draught  of  a  speech  the  German  Chancellor  had  intended  to 
make! 


(178  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

the   Austrian   Emperor    is    titular   king   of    it. 

The  only  question  is :  Was  the  acquisition  of 
this  wonderful  document  a  "sell"  on  the  man  who 
acquired  it,  or  is  the  publication  to  be  regarded 
as  a  "sell"  on  French  readers  who  are  willing, 
of  course,  to  believe  anything  possible  in  Ger- 
many? 

Unhappily  the  Ambassador  and  his  staff  are 
also  quite  incapable  of  discerning  between  facts 
and  hearsays,  or  of  judging  the  real  significance 
of  an  event  considered  as  a  symptom  of  the  state 
of  Germany  and  German  public  opinion.  The 
Frenchman,  as  ever,  knows  only  France  and 
French  ways. 

For  instance,  in  a  note  addressed  on  March  15, 
191 3,  by  the  naval  attache  of  the  Embassy,  M. 
de  Faramond,  to  the  Naval  Minister,  M.  Bau- 
din  (Yellow  Book  No.  1,  Annex  II),  a  conversa- 
tion between  a  member  of  the  French  Embassy 
and  the  Prince  of  Henckel-Donnersmarck  is  re- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  179 

ported  in  which  the  latter  said  among  other 
things :  "The  French  are  quite  wrong  in  believ- 
ing that  we  have  dark  designs  and  wish  for 
a  war.  But  we  cannot  forget  that  in  1870  pub- 
lic opinion  forced  the  French  Government  to  at- 
tack us  in  a  foolish  manner  without  being  pre- 
pared. Who  is  to  assure  us  that  French  public 
opinion  always  so  quick  to  flare  up  in  excitement, 
will  not  some  day  oblige  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  to  make  war  on  us?  All  we  want  is  to 
be  protected  against  this  danger." 

In  No.  3  (Note  by  M.  J.  Cambon  to  M.  Pichon 
of  May  6,  1913,  Yellow  Book  No.  3),  M.  Cam- 
bon has  heard  that  in  military  circles  the  Chief 
of  the  German  General  Staff,  General  von 
Moltke,  is  reported  to  have  said :  "We  must  do 
away  with  all  trivial  phrases  concerning  the  re- 
sponsibility which  will  lie  at  the  aggressor's  door 
...  on  the  day  on  which  there  will  be  nine 
chances  to  one  that  war  is  to  break  out,  we  have 


180  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

to  forestall  our  chief  adversary,  and  to  begin 
without  further  delay  to  tread  down  brutally 
all  resistance."  Being  a  German  officer,  accus- 
tomed to  silence  and  duty,  General  von  Moltke, 
even  if  he  had  entertained  such  a  thought,  would 
never  have  given  expression  to  it ;  least  of  all  in 
the  way  in  which  it  is  reproduced  in  this  note. 
But  if  we  go  on  perusing  the  French  publica- 
tion, we  find  that  the  reasonable  and  authentical 
words  of  Prince  Donnersmarck  are  nothing  to  the 
French  statesmen,  while  a  tale  which  they  ad- 
mit to  be  only  a  hearsay,  reported  for  all  we 
know,  by  the  fourth  or  fifth  person,  gives  the  bias 
to  their  whole  thought. 

Prince  Henckel-Donnersmarck  was  mistaken 
only  in  so  far  as  that,  this  time,  it  was  not  pub- 
lic opinion  which  forced  the  French  Government, 
but  the  French  Government  which  forced  the 
public  opinion  of  France,  and  is  still  trying  to 
force  it  by  such  publications. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  181 

No.  6  of  the  "Prelude"  contains  similar  utter- 
ances, ascribed  to  General  von  Moltke  and  to  the 
Emperor,  which  they  are  reported  to  have  made 
in  a  private  conversation  with  the  King  of  Bel- 
gium in  November,  1913.  M.  Cambon's  author- 
ity seems  to  be  the  King  of  Belgium  himself  or, 
what  is  more  probable,  some  person  to  whom  the 
King  confided  his  impression.  M.  Cambon  him- 
self says  only  that  he  has  his  information  from 
a  "source  absolutely  sure."  Now  the  German  au- 
thorities have  since  stated  in  the  "Norddeatsche 
Allgemeine  'Zeitung"  that  such  a  conversation 
never  took  place,  but  that  the  King  of  Belgium 
who  had,  of  course,  conferred  with  the  German 
Emperor,  had  had  another  and  strictly  private 
conversation  with  General  von  Moltke  at  which 
nobody  else  was  present.  We  can  but  conclude 
that,  passing  through  several  brains  and  as  many 
mouths,  everything,  the  persons  conversing  as 
well  as  their  utterances,  underwent  the  changes 


182  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

which  are  inevitable  in  such  cases,  until  finally 
they  reached  the  childish  tenor  which  best  suited 
M.  Cambon's  intentions. 

We  may  open  the  pamphlet  at  random ;  every- 
where we  find  sources  of  information  of  the  same 
nature : — gossips,  hearsays,  conjectures,  hypothe- 
ses, beliefs,  suspicions. 

In  No.  14  (Consular  note,  dated  from  Vienna 
July  20,  1914),  the  intentions  of  the  official  Aus- 
trian Agency  are  suspected.  In  No.  16  M.  Jules 
Cambon  "has  every  reason  to  believe  that  Ger- 
many will  not  intervene  at  the  court  of  Vienna." 
In  No.  29,  the  same  statesman  wires  that  the 
Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  "is  inclined  to  think" 
that  a  great  part  of  German  public  opinion  is 
desirous  of  war.  In  No.  30  he  believes  the  con- 
trary of  what  Herr  von  Jagow  tells  him.  In  No. 
55  M.  Dumaine  states  his  impression  of  what 
the  Austrian  Government  will  in  future  "be- 
lieve"   In  No.  57,  a  note  of  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  183 

"(published  in  the  British  Blue  Book  as  No.  95), 
in  which  he  says  that  he  is  unable  to  verify  a 
certain  supposition,  is  quoted  as  a  proof  of  the 
same  supposition.  In  No.  102  M.  Dumaine  has 
"the  suspicion"  that  Germany  has  caused  Austria 
to  attack  Servia  in  order  to  be  able  herself  to 
make  war  on  Russia  and  France! 

Distrust  of  all  German  acts  and  disbelief  in 
all  German  assertions  appear  to  be  a  main  char- 
acteristic of  French  statesmanship.  Now  to  a 
certain  extent  this  might  seem  comprehensible, 
though  it  must  be  clear  at  once  how  difficult  the 
establishment  of  sincere  and  peaceful  relations 
between  the  two  nations  was  thereby  rendered. 
But  both  the  distrust  and  the  disbelief  go  to  a 
length  which  is  simply  illogical.  No  reason  or 
evidence,  however  conclusive,  holds  out  against 
French  prejudice. 

It  is  in  vain  that  Herr  von  Jagow  and  Herr 
von  Schoen  repeat  over  and  over  again  (Yellow 


fi84  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

Book  No.  30,  41,  57)  that  they  had  not  been 
informed  beforehand  of  the  contents  of  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum.  The  French  statesmen  will  not 
believe  it.  But  they  are  quite  ready  to  believe 
that  the  Italian  statesmen  had  not  been  informed 
of  it.  Yet  Germany  being  bound  to  assist  Aus- 
tria against  Russia  under  all  circumstances,  and 
Italy  being  bound  to  do  so  only  if  the  measure 
taken  had  been  preconcerted  with  her,  it  would 
have  been  much  more  important  to  Austrian 
statesmen  to  inform  the  Italian  Cabinet  of  their 
intentions  than  to  inform  their  German  Col- 
leagues. M.  Cambon  with  all  his  intelligence 
did  not  see  that  the  Austrian  Government,  in 
spite  of  its  close  and  faithful  alliance  with  Ger- 
many, had  always  jealously  guarded  its  indepen- 
dence of  German  dictates  in  what  it  considered 
its  own  affairs. 

I  can  but  repeat  what  has  been  said  on  the 
question  in  the  second  part  of  this  study.    Aus- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  185 

trian  politicians  had  no  need  to  be  goaded  on  in 
this  matter.  They,  not  the  German  Government,! 
had  felt  for  years  the  burning  and  irritating 
wound  caused  by  Servian  propaganda;  their 
heir  apparent  had  been  murdered,  not  the  Ger- 
man prince.  It  is  quite  possible  and  even  prob- 
able that  Austrian  statesmen  feared  that  the 
German  Government  as  well  as  the  Italian, 
both  being  very  interested  in  the  result,  might 
try  to  exert  a  moderating  influence  on  them,  of 
which  they  would  have  been  impatient.  That 
this  would  in  fact  have  been  the  case  is  ren- 
dered particularly  probable  by  a  conversation 
between  Sir  Horace  Rumbold  and  Herr  von 
Jagow  which  took  place  on  July  25,  and  is  re- 
ported in  a  note  of  the  same  day,  published  in 
the  British  Blue  Book  No.  18. 

If  it  were  worth  while  to  examine  the  whole 
performance  in  detail,  one  could  easily  make  a 
long  article  by  merely  pointing  out  inaccurate 


1 86  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

statements  and  false  suppositions.    But  we  need 
only  dwell  on  a  few  important  passages. 

I.  The  question  discussed  by  us  in  our  digres- 
sion on  the  British  Blue  Book  on  p.  110-9  is 
treated  in  the  following  way  in  the  French  Yel- 
low Book. 

On  July  29,  M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassa- 
dor in  St.  Petersburg,  states  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  refused  the  Russian 
Government's  invitation  for  direct  negotiations 
between  the  two  Cabinets  (Yell.  B.  No.  91)  ;  M. 
Dumaine  wires  from  Vienna  that  Count  Berch- 
told  flatly  refused  the  demand  of  M.  Schebeko 
for  particular  powers  to  be  given  to  Count 
Szapary  for  that  end  (Yell.  B.  No.  94),  and  M. 
Paul  Cambon  in  London  has  heard  that  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  informed  Prince  Lichnowsky  of  Aus- 
tria's refusal.  (Yell.  B.  No.  96.)  M.  Sazonof 
himself  telegraphs  to  his  Ambassador  in  Paris 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  187 

tHat  the  fact  of  Austria's  having  declared  war 
on  Servia  makes  a  continuation  of  his  confer- 
ences with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 
impossible  (Yell.  B.  No.  95). 

In  the  meanwhile  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French 
Ambassador  in  Berlin,  has  telegraphed  from  Ber- 
lin that  the  German  Chancellor  is  intervening 
in  favor  of  a  continuation  of  these  conferences 
(Yell.  Book  No.  92),  and  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
acting  French  Foreign  Minister,  has  received  the 
same  information  from  Herr  von  Schoen,  the 
German  Ambassador  in  Paris.  (Yell.  B.  No. 
94.)  Consequent  upon  this  M.  Dumaine  is  in  a 
position  to  telegraph  from  Vienna  on  the  next 
day — July  30 — that  the  conferences  between  Aus- 
tria and  Russia  are  to  continue,  the  interrup- 
tion being  due  to  a  misunderstanding,  Count 
Berchtold  having  believed  that  the  Austrian  ul- 
timatum itself,  that  is  to  say  Austria's  demands, 
should  be  discussed,  to  which  he  could  by  no 


1 88  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

means  consent.  (Yell.  B.  No.  104.)  On  the 
following  day — July  31 — M.  Viviani,  the  French 
Premier  and  Foreign  Minister,  informs  his  Am- 
bassadors of  M.  Sazonof's  "formula"  which  the 
French  Government  is  ready  to  accept,  and  M. 
Paleologue  informs  him  in  turn  of  the  altera- 
tion of  the  formula  (Yell.  Book  No.   112  and 

113). 

So  far  everything  is  correct ;  but  now  the  same 
mode  of  juggling  sets  in  which  we  have  observed 
in  the  Introduction  to  the  British  Blue  Book 
and  in  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen's  letter.  In  a 
note  of  Aug.  1,  the  day  after  the  German  ulti- 
matum,— this  is  very  important  to  note — M.  Vi- 
viani says  that  on  the  evening  before  the  Aus- 
trian Ambassador  in  Paris,  Count  Szecsen,  had 
informed  him  of  the  intention  of  his  Government 
not  to  aspire  to  any  territorial  aggrandisement  in 
Servia,  on  condition  that  the  conflict  should  be 
localised  to  Austria  and  Servia  only;  and  that 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  189 

the  Russian  Government  had  been  notified  of 
the  same.  Yet  in  the  same  note  M.  Viviani  pre- 
tends that  in  St  Petersburg  M.  Sazonof  had 
been  informed  by  Count  Szapary  of  Austrian 
readiness  to  discuss  the  ultimatum  itself.  You 
see,  the  Russian  Minister  went  in  his  interpre- 
tation of  Austria's  offers  just  the  one  step  fur- 
ther which  is  all  important  and  which  Austria 
was  not  willing  to  go.  Had  negotiations  con- 
tinued, he  would  probably  have  said,  as  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  said  on  another  memorable  occasion, 
that  he  had  "misunderstood"  Count  Szapary  or 
that  he  had  been  misunderstood  himself;  his  pre- 
tension was  simply  a  "ballon  d'essay."  But  as 
further  negotiations  were  cut  short  by  the  war, 
M.  Viviani  and  Sir  Maurice  took  up  the  "ball/' 
because  it  enabled  them  to  lay  the  blame  on  Ger- 
many. The  way,  however,  in  which  this  was 
done  by  the  French  Minister  is  so  very  strange 
that  it  has  to  be  stated  in  detail  here.     For  in 


i9o  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

the  introductory  lines  of  that  same  note  (Yell. 
B.  No.  120)  M.  Viviani  says  that  the  Austrian 
Ambassadors  had,  on  the  previous  day,  made 
two  conciliatory  steps,  one  rather  vague  in  Paris, 
and  one  very  precise  at  St.  Petersburg.  Now, 
whoever  reads  M.  Viviani's  own  note  must  see 
that  just  the  opposite  had  been  the  case,  that 
Count  Szecsen  had  made  in  Paris  a  very  pre- 
cise statement ;  having  said  according  to  Viviani's 
own  words,  that  "the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment had  no  territorial  ambition  and  would  not 
touch  the  independence  of  the  Servian  State; 
that  it  had  no  intention  to  occupy  the  Sandjak; 
but  that  these  same  declarations  of  disinterested- 
ness should  be  valid  only  in  case  of  a  localisa- 
tion of  the  conflict,  as  a  European  war  might 
bring  eventualities  which  nobody  was  in  a  situ- 
ation to  foresee."  M.  Viviani  adds  that  Count 
Szecsen  commented  upon  this  declaration  and 
gave  him  to  understand  that  "though  his  Gov- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  191 

ernment  could  not  answer  any  questions  put  to 
it  by  the  Powers  in  their  own  name,  it  could 
undoubtedly  answer  questions  put  by  Servia  her- 
self or  by  another  Power  in  Servia's  name,  and 
that  there  might  be  some  hope  in  this/'  On  the 
contrary,  Count  Szapary  is  said  to  have  declared 
to  M.  Sazonof  "his  Government's  readiness  to 
discuss  the  contents  of  the  ultimatum" ;  nothing 
more! 

How  curious  that  M.  Viviani  should  call  this 
declaration  which  could  not  be  more  vague,  a 
precise  one,  and  Count  Szecsen's  declaration 
which  could  not  be  preciser  a  vague  one  ? 

In  fact,  Count  Szecsen  and  Count  Szapary  had 
both  received  exactly  the  same  information  from 
their  Government,  and  had  both  stated  exactly 
the  same  thing,  one  to  M.  Viviani  and  the  other 
to  M,  Sazonof;  yet  as  M.  Sazonof  had  seen  fit 
to  misunderstand  Count  Szapary,  and  to  believe 
that  Austria  was  willing  to  defer  to  a  conference 


192  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

of  the  Powers,  M.  Viviani  saw  fit  to  believe  M. 
Sazonof  and  to  disbelieve  the  explicit  and  of- 
ficial communication  which  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador had  made  to  him  in  his  Government's 
name,  and  in  which  a  deference  to  the  Powers 
was  expressly  excluded! 

All  this  is  curious,  but  what  is  more  curious 
is  that,  in  his  next  note,  1VL  Viviani  also  goes 
one  step  further  and  says  that  he  informed  the 
German  Ambassador  of  his  having  received  com- 
munications from  the  Austrian  Government  de- 
claring that  it  had  no  desire  for  aggrandisement 
in  Servia,  nor  would  it  invade  the  Sandjak;  and 
that  it  was  ready  to  discuss  the  whole  question 
in  London  with  the  other  Powers. 

Now  here  we  have  a  direct  falsehood;  for 
never  had  M.  Viviani  received  such  a  communi- 
cation from  the  Austrian  Government.  Count 
Szecsen  having  declared  only  the  first  part  of  it, 
M.  Viviani  had  heard  from  the  Russian  Govern- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  193 

ment — but  not  from  Austria — that  Austria  had 
declared  herself  ready  to  discuss  the  Servian  ul- 
timatum. Now,  this  makes  all  the  difference  in 
the  world !  And  not  even  Sazonof  had  dared  to 
pretend  that  Austria  was  really  willing  to  dis- 
cuss in  London  with  the  Powers;  he  had  only 
said  that  such  was  his  own  wish ! 

Owing  to  the  publication  of  the  Austrian  Red 
Book  which  has  appeared  just  as  this  little  study 
is  going  to  print,  we  are  in  a  position  to  give 
the  exact  tenor  of  the  information  which  Count 
Szapary  had  received  from  his  government: 

In  his  telegram  of  July  30,  1914  (Red  Book 
No.  49),  Count  Berchtold  forwarded  the  follow- 
ing instruction:  "Answer  to  Your  Excellency's 
telegram  of  July  29:  As  before,  I  do,  of  course, 
not  object  to  Your  Excellency's  explaining  to  M. 
Sazonof  the  various  points  of  our  note  to  Servia, 
though  later  events  (viz.  the  Austrian  declaration 
of  war  on  Servia)  have  deprived  it  of  actuality. 


194  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

I  should  also  particularly  appreciate  it  if  on  this 
occasion — as  M.  Schebeko  intimated — the  ques- 
tions directly  concerning  our  relations  to  Russia 
would  be  discussed  in  a  friendly  and  confidential 
manner.  As  a  result  of  such  a  discussion,  one 
may  hope  that  incertainties  and  doubts  which 
much  to  our  regret  exist,  may  be  cleared,  and 
the  desirable  peaceful  development  of  further 
relations  between  the  two  neighbouring  Empires 
be  assured." 

In  order  to  exclude  all  incertainty  as  to  the 
meaning  of  this  telegram,  Count  Berchtold  wired 
a  second  time  on  the  same  day  (Red  Book  No. 

50): 

"As  I  telegraphed  to-day,  Your  Excellency  is 
free  to  give  to  M.  Sazonof  all  explanations  de- 
sired concerning  our  note,  though  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  has  deprived  it  of  actuality.  Such 
explanations  can,  of  course,  be  nothing  more 
than  a  comment  post  factum,  as  it  has  never  been 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  195 

our  intention  to  yield  on  any  point  of  our  note. 
I  have,  moreover,  empowered  Your  Excellency  to 
discuss  our  special  relations  to  Russia  with  M. 
Sazonof  in  a  friendly  way." 

To  this  Count  Szapary  gave  answer  in  a  tele- 
gram of  Aug.  1,  1914  (Red  Book  No.  56)  :  "  .  .  . 
I  told  M.  Sazonof  that  it  was  an  error  that  we 
had  declined  further  negotiations  with  Russia. 
I  informed  him  that  Your  Excellency  was  not 
only  ready  to  treat  with  Russia  on  the  broadest 
basis  but  particularly  to  discuss  the  text  of  our 
note,  in  so  far  as  an  interpretation  of  the  text 
should  be  desired.  .  .  .  On  M.  Sazonofs  calling 
my  attention  to  the  fact  that  a  discussion  in  St. 
Petersburg  seemed  for  obvious  reasons  to  give 
less  hope  of  success  than  one  in  neutral  London, 
I  gave  answer  that  Your  Excellency  intended,  as 
I  had  told  him  before,  direct  communication 
with  St.  Petersburg,  that  I  was  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  make  any  utterance  on  his  proposal  of 


196  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

a  discussion  in  London,  but  would  report  on  it 
to  Your  Excellency/ ' 

The  case  is  quite  clear,  and  the  mildest  in- 
terpretation of  the  whole  proceeding  would  be 
the  following:  All  the  Powers  wished  for  di- 
rect conferences  between  Russia  and  Austria, 
which  Austria  refused  because  Russia  desired 
them  to  go  farther  than  Austria  thought  she 
could  permit ;  upon  Germany's  intervention  Aus- 
tria consented,  on  the  express  condition  that  her 
demands  as  stated  in  the  ultimatum  should  not 
be  touched  on.  M.  Sazonof,  however,  at  once 
made  the  attempt  to  disregard  the  Austrian  con- 
dition by  trying  to  impose  his  formula  on  her; 
and  he  probably  did  this,  because  in  Germany's 
intervention  and  in  Count  Pourtales'  earnest  ap- 
peal on  behalf  of  peace  (see  Brit.  Blue  Book  No. 
97),  he  believed  he  saw  a  sign  of  weakness  on 
Germany's  side.  When  he  found  out  that  he 
had  deceived  himself  and  failed  to  triumph  in 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  197 

this  way,  he  simply  bade  his  representatives 
state  the  untruth  that  Austria  had  been  quite 
willing  to  do  on  the  31st,  what  she  had  flatly 
refused  until  then.  And  the  British  as  well  as 
the  French  statesmen  seconded  him  in  this,  not 
only  because  they  desired  Russia's  triumph,  but 
because  they  desired  still  more  to  deceive  the 
world  concerning  the  fact,  that  Germany  had 
seriously  intervened  in  Vienna  in  the  interests 
of  peace;  and  because  in  what  they  well  knew 
to  be  a  Russian  stratagem  and  an  absolute  un- 
truth, they  saw  a  further  possibility  to  lay  the 
blame  on  Germany. 

We  would  fain  believe  that  in  the  hurry  and 
excitement  of  the  hour  such  a  misunderstanding 
had  been  possible,  were  not  the  methods  adopted 
in  these  misunderstandings  so  curiously  and  so 
exactly  alike  in  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen's  letter 
of  Sept.  1,  and  in  M.  Viviani's  note  of  August 


198  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

i,  which  note — observe! — was  not  published  un- 
til December,  19 14. 

There  is,  however,  a  piece  of  still  more  curi- 
ous information  to  be  found  in  the  Yellow  Book: 

On  page  127  we  find  printed  as  No.  115  a  note 
from  M.  Dumaine  to  M.  Viviani,  dated  Vienna, 
July  31,  1914,  in  which  the  Ambassador  informs 
the  Minister  that  "general  mobilisation  had  been 
decreed  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  on 
the  same  day  at  one  o'clock  after  midnight."  On 
page  129,  follows  as  No.  118  a  note  by  M.  Paleo- 
logue  from  St.  Petersburg,  dated  the  same  day, 
in  which  it  is  said,  that  "because  of  the  general 
mobilisation  in  Austria  and  the  secret  measures 
taken  in  Germany,  the  order  for  general  mobili- 
sation of  the  Russian  army  had  been  issued/' 

Now  these  two  notes  and  their  arrangement 
constitute  a  falsification  of  facts.  Austrian 
statesmen  for  a  long  time  and  as  late  as  July 
29  gave  expression  to  the  hope  that  Russia  would 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  199 

not  interfere  (see  British  Blue  Book  No.  32  and 
71).  It  is  known  to  all  the  world  that  Austria 
mobilised  against  Servia  only,  until,  by  Russia's 
having  mobilised  against  her  during  several  days, 
she  was  finally  forced  to  mobilise  herself  in  Ga- 
licia  on  July  31  (see  Red  Book  No.  53).  This 
fact  is  confirmed  by  the  English  Ambassador  in 
St.  Petersburg,  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  in  his  note 
of  July  25  (Blue  Book  No.  6),  in  which  he  re- 
ports on  M.  Sazonof  s  declaration  that  "if  Aus- 
tria proceeded  to  embark  on  military  measures 
against  Servia,  Russian  mobilisation  would  have 
to  be  carried  out/'  It  is  confirmed  by  the  Czar 
himself,  who  in  his  telegram,  to  the  German  Em- 
peror of  July  30,  which  is  reprinted  in  the  Yellow 
Book  on  page  211,  states  that  Russian  military 
measures  had  been  decreed  five  days  ago,  that  is 
to  say  on  July  25,  as  a  measure  of  defence  against 
Austria's  preparations  (against  Servia,  of 
course).    Not  a  word  is  said  of  a  general  mobili- 


200  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

sation  having  taken  place  in  Austria  in  the  tele- 
gram in  which  Sir  G.  Buchanan  informed  his 
Government  of  the  Russian  order.  The  British 
Ambassador  says :  "This  decision  has  been  taken 
in  consequence  of  report  received  from  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  the  effect  that  Austria 
is  determined  not  to  yield  to  intervention  of  Pow- 
ers, and  that  she  is  moving  troops  against  Rus- 
sia as  well  as  against  Servia."  It  is,  therefore, 
clear  that  the  text  of  the  M.  Paleologue's  note 
has  been  changed  and  arranged  for  publication. 
By  a  rather  poor  trick  the  telegram  announcing 
the  Austrian  general  mobilisation  has  been 
printed  before  the  telegram  announcing  the  Rus- 
sian one,  though  the  two  orders  having  been  is- 
sued in  the  inverse  order,  the  telegrams,  neces- 
sarily, had  likewise  been  sent  in  the  inverse  or- 
der. It  is  further  a  conscious  falsehood  when 
in  his  note  of  August  I,  M.  Viviani  says  or  pre- 
tends to  have  said  that  -Austria  first  proceeded 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  201 

to  a  general  mobilisation/ '  (Yellow  Book  No. 
127.)  All  this  is  obviously  done  with  the  inten- 
tion of  freeing  Russia  from  blame,  and  laying 
on  Austria  the  responsibility  of  having  broken 
the  world's  peace. 

Now  M.  Viviani  shows  himself  too  solicitous  a 
friend.  In  order  to  please  England,  he  states 
that  Austria  on  July  31  was  ready  to  submit  to 
Russia  and  to  allow  her  demands  to  be  discussed 
by  a  conference  of  the  Powers,  and  that  only 
the  thunderbolt  of  the  German  ultimatum,  de- 
spatched to  Russia  on  the  same  day  at  noon, 
destroyed  the  hopes  founded  on  Austria's  peace- 
ful dispositions.  And  in  order  to  please  Russia, 
he  states  in  the  same  breath  that  while  Russia 
showed  an  incontestable  goodwill  ("montrait  une 
bonne  volonte  incontestable"),  Austria,  peaceful 
Austria,  proceeded  in  the  first  hour  of  the  very 
same  day  on  which  she  is  said  to  have  yielded, 
first  of  all  Powers,  to  a  general  mobilisation, 


202  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 

and  this  not  after  the  German  ultimatum  but 
eleven  hours  before !  For  M.  Dumaine,  French 
Ambassador  in  Vienna,  states  expressly  in  his 
telegram  that  the  Austrian  order  for  general 
mobilisation  had  been  decreed  at  one  o'clock  in 
the  morning  of  July  31.  It  is  an  old  saying  that 
he  who  proves  too  much  does  prove  nothing  at  all. 

For,  if  M.  Dumaine  in  his  telegram,  Sir  Mau- 
rice de  Bunsen  in  his  letter,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
in  his  introduction,  M.  Viviani  in  his  Yellow 
Book,  and  M.  Sazonof  in  his  notes  have  said 
the  truth,  Austria  on  the  evening  of  the  same 
day  on  which  she  had  issued  the  order  for  gen- 
eral mobilisation  against  Russia  declared  her- 
self ready  to  do  all  that  Russia  desired! 

The  lesson  conveyed  by  these  astonishing  facts 
seems  to  be:  If  you  see  fit  to  make  false  state- 
ments, do  not  make  two  which  are  flatly  contra- 
dictory to  each  other.  For  either  Austria  was 
the  first  to  issue  the  order  for  general  mobilisa- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  203 

tion  on  the  morning  of  July  31,  and  then  cer- 
tainly her  intentions  on  that  day  were  far  from 
peaceful,  and  Germany  could  not  interrupt  any 
negotiations  between  her  and  Russia;  or  Aus- 
tria was  peaceful,  and  then  she  cannot  have  been 
the  first  of  all  Powers  to  decree  general  mobili- 
sation on  July  31. 

II.  The  French  note  which  has  been  altered 
several  times  in  the  British  Blue  Book  (see  pp. 
12 1-2  of  this  study)  seems  to  have  never  been  the 
genuine  French  note  at  all.  We  do  not  venture 
to  decide  whether  the  first  alterations  were  made 
by  the' French  Embassy  in  London  on  its  own 
account  or  on  the  demand  of  the  British  Foreign 
Office.    We  do  but  state  the  fact. 

The  publication  of  the  French  Yellow  Book 
affords  evidence  that  the  whole  text  of  the  French 
Foreign  Minister's  note  has  been  changed.  The 
original  which  is  reprinted  in  the  Yellow  Book 


204 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 


as  No.  106  on  p.  120,  is  dated  from  July  30,  and 
even  these  sentences  which  are  contained  in  both 
versions  are  rendered  in  a  different  sequence. 
For  the  reader's  convenience,  both  texts  are  re- 
printed Here  and  put  beside  each  other.  The 
parts  contained  in  both  notes  are  printed  in 
italics,  the  passage  quoted  on  p.  122,  which  is 
added  in  the  Blue  Book  while  it  is  not  to  be 
found  in  the  original  note,  is  designated  by  quo- 
tation-marks. 


Yellow  Book  No.  106. 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du 
Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
etrangeres,  a  M.  Paul  Cambon, 
Ambassadeur  de  France  a 
Londres. 

Paris,  le  30  juillet  1914. 

Je  yous  prie  de  porter  a  la 
connaissance  de  Sir  Edward 
Grey  les  renseignements  sui- 
vants  touchant  les  preparatifs 
militaires  francais  et  alle- 
mands.  L'Angleterre  y  verra 
que  si  la  France  est  resolue,  ce 
n'est  pas  elle  qui  prend  des 
mesures  d'agression. 

_Vous  attirerez  l'attention  de 
Sir  Edward  Grey  sur  la  de- 
cision prise  par  le  Conseil  des 


Blue  Book  No.  105,  Enclosure 
III. 

French   Minister   for   Foreign 

Affairs  to  M.  Cambon,  French 

Ambassador  in  London. 

Paris,  le  31  Juillet  1914. 
12ARMEE  allemande  a  ses 
avant-postes  sur  nos  homes- 
frontier  es,  Vendredi  hier;  par 
deux  fois  des  patrouilles  alle- 
mandes  ont  penetre  sur  notre 
territoire.  Nos  avant-postes 
sont  en  retraite  a  wkilom.  en 
arricre  de  la  fronticre.  Les 
populations  ainsi  abandonnees 
a  l'attaque  de  Tarmee  adverse 
protestent;  mais  le  Gouverne- 
ment  tient  a.  montrer  a  l'opin- 
ion  publique  et  au  Gouverne- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 


205 


Yellow  Book  No.  106 — Cont. 
Ministres  de  ce  mating  bien 
que  l'Allemagne  ait  pris  ses 
dispositif  s  de  _  couverture  a 
quelques  centaines  de  metres 
de  la  frontiere,  sur  tout  le 
front  du  Luxembourg  aux 
Vosges,  et  porte  ses  troupes  de 
couverture  sur  leurs  positions 
de  combat,  nous  avons  retenu 
nos  troupes  a  10  kilometres  de 
la  frontiere,  en  leur  interdisant 
de  s'en  rapprocher  d'avantage. 

Notre  plan,  concu  dans  un 
esprit  d'offensive,  prevoyait 
pourtant  que  les  positions  de 
combat  de  nos  troupes  de  cou- 
verture seraient  aussi  rappro- 
chees  que  possible  de  la  fron- 
tiere. En  livrant  ainsi  une 
bande  du  territoire  sans  de- 
fense a  l'agression  soudaine  de 
l'ennemi,  le  Gouvernement  de 
la  Republique  tient  a  montrer 
que  la  France,  pas  plus  que  la 
Russie,  n'a  la  responsabilite  de 
l'attaque. 

Pour  s'en  assurer,  il  suffit  de 
comparer  les  mesures  prises 
des  deux  cotes  de  notre  fron- 
tiere: en  France,  les  permis- 
sionnaires  n'ont  ete  rappeles 
qu'apres  que  nous  avons  acquis 
la  certitude  que  l'Allemagne 
l'avait  fait  depuis   cinq  jours. 

En  Allemagne,  non  seule- 
ment  les  troupes  en  garnison 
a  Metz  ont  ete  poussees 
jusqu'a  la  frontiere,  mais  en- 
core elles  ont  ete  renforcees 
par  dest  elements  transported 
en  chemin  de  fer  des  garnisons 
de  1'interieur,  telles  que  celles 
de    Treves    ou    de    Cologne. 


Blue  Book  No.  105,  Enclosure 
III.     Continued 

ment  britannique  que  l'agres- 
seur  ne  sera  en  aucun  cas  la 
France.  Tout  le  16*  Corps  de 
Metz  renforce  par  une  partie 
du  8*  venu  de  Treves  et  de  Co- 
logne occupe  la  frontiere  de 
Metz  au  Luxembourg.  Le  15* 
Corps  d'Armee  de  Strasbourg 
a  serre  sur  la  frontiere.  Sous 
menace  d'etre  fusilles  les  Al- 
saciens-Lorrains  des  pays  an- 
nexes ne  peuvent  pas  passer  la 
frontiere;  des  reservistes  par 
dizaines  de  milliers  sont  rap- 
peles en  Allemagne ;  c'est  le 
dernier  stade  avant  la  mobili- 
sation; or  nous  n' avons  rap- 
pele  aucun  reserviste. 

Comme  vous  le  voyez,  l'Alle- 
magne l'a  fait.  "J'ajoute  que 
"toutes  nos  informations  con- 
"cordent  pour  montrer  que  les 
"preparatifs  allemands  ont 
"commence  samedi,  le  jour 
"meme  de  la  remise  de  la  note 
"autrichienne." 

Ces  elements,  ajoutes  a  ceux 
contenus  dans  mon  telegramme 
d'hier  vous  permettent  de  faire 
la  preuve  au  Gouvernement 
britannique  de  la  volonte  paci- 
fique  de  l'un,  et  des  intentions 
agressives  de  l'autre. 


206  ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR 


Yellow  Book  No.  106 — Cont. 
Rien    d'analogue   n'a   ete    fait 
en  France. 

L'armement  des  places  de 
la  frontiere  (deboisements, 
mise  en  place  de  rarmement, 
construction  de  batteries,  ren- 
forcement  de  reseaux  de  fil 
de  fer)  a  ete  commence  en 
Allemagne  des  le  samedi  25; 
chez  nous,  il  va  l'etre,  la 
France  ne  pouvant  plus  se^  dis- 
penser de  prendre  les  memes 
mesures. 

Les  gares  ont  ete  occupees 
militairement  en  Allemagne  le 
samedi  25,  en  France  le  mardi 
28. 

Enfin,  en  Allemagne,  les  re- 
servistes,  par  dizaine  de  mil- 
liers,  ont  ete  rappelcs  par  con- 
vocations individuelles,  ceux 
residant  a  l'etranger  (classes 
de  1903  a  191 1 )  rappeles,  les 
officiers  de  reserve  convoques; 
a  l'interieur,  les  routes  sqnt 
barrees,  les  automobiles  ne  cir- 
culent  qu'avec  un  permis.  C'est 
le  dernier  stade  avant  la  mo- 
bilisation. Aucune  de  ces  me- 
sures n'a  ete  prise  en  France. 

L'armee  allemande  a  ses 
avant-postes  sur  nos  bornes- 
fronticres;  par  deux  fois,  hier, 
des  patrouilles  allemandes  ont 
pcnctre  sur  notre  territoire. 
Tout  le  XV P  Corps  de  Mete, 
r  enforce  par  une  par  tie  du 
VHP  venu  de  Treves  et  de 
Cologne,  occupe  la  frontiere 
de  Mete  au  Luxembourg;  le 
XVe  Corps  d'armee  de  Stras- 
bourg a  serrc  sur  la  frontiere. 

Sous  menace  d'etre  fusilles, 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR  207 

yellow  Book  No.  106 — Cont. 
les  Alsaciens-Lorrains  des  pays 
annexes  out  defense  de  passer 
la  frontier e. 

Rene  Viviani. 

We  offer  no  comments  except  the  repeated 
question:  What  confidence  can  serious  readers 
grant  to  official  publications  where  the  published 
documents  appear  to  be  arranged  and  altered  at 
convenience  ? 

As  to  the  parts  of  the  French  publication  which 
seem  serious  and  genuine,  they  offer  nothing  new 
but  contain  only  facts  which  are  already  known. 


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